University of Alberta

Split Subjects and Other(ed) Victorian Bodies

by

Rick Lee

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Department of English

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Split Subjects and Other(ed) Victorian Bodies" by Rick Lee in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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For my brother, Rudy

Abstract

"Split Subjects and Other(ed) Victorian Bodies" *qu(e)eries* the interrelationship between literature, science, and culture in three texts: Mary Shelley's Frankenstein; or the Modern Prometheus; Robert Louis Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde; and Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray. My project first seeks to examine the cultural repurcussions of several interrelated scientific and medical debates (from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries); and, secondly, to discuss how "science" (in the broadest sense of the term) informs and permeates other cultural discourses such as gender ideology, moral reform, jurisprudence, and political economy. In Chapter One, I argue that Mary Shelley's Frankenstein introduces the (im)possibility of male reproductive bodies that problematizes Erasmus Darwin's theories of evolution and reproduction. In Chapter Two, my discussion of split subjectivites in Robert Louis Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde foregrounds the cross-disciplinary translation of psychological and psychiatric discourses into jurisprudential legislation; and, also, the permeability of the boundaries structuring the Victorian spatial ideology of public and private spheres. In Chapter Three, I argue that Oscar Wilde's Dorian Gray demonstrates a symptomatic articulation of sexological and psychoanalytic theories of dissisent sexuality. Juxtaposing literary with scientific discourses, all three chapters share a common focus: the tracing out of the networks of male homoerotic, homosocial, and homosexual desires (in)evident in the fictional works themselves.

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I hope this thesis is worthy proof to my brother, Rudy — to whom it is dedicated — that his consistent support is truly justified.

Split Subjects and Other(ed) Victorian Bodies

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Science and Culture, Literature and Science

In Science and Culture (1880), Thomas Henry Huxley defends the role of science in late-nineteenth-century higher-educational institutions. He foregrounds, in a clear and concise style, the necessary function of science and, specifically, the value of scientific knowledge in the formation and cultivation of culture. To support his argument, Huxley underscores the sociocultural and pedagogical assumptions inherent within the liberal educational processes that undervalue the physical and natural sciences, and that instead privilege humanistic and literary studies (namely the Classics, Latin and Greek). As Huxley asserts: "for the purpose of attaining real culture, an exclusively scientific education is at least as effectual as an exclusively literary education" (1445). Huxley's defense essentially locates, and hence rightly re-positions, the centrality of scientific knowledge within "the Victorian frame of mind," to borrow from the title of Walter E. Houghton's influential study.

Huxley's views, not surprisingly, provoked a response from Matthew Arnold, one of the Victorian era's best examples of the embodiment of the Carlylean "hero as man of letters." Arnold's Literature and Science (1883, 1885) counters Huxley's attempt to equate scientific studies *with* literary studies. "Interesting, indeed, [the] results of science are, important they are, and we should all of us be acquainted with them" (1436), Arnold concedes in his response to

Huxley, thus acknowledging the practical consequences of scientific information within a larger cultural framework. At the same time, however, Arnold remains dissatisfied with the systematic dissemination of knowledge which largely informs scientific methodologies. "[T]he men of science . . . will give us other pieces of knowledge," Arnold observes,

> other facts, about other animals and their ancestors, or about plants, or about stones, or about stars. . . . But it will still be ***knowledge*** only which they give us; knowledge not to put us into relation for our sense of conduct, our sense for beauty, and touched with emotion by being so put; not thus put for us, and therefore, to the majority of mankind [*sic*], after a certain while, unsatisfying, wearying.
>
> (1436-437; emphasis original)

In not being a "born naturalist" himself (1437), Arnold generally finds scientific knowledge to be "unsatisfying" and "wearying," and he yearns for the translation of "facts" into "emotion[s]." In Arnold's view, such a translation can only be possible via literary studies, a discipline whose tools (words and language) are capable of transforming and *relating* factual information into palpable and emotive descriptions. Words and language, moreover, will not only contribute to the translation of scientific knowledge, but they will also assuredly enliven and preserve the scientific disciplines themselves. For, as Arnold concludes, "[l]etters will call out their [the physical and natural sciences] being at more points, will make them live more" (1440).

The exchange between Huxley and Arnold demonstrates the pinnacle of a vexed, but also productive, cross-disciplinary dialogue between literature and science that foregrounds a major cultural preoccupation of the Victorian period. As the titles of their respective projects clearly indicate, Huxley and Arnold remain fully cognizant of the interrelationships between literature, science, and culture. While I am less interested in further rehearsing Huxley's and Arnold's prolific arguments in my current project, I remain committed, nonetheless, to tracing out more fully the cultural repercussions of the relationship between science and literature during the Victorian period, specifically as they pertain to gender ideology and the construction of dissident male subjectivities. I begin with the assumption that science and literature share a primary goal, though each discipline obviously employs different methodologies and yields distinctive conclusions as a result. That is, insofar as we can identify both science and literature as intellectual pursuits, in the broadest sense, it then follows that they share an epistemological aim — namely, the gathering, evaluation, and deployment of "knowledge." The epistemic affinities between science and literature, therefore, contribute and relate to the formation and re-formation of culture. Indeed, as the title of George Levine's collection of essays so obviously insists, science and literature share the same cultural context — quintessentially, both are discursive phenomenons circulating within "one culture."

The relational correspondence between science and literature — *and*, for that matter, between literature and science — informs and structures my project,

"Split Subjects and Other(ed) Victorian Bodies." Before I outline the major propositions in my project, however, I would first like to consider briefly the technical *function* of the "and" — that is, the word's grammatical role as a connective mechanism in the realm of language. In her introduction to Languages of Nature, a collection of essays whose contributors' methodologies nicely blend literary criticism with the history of science, Ludmilla J. Jordonova observes that:

> 'Science *and* literature,' like 'science and society,' is a slippery phrase. 'And' is a loose term of linkage employed in lists; it denotes miscellany and is often used in speech to get from one thought to another without spelling out exactly what the connection is. 'And' leaves much to the imagination. In science and literature, as well as in science and society, the 'ands' indicate our belief in a link, but we leave its precise nature unspecified.
>
> (17; emphasis original)

Jordonova's deliberate reference to the "comfortable" function of the "and" in speech acts and in language, more generally, recalls to mind Shoshana Felman's opening essay in the collection, Literature and Psychoanalysis. In "To Open the Question," Felman wonders:

> What does the *and* really mean? What is the usual approach to the subject? In what way would we like to *displace* this function (to reinvent

> the "and"), — what would we like it to mean, how would we like it to *work* . . . ?
>
> (5; emphasis original)

Felman's series of thought-provoking questions presents a a strategy that aims at displacing, specifically, the subjection of literature by psychoanalytic discourses. In a not dissimilar attitude, therefore, both Jordonova and Felman foreground the necessary *interrogation* of the term "and" for the purposes of examining the interstitial "space" between literary and scientific discourses. Following their examples, I, too, will *qu(e)ery* the place and placement of literature and science in the context of Victorian culture.

"Split Subjects and Other(ed) Victorian Bodies" *qu(e)eries* the literary representations of various scientific and medical discourses in three texts: Mary Shelley's Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818, 1831), Robert Louis Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886), and Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890, 1891). Because my overarching methodology aims at reading each literary text *alongside* the scientific and medical doctrines of the time, let me first rehearse the various debates which inform my discussion. In Chapter One, I will consider a major premise in Erasmus Darwin's theory of evolution, namely, his differentiation between asexual, hermaphroditic, and sexual reproduction. Necessarily, I will first introduce some of the prevailing assumptions inherent in Baconian science and Renaissance alchemy, and their subsequent contributions to the development of the "new science" during the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In addition to considering the competing philosophies in the "new science" devoted to the human observation of nature, Chapter One will also consider the significant shift from a one-sex to a two-sex model in gender ideology during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In Chapter Two, I will first look at the fields of phrenology and physiology, two scientific enterprises of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. I will then discuss the extent to which phrenological and physiological discourses furnished some of the theories for the areas of psychology and psychiatry, two sciences which began to gain particular currency during the mid- to late-nineteenth centuries. Chapter Two examines a specific cultural repercussion of the debates in psychology and psychiatry: the concomitant medicalization and criminalization of homosexuality towards the later part of the nineteenth century. In Chapter Three, I will continue my discussions from the previous chapter by considering the contributions of psychology in the development of sexology and psychoanalysis towards the fin-de-siècle. I will consider the differentiation of sexualities and desires in sexological theories of inversion and in psychoanalytic theories of pleasure as forwarded, respectively, by Havelock Ellis and Sigmund Freud. In particular, the Freudian theories of pleasure in relation to sexualities often resonate, significantly, with those in political economy that mark the shift from a productivist to a consumerist culture during the later part of the nineteenth century.

My project does not aspire, by any means, to delineate a history of modern science *per se*. Though I may not fully embrace Arnold's privileging of the humanities, I do share his weakness: neither one of us, in any case, is a "born naturalist." As the above rehearsal indicates, my project instead seeks to examine the cultural repercussions of several interrelated scientific and medical debates. These debates remain particularly striking even today, not least because they inform, permeate, and reverberate in other cultural discourses — namely, gender ideology, moral reform, jurisprudence, and political economy. To the extent that I will consider the (in)direct representations of scientific and medical discourses in Frankenstein, Jekyll and Hyde, and Dorian Gray, I am also committed to tracing out *other* cultural anxieties which *exceed* these representations. In Chapter One, "Reproduction and Representation in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein," I will argue that Victor Frankenstein's animation of the creature introduces the (im)possibility of *male* reproductive bodies that problematizes Erasmus Darwin's three levels of reproduction. My argument in Chapter Two, "The Open Secret of Robert Louis Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde," elucidates the split subjectivities between Henry Jekyll and Edward Hyde by foregrounding the cross-disciplinary translation of psychological and psychiatric discourses into jurisprudential legislation; and, also, by discussing the permeability of the boundaries structuring the Victorian spatial ideology of public and private spheres. Finally, in Chapter Three, "The Consumption of Desires in Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray," I will argue that Dorian's pursuit of a secret

life, replete with pleasurable sensations, demonstrates a symptomatic articulation of sexological and psychoanalytic theories of dissident sexuality. Throughout the project, I consistently focus my attention on teasing out and unpacking the networks of *male* homoerotic, homosocial, and homosexual desires (in)evident in the fictional works themselves.

Presently, I would like to return to Felman's seductive suggestion above and incorporate it into my introductory discussion. To the extent that the reinvention of the "and" presents a viable interrogation of the liminality between discourses, this strategy can also prove fruitful in *qu(e)rying* the technical function of the coordinating conjunctions ("and," "or") and the possessive preposition ("of") in the titles of the literary texts I examine in the following chapters: Frankenstein; ***or***, The Modern Prometheus; Strange Case ***of*** Dr Jekyll ***and*** Mr Hyde; and The Picture ***of*** Dorian Gray. The title of my own project, "Split Subjects and Other(ed) Victorian Bodies," essentially begins the dialogue that will be rehearsed in the following pages. My project will implicitly demonstrate how these terms operate in anticipating the thematics of split subjectivities and other(ed) bodies present in the literary texts themselves. In problematizing the notion of ontological and discursive coherence in her/his texts, Shelley, Stevenson, and Wilde skillfully present the productive, not to mention always "promiscuous," relationship between literature, science, and culture.

Reproduction and Representation in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein

I. An Original Thought on Origin(s)

Erasmus Darwin's last poem, The Temple of Nature; or, The Origin of Societies (1803), presents a poetic treatise outlining his views on evolution and nature. Central to Darwin's speculations is the function of reproduction, which he discusses at great length in the second canto of the poem:

> The reproduction of the living Ens
> From sires to sons, unknown to sex, commence. . . .
> . . . . . .
> Birth after birth the line unchanging runs,
> And fathers live transmitted in their sons.
>
> (II. 63-64, 107-08)

Darwin observes that "before mankind [*sic*] introduced civil society, old age did not exist . . . as all living creatures, as soon as they became too feeble to defend themselves, were slain or eaten by others . . ." (Temple II. 3, note). According to Darwin's formulation, reproduction enables nature's living creatures to prolong the period of youth, so to speak, through the process of regeneration. Darwin, moreover, identifies three distinct evolutionary stages of reproduction: asexual (i.e., solitary paternal propagation), hermaphroditic, and sexual reproduction. The creatures which engage in asexual reproduction, such as the polypus and

tapeworm, are able to reproduce themselves, "[f]rom sires to sons, unknown to sex." Hermaphroditic creatures, such as snails and worms, occupy the second stage of evolutionary reproduction: these creatures possess both male and female sexual qualities and could essentially impregnate themselves or each other. Nature's *chef-d'œuvre* or masterpiece, however, lies in sexual reproduction. According to Darwin, creatures who are descendants of a combined male-female parentage are superior to those of asexual or hermaphroditic origins; and these creatures are, in turn, necessary for evolutionary improvement. As he writes in an earlier study, Phytologia: or, The Philosophy of Agriculture and Gardening (1800), in asexual reproduction "the same species are only propagated ad infinitum; whereas by the sexual mode of reproduction a countless variety of animals are introduced into the world, and much pleasure is afforded to those which already exist in it" (103).

The subject of reproduction crucially structures Mary Shelley's Frankenstein: or, The Modern Prometheus (1818, 1831). As I will argue in this chapter, the story of Victor Frankenstein's experiment with and animation of the creature in Shelley's text emblematizes and, at the same time, collapses Darwin's thesis of the multiple stages of evolutionary reproduction. At its most basic level, Mary Shelley's novel narrates one being's (scientific) pursuit to create another being: essentially, then, it is a revisionist retelling of the creation myth as narrated in Genesis. Yet, more importantly, Victor Frankenstein's *(re)production* of another being foregrounds the tenuous relationship between "creature" and

"creator" — a relationship which certainly occupied the literary imaginations of a generation of Romantic writers from William Blake to Percy Bysshe and Mary Shelley. As Paul A. Cantor observes in his study of myth-making and English romanticism:

> In general, the Romantic fascination with creation myths, can be viewed as an attempt to find radically fresh themes by learning to deal with cosmic beginnings. If one can present for the first time a true account of man's [*sic*] origins, one can legitimately claim to have found a new way of writing about what no man [*sic*] has ever written before. ***The Romantic quest for origins is profoundly connected with the Romantic quest for originality.***
>
> (xii; emphasis added)

If nothing else, Mary Shelley's Frankenstein is certainly original in its problematization of Erasmus Darwin's thesis of the multiple stages of evolutionary reproduction. In other words, Mary Shelley collapses Darwin's hierarchized schematization by conflating the three stages of evolutionary reproduction. Victor Frankenstein's "successful" experiment in (re)producing another being demonstrates that the asexual, hermaphroditic, and sexual stages which Darwin delineates are not wholly separable from each other. As Friedrich Nietzsche once articulated:

> In man *creature* and *creator* are united: in man there is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in man there is also creator, form-

> giver, hammer hardness, spectator divinity, and seventh day: do you understand this contrast?
>
> (qtd. in Cantor, n.p.)

Therefore, the text that is Frankenstein, the main protagonist that is Victor Frankenstein, *and* the creature who is now often confused *with* Frankenstein, all attempt to understand the contrast — and, I would add, the conjunction — between creature and creator in the process of reproduction. Frankenstein's own monster articulates the contrast, at least, if not also the conjunction, when he wonders: "And what was I? . . . I was not even of the same nature as man. . . . Was I then a monster. . .?" (106).

The remainder of this chapter consists of three sections. In "A Critical Progeny of One's Own," my discussion foregrounds a reproductive tendency within the critical tradition of Frankenstein that often mirrors the anxieties present in Shelley's novel. The next section, "The (Re)Productive Debates," first summarizes and then discusses several of the problematics informing the discourse of reproduction and representation in scientific and medical discourses of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The final section, "Representing/ Repressing the Reproductive Male Body," discusses at greater length Frankenstein's problematization of Darwin's three levels of reproduction. I will argue that the issue of male reproductive bodies in Frankenstein remains both a possibility *and* a threat to the distinctive processes of reproduction and regeneration which Darwin outlines. The transference of the multiple narratives

in Frankenstein, I will propose later, demonstrates far more complex mechanisms that surpass *the physical enactments* of oral/aural transmission — which, in themselves, are obvious and characteristic elements of storytelling. Rather, I will read these narrative transmissions as demonstrations of the psychical and seductive dynamics involved in the transference of male-male desires between the various speakers and listeners in Shelley's text (i.e., between Professor Waldman and Victor Frankenstein, between the monster and Victor, and between Victor and Robert Walton). The evident homoerotic desires in Frankenstein thus confirm and depart from Darwin's schema: that is, the text's alternative model certainly privileges the *male* reproductive body, though it simultaneously foregrounds the (im)possibility of such a reproductive process for regeneration.

II. A Critical Progeny of One's Own

In her seminal essay, "Female Gothic," Ellen Moers persuasively argues that Frankenstein "is a birth myth, and one that was lodged in the novelist's imagination . . . by the fact that [Mary Shelley] was herself a mother" (79). Moers reads Frankenstein as a text which records "a *woman's* mythmaking on the subject of birth" and, more specifically, it does so by offering a metaphorical commentary on "the trauma of the afterbirth" (81; emphasis original).[1] Equally important as its actual argument, the very appearance of Moers's essay has since proven to be the impetus initiating a tradition of feminist readings of Frankenstein; notable critics

within this tradition include Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, Kate Ellis, U. C. Knoepflmacher, and Mary Poovey.[2] It seems especially fitting and simultaneously uncanny, as I write this two decades later, that Moers's now classic discussion of Frankenstein as a birth myth has resulted in a critical progeny of its own.

The afterbirth of this critical tradition, however, also resonates with its own "trauma," to borrow from Moers's own formulation. As Bette London recently points out in her essay, "Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, and the Spectacle of Masculinity," "many [feminist] commentaries on the novel . . . continue to pursue Frankenstein's critical project, upholding the illusion of gender-neutrality, of the invisibleness of masculinity" (256). For example, according to London, Gilbert and Gubar's insistence in naming the creature and creator "Eve and Eve all along," and their reading of the novel's characters as "female in disguise" ("Horror's Twin" 246, 237), participates in "[e]rasing all markers of masculine presence . . . cover[ing] over Frankenstein's investments in male exhibitionism, thus supporting, however inadvertently, dominant ideological imperatives" (256). Instead, what London urges readers of Shelley's text to recognize is "the self-evident: Frankenstein's insistent specularization of masculinity, its story of the male creator making a spectacle of himself" (256).

London's essay focuses on the relationship between Mary Shelley's Frankenstein and other nineteenth-century cultural artifacts, and how these different texts participated in the construction and circulation of particular

meanings to represent what we now recognize as the romanticized Shelleyan legacy of Percy Bysshe and Mary Shelley.[3] Moreover, such views of the always unbalanced dyad between Percy Bysshe and Mary Shelley serve as our inheritance, however problematically we may choose either to claim or reject those views.[4] Examining Percy Bysshe's presence in the composition of Frankenstein (in particular, his editorial assistance) and Mary's authorial strategies (her numerous literary allusions and textual borrowings), London comments on the material conditions which informed the textual (re)production of Frankenstein:

> Writing in a hand not distinctly her own, Mary Shelley opens to question the copied status of the text she copies into her own. Bearing the word, . . . Frankenstein (creature, creator, text) bares the underpinnings of the male romantic economy, '[literalizing] the literalization of male literature.'[5] The joins in Frankenstein's textual anatomy thus demonstrate that composition, even in male hands, is always of the body. Accordingly, the spectacle of the text — of the text's irregular body — prompts with new urgency the question of gender at the novel's source: whose body does the text display? (258)

Although my focus will be solely on the novel and its usage of scientific and medical discourses — in particular, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century speculations in natural philosophy which informed nineteenth-century understandings of science and medicine — I, too, am interested in examining the

critical ramifications of London's *qu(e)ry* for my project: indeed, *whose body* does the text of Frankenstein display? My project thus intends to uncover what Shelley's text obliquely attempts, simultaneously, to represent and repress — namely, the spectacle of the male reproductive body.

III. The (Re)Productive Debates

Much critical work on Frankenstein has acknowledged the diverse reading materials informing Shelley's writing of the novel. The novel's critical tradition, however, has neglected to examine more fully Shelley's use of and familiarity with the scientific and medical debates of her time. In fact, ever since James Rieger pronounced in his 1974 introduction to the 1818 version of Shelley's novel that "Frankenstein's chemistry is switched-on magic, souped-up alchemy, the electrification of Agrippa and Paracelcus" (xxvii), many critics have similarly dismissed what seems to be Shelley's "naïve" use of pseudo-scientific discourses in her novel. But, as Samuel Holmes Vasbinder rightly notes, "despite the vagueness of the scientific data [in Frankenstein] there might prove to be a much deeper scientific base upholding the story itself, a base that would enable it to be built in scientific terms without the suffocation of heavy layers of science" (1). Vasbinder's study, Scientific Attitudes in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, provides a comprehensive analysis of the many possible connections between Shelley's novel and the debates informing the area of the "new science," "a technique for

investigating the physical nature of the universe [which] was based on the supposition that the structure of the universe was knowable by man [*sic*] through the careful application of human reason to the observation of natural phenomena" (65).

While Vasbinder's findings are, on the whole, suggestive, he neglects to consider Shelley's debt to the works of Erasmus Darwin, which she herself acknowledges in both her preface and introduction. In the 1817 preface to Frankenstein, we find the following reference: "The event on which this fiction is founded, has been supposed, by Dr. Darwin, and some of the physiological writers of Germany, as not of impossible occurrence" (24).[6] Fifteen years following the publication of Frankenstein, and at the request of "The Publishers of the Standard Novels . . . that [Shelley] should furnish them with some account of the origin of the story" (19), she recounts the events of the fateful summer of 1816, a period of months during which the Shelleys spent their time with Lord Byron in Switzerland. In her 1831 appended introduction, Shelley elaborates on "the event on which [Frankenstein] is founded" and, namely, hints at Victor Frankenstein's production and animation of the creature. In reference to one of Erasmus Darwin's experiments with electricity, Shelley observes that "[p]erhaps a corpse would be re-animated; galvanism had given token of such things: perhaps the component parts of a creature might be manufactured, brought together, and endued with warmth" (22).

What I want to foreground immediately, however, are the sentences which precede Shelley's rather off-hand reference to Darwin. Mary begins the paragraph by commenting on the "[m]any and long . . . conversations between Lord Byron and [Percy Bysshe] Shelley, *to which [she] was a devout but nearly silent listener*" (22; emphasis added). "During one of these [conversations]," Mary continues,

> various philosophical doctrines were discussed, and among others the nature of the principle of life, and whether there was any probability of its ever being discovered and communicated. They [Lord Byron and Percy Bysshe Shelley] talked of the experiments of Dr. Darwin *(I speak not of what the Doctor really did, or said that he did, but, as more to my purpose, of what was then spoken of as having been done by him,)* who preserved a piece of vermicelli in a glass case, till by some extraordinary means it began to move with voluntary motion. Not thus, after all, would life be given. Perhaps a corpse would be re-animated. . . .
>
> (22; emphasis added)

Mary's role as "a devout but nearly silent listener"[7] and her parenthetical insertion are crucial for understanding the interrelationship between speech and silence — not only in terms of appreciating the extratextual (i.e., the scientific and medical debates), but also the intertextual (i.e., the multiple, framing narrative structure) origin of the Frankenstein story. As Michel Foucault has shown us, the construction and circulation of discourses operate within an epistemological nexus

between speech and silence: "There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the [over-all] strategies that underlie and permeate discourses" (History 27). Moreover, as William Veeder points out in his study on Mary Shelley, "Frankenstein, and Mary's other pieces of public and private prose, must . . . be read with attention to silences and indirection, and to meaning as a thing of levels. Only through patient delicacy can we deal evenhandedly with Mary Shelley" (Mary 9).

Heeding both Foucault's strategy and Veeder's suggestion, I will now consider the multiple ways in which silence and speech inform the inside and outside structure of Frankenstein. Following the concentric structure of Frankenstein itself, let us begin with the extratextual origins informing Shelley's novel. In "Frankenstein: A Feminist Critique of Science," Anne K. Mellor argues that "[t]he works of three of the most famous scientists of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century — Humphry Davy, Erasmus Darwin, and Luigi Galvani — together with the teachings of two of their ardent disciples, Adam Walker and Percy Shelley, were crucial to Mary Shelley's understanding of science and the scientific enterprise [in Frankenstein]" (288). Mellor reads Frankenstein as a novel that "distinguishes between those scientific researches which attempt to describe accurately the functionings of the physical universe and those which attempt to *control* or *change* that universe through human intervention" (288; emphasis original). According to Mellor, then, Frankenstein privileges the works

of Erasmus Darwin by alerting its readers "to the dangers inherent . . . in the work[s] of Davy, Galvani, and Walker" (288).

A more careful examination of the Shelleys's reading of scientific treatises and Frankenstein's own preface and introduction, however, problematizes such a suggestion. Mellor points out that "Mary Shelley was introduced to Darwin's thought both by her father and later by her husband, who had been heavily influenced by Darwin's evolutionary theories while writing 'Queen Mab' " (298). She offers documentation from Percy Bysshe's Letters that he had obtained and read Darwin's The Botanic Garden in July 1811 and his Zoonomia and The Temple of Nature in December 1812 (298). Mellor also points out that in Percy Bysshe's other correspondence he had commented on his ordering of Humphry Davy's Elements of Chemical Philosophy from Thomas Hookham on 29 July 1812. With this information, Mellor further suggests that "[t]his may [have] be[en] the book listed in Mary's Journal on 29, 30 October, 2 and 4 November 1816, where Mary notes that she 'read Davy's 'Chemistry' with Shelley' and then alone" (289). Since Mellor directly documents from Percy Bysshe's Letters and Mary's Journal, her argument presents a disturbing though productive discrepancy. She seems to suggest that, *as a given*, Mary would have admired the works of Erasmus Darwin *simply* because both William Godwin and Percy Bysshe Shelley did so themselves. On the other hand, with regards to the works of Davy and his Elements of Chemical Philosophy in particular, Mary engaged in reading the textbook first with her husband and then alone, thus suggesting that

understanding — let alone appreciating — Davy's works required a *personal* reading for Mary, as opposed to a mediated diffusion of Darwin's works via Godwin and Percy Bysshe.

If, as Mellor argues, Frankenstein presents a binary between two seemingly incommensurable strands of scientific thought — between the method of human observation espoused by Darwin and the strategy of human intervention espoused by Davy — how then are we to approach the absence of Davy and the repeated reference to Darwin in Frankenstein's preface and introduction? In short, what remains problematic in Mellor's otherwise careful formulation is its insistence on separating two competing but often complementary forms of discourse. The observation of nature as a scientific practice in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries surely enabled and fostered a concomitant desire, on the part of natural philosophers, to attempt to control nature in the name of scientific inquiry. For, as Evelyn Fox Keller notes in her study, Reflections on Gender and Science, "[t]he subsequent history of science provides abundant evidence that the values articulated by early modern scientists were in fact effective in promoting those kinds of knowledge that would lead to the mastery, control, and domination of nature" (64).

Let us return briefly to Mary's deliberate parenthetical insertion invoking Erasmus Darwin:

> (I speak not of what the doctor really did, or said that he did, but, as more to my purpose, of what was then spoken of as having been done by him,) . . . .[8]
>
> (22)

I would argue that such a parenthetical insertion signals an important ambivalence on the part of the novelist. According to Mellor, Shelley incorporated the scientific debates of her time in Frankenstein in order "both to analyze and to criticize the more dangerous implications of both the scientific method and its practical results" (287). Moreover, Mellor suggests that:

> Mary Shelley based Victor Frankenstein's attempt to create a new species from dead organic matter through the use of chemistry and electricity on the most advanced scientific research of the early nineteenth century. But Frankenstein reflects much more than merely an intelligent use of the latest scientific knowledge. *Perhaps because she was a woman*, Mary Shelley understood that much of the scientific research of her day incorporated an attempt to dominate the female.
>
> (305; emphasis added)

I agree with Mellor's observation that Shelley's analysis and critique of the scientific research of her day articulate a subtle and complex sense of ambivalence — an ambivalence, moreover, that is necessarily informed by gender. However, I would like to extend Mellor's suggestion further, in order to deduce the possible

motivations behind such gendered perspectives between Mary Shelley and the two influential male figures in her life, William Godwin and Percy Bysshe Shelley.

I would argue that, on the one hand, it is certainly plausible that Mary's familiarity with the works of Erasmus Darwin might have been heavily influenced by Godwin's and Percy Bysshe's views of Darwin. On the other hand, however, Percy Bysshe himself was challenged and, to a certain extent, threatened by Darwin's evolutionary views. According to Desmond King-Hele in "Shelley and Erasmus Darwin," Percy Bysshe remained reluctant to entertain Darwin's ideas on evolution because he was unable and unwilling to dissociate himself completely from *his own* religious imperatives (132). "[E]ven when [Percy Bysshe Shelley] reacted violently against [religion]," writes King-Hele, "he still allowed religion to dominate his pattern of thought" (132). With this observation, King-Hele concludes: "As it is, [Percy Bysshe] Shelley remains a pre-evolutionary thinker" (132).[9]

Mary's parenthetical insertion in her introduction to Frankenstein, therefore, reveals a productive ambivalence. It certainly confirms, on the one hand, her seemingly unfluctuating and uncompromising devotion to her lover, inasmuch as Mary positions herself as a passive listener and observer of Percy Bysshe's and Lord Byron's philosophical discussion, unwilling "to speak of what [Erasmus Darwin] really did, or said that he did, but . . . [rather] of what was then spoken of as having been done by him." On the other hand, however, the final clause within the parenthetical insertion presents an ambiguity: who was then

doing "the speaking" concerning Darwin? Is Mary merely referring to a general preoccupation with natural philosophy, or rather, is she potentially limiting "the speakers" to Percy Bysshe and Lord Byron? I would argue that both of these hypotheses are certainly possible. As such, Mary both skillfully adopts and, paradoxically, distances herself from the views of her lover — views which are simultaneously attractive (i.e., plausible) and threatening (i.e., hearsay) to her own understanding and appreciation of natural philosophy. While Percy Bysshe certainly admired Darwin's new-world view of evolution (recall to mind Mellor's identification of him as an "ardent disciple" of Davy, Darwin, and Galvani), he nonetheless remained reluctant to accept the challenges which Darwin's evolutionary theories posed to his religious beliefs. Contrary to this, Mary remains ambivalent in her attitudes towards new findings in the scientific enterprise; thus she is able to develop a more receptive though, nonetheless, critical position for Darwin's evolutionary theories.[10]

The restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660 was immediately followed by Charles II's chartering of the Royal Society of London for the Improving of Natural Knowledge in 1662. This state intervention legitimated the scientific movement that Francis Bacon had proposed earlier in the century and that was then just coming to maturity. During this same time, however, earlier philosophical debates, especially those in Renaissance alchemy, foregrounded a redefinition of power within the scientific enterprise which attempted to depart from Baconian science. Baconian science was immersed in the mechanical

tradition which divorced matter from spirit; in contrast, Renaissance alchemy was rooted in the hermetic tradition which saw material nature as suffused with spirit. According to Keller, this difference between the two traditions is made particularly noticeable in their opposing presentations of sexual metaphors:

> If the root image for Bacon was a "chaste and lawful marriage between Mind and Nature" that will "bind [Nature] to [man's] service and make her [his] slave,"[11] the emphasis was on constraint, on the disjunction between mind and nature, and ultimately on domination. By contrast, the root image of the alchemists was coition, the conjunction of mind and matter, the merging of male and female. As Bacon's metaphoric ideal was the virile superman, the alchemist's was the hermaphrodite. Whereas Bacon sought domination, the alchemists asserted the necessity of allegorical, if not actual, cooperation between male and female.
>
> (48)

Keller further notes that "[t]he founding fathers of modern science rejected some elements of Bacon's thought and often retained at least a covert interest in alchemy" (54). Therefore, it would be misleading and simplistic to assume a clear demarcation between those practising Baconian science and those practising alchemy in the field of the new science.

In an interesting footnote, Keller cites Sally Allen and Joanna Hubbs's "Outrunning Atalanta: Feminine Destiny in Alchemical Transmutation," which, according to Keller's reading, makes an important point in foregrounding "the

desire, evident in alchemical writings, *to coopt the female procreative role. A similar desire can be discerned in Bacon's writings as well*" (53; fn. 9; emphasis added). Such an attitude of co-optation evident in both alchemical and Baconian writings foregrounds the problematics informing the gendering of the new science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. These problematics, moreover, also performed and produced similar ambiguities within dominant discourses in the ideology of gender. Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, I would argue, provides a useful commentary on the gendering of the new science and the tensions inherent in this nascent field of epistemological inquiry. By attempting to reconcile the terms of Baconian science with those of Renaissance alchemy, Shelley's text subsequently interrogates the ways in which such a gendering of science is also reflected within dominant discourses of gender as well. A notable example of this pervasive masculinist tendency to co-opt the female procreative role — and one which Shelley herself would have been familiar with — exists in William Godwin's "utopian" speculations in political philosophy. In his Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Godwin portrays an ideal future in which "[t]he men . . . will probably cease to propagate. The whole [earth] will be a people of men, and not of children. Generation will not succeed generation" (776). According to Peter Melville Logan, in Godwin's "disease-free utopia, the female body, as the site of reproduction, disappears" from existence (50).[12] Victor Frankenstein, too, articulates such a Godwinian fantasy during his later confession to Walton. This is especially evident at the moment when he recalls, rather boastfully, that his

initial project to create a human being was motivated by a similar desire to have "a new species . . . bless [him] as its *creator* and *source*; many happy and excellent natures would owe their being to me. *No father could claim the gratitude of his child so completely as I should deserve theirs*" (55; emphasis added). Victor's language, here, exposes his phallocentric investment in the scientific enterprise — namely, his belief in the reproductive male body as a "source," as the origin. In addition, by positioning himself as the ultimate "creator" of and "father" to a new species of beings, Victor's confession to Walton belies a general desire to uphold the privileging of the male sex/gender. The language of procreation and patriarchy thus informs Victor's scientific project — a project he directly inherits from previous generations of both Baconian scientists and Renaissance alchemists, whose important descendants include Erasmus (and, later, his own grandson, Charles) Darwin.

IV. Representing/Repressing the Reproductive Male Body

"Sex" and "gender," according to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick in Epistemology of the Closet, are terms "whose usage relations and analytical relations are almost irremediably slippery" (27). Referring to Gayle Rubin's identification of the "sex/gender system" within Western ideology, Sedgwick elaborates that "[this] system by which chromosomal sex is turned into, and processed as, cultural gender, has tended to minimize the attribution of people's various behaviors and

identities to chromosomal sex and to maximize their attribution to socialized gender constructs" (Epistemology 28). The elision of sex within the category of gender can be traced to the "discovery" of the two-sex model during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, during which time, as Thomas Laqueur argues in Making Sex, "science fleshed out, in terms acceptable to the new epistemology, the categories 'male' and 'female' as opposite and incommensurable biological sexes" (154). The biological conceptualization of the two sexes thus helped to inscribe *difference* between male-female relations and masculine-feminine values. The codification of the difference(s) between the two sexes contributed, and continues to contribute, to the elision of sex within the category of gender. As Judith Butler succinctly observes in Gender Trouble:

> It would make no sense, then, to define gender as the cultural interpretation of sex, if sex itself is a gendered category. Gender ought not to be conceived merely as the cultural inscription of meaning on a pregiven sex (a juridical conception); *gender must also designate the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are established.*
>
> (7; emphasis added)

Reproduction and representation are therefore inextricably linked, providing the context for the articulation of two incommensurable sexes, as Laqueur points out. Moreover, such an articulation is importantly informed by, and concomitantly informs, the construction and circulation of gender ideology. However, Laqueur offers a worthwhile reminder that, while the discovery of the two-sex model

differentiated between the male sex and the female sex, it did not completely displace the one-sex model. In his words, while the one-sex model "met a powerful alternative" in the two-sex model, "one-sex . . . did not die" (154). Therefore, it is neither surprising nor coincidental that Keller's tracing of the gendering of science and Laqueur's tracing of the biological discovery of the sexes both focus on the preoccupations of the same historical periods — that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries — whose scientific projects informed Shelley's writing of Frankenstein.

Mellor argues that Humphry Davy's A Discourse, Introductory to a Course of Lectures on Chemistry (1802) "provided Mary Shelley with both the content and the rhetoric of [Professor] Waldman's final panegyric on modern chemistry, which directly inspired Victor Frankenstein's subsequent research" (289).[13] According to Mellor, Davy privileges the pursuit of chemical knowledge and, consequently, he predicts that such an activity will result in "a more harmonious, cooperative and healthy society" (291). Mellor further notes that Davy would have been "very skeptical about Victor Frankenstein's chosen field, the new field of chemical physiology" (291). As evidence for her suggestion, Mellor directly documents from Davy's Discourse, where he warns his readers:

> if the connexion of chemistry with physiology has given rise to some visionary and *seductive* theories; yet even this circumstance has been useful to the public mind in exciting it by doubt, and leading it to new investigations. A reproach, to a certain degree just, has been thrown upon

> these doctrines known by the name of chemical physiology; *for in the applications of them speculative philosophers have been guided rather by analogies of words than of facts.* Instead of slowly endeavouring to lift up the veil concealing the wonderful phenomena of living nature; full of ardent imaginations, they have vainly and presumptuously attempted to tear it asunder.
>
> (Discourse, no. 9; emphasis added)

Mellor concludes that "Mary Shelley clearly heeded Davy's words, for she presents Victor Frankenstein as the embodiment of hubris, of that satanic or Faustian presumption which blasphemously attempts to penetrate the sacred mysteries of that universe" (291-92). In contradistinction with Mellor's confident assertion, I remain skeptical about whether or not Shelley does indeed heed Davy's warning. As I suggest above, the fact that Frankenstein's preface and introduction repeatedly invoke Erasmus Darwin, while keeping silent about Humphry Davy, foregrounds a more complex tension between the Foucauldian nexus of speech and silence. Because Shelley makes no mention of Davy in either the preface or introduction to her novel, but instead subtly borrows from his works, her text foregrounds the multiple and contradictory ways in which variable scientific discourses simultaneously competed with and supported each other. In short, Frankenstein is not about "the good science" of Erasmus Darwin versus "the bad science" of Humphry Davy, as Mellor's essay reductively propounds. I

would instead argue that both Darwin and Davy are present in Frankenstein, despite or in spite of whether one is named and the other is not.

Even though Davy and his Discourse remain unnamed in Shelley's text, his discussion of chemical physiology nonetheless bears particular relevance to Frankenstein. Davy first observes that "the connexion of chemistry with physiology has given rise to some visionary and *seductive* theories." He then explains that "speculative philosophers have been *guided* rather by the analogies of words than of facts" in their application of the scientific doctrines of chemical physiology. I would like to isolate the issues of seduction and guidance which Davy raises in his Discourse, and discuss the ways in which the transferential nature of the multiple narratives in Frankenstein — themselves, in the act of being orally/aurally *transferred* from speaker to listener — crystallizes a network of same-sex desires between speaking- and listening-subjects in Shelley's text.

Consider Victor's recollection of his first meeting with Waldman at the University of Ingolstadt. "Such were the professor's words," recalls Victor to Walton, "the words of fate, enounced to destroy me" (51). "As he [Waldman] went on," Victor continues,

> I felt as if my soul were grappling with a palpable enemy; one by one the various keys were touched which formed the mechanism of my being: chord after chord was sounded, and soon my mind was filled with one thought, one conception, one purpose. So much had been done, exclaimed the soul of Frankenstein, — more, far more, will I achieve: treading in the

> steps already marked, I will pioneer a new way, explore unknown powers, and unfold to the world the deepest mysteries of creation.
>
> (51)

While sitting in on a lecture of Waldman's, Victor admits that the professor's words feed his nascent megalomania. More importantly, for my purposes, I want to foreground the subtle, though nonetheless present, transformation evident in Victor's confession. First, Victor notes how a palpable enemy grappled with his soul, thus (trans)forming "the [very] mechanism of his being"; he then interpellates himself in the third-person, identifying the now-transformed "soul of Frankenstein"; finally, Victor resorts back to a first-person subjectivity, an "I" determined to achieve success and one who will "pioneer a new way, explore unknown powers, and unfold . . . the deepest mysteries of creation." I would additionally argue that, not only does Victor's recollection of this past scenario attempt to recreate the urgency of that momentous event, but it also betrays a highly-charged erotic and sexual energy, as evidenced in Victor's language. The various keys of his soul were touched, Victor admits, and "soon [his] mind *was filled* with one thought, one *conception*, one purpose" (emphasis added), thus illustrating the penetrative repercussions of Waldman's lecture.[14]

In a brilliant move, then, Mary Shelley provides a foreshadowing of the monster's later creation through Victor's own confession, one which exposes his own metamorphosis — or, better yet, his own re-production or re-birth. In other words, I would argue that Victor's confession about the influence of Waldman's

lecture on his subsequent scientific project metaphorically demonstrates what Darwin has identified as asexual reproduction or solitary paternal propagation. Surprisingly, critics of Shelley's text have neglected to consider this possibility. For example, Mellor argues that, "[s]ignificantly, in his attempt to create a new species, Victor Frankenstein substitutes solitary paternal propagation for sexual reproduction. He thus reverses the evolutionary ladder described by [Erasmus] Darwin" (298). In concentrating solely on Victor's creation of the monster, Mellor (and others) fail to consider the other possible "births" or "re-productions" in Shelley's novel. Victor, himself, is always in the process of being created and re-created — or, in his own words, "restored to life." For example: in having been rescued by Walton and his crew, Victor gratefully admits that "[Walton and his crew] have benevolently restored [him] to life" (34); and, later, during his feverish illness, Victor claims that "surely nothing but the unbounded and unremitting attentions of [his] friend [Henry Clerval] could have restored [him] to life" (60). The homoerotic affections between Victor and Walton, and between Victor and Clerval, thus point to the anxieties evident in Shelley's novel surrounding the issue of nurturing/reproductive male bodies. In particular, these bodies complement, and simultaneously differ from, the reproductive male body of Victor Frankenstein in relation to his own creation.

As Victor continues his confession to Walton, describing the days and nights he spent in vaults and charnel-houses in his quest to observe the decay of the human form, he reminds his listener that what he is sharing is not "the vision

of a madman" (54). "After days and nights of incredible labour and fatigue," Victor goes on to narrate, "I succeeded in discovering the cause of generation and life; nay, more, I became myself capable of bestowing animation upon lifeless matter" (54). Witnessing Walton's responses to his storytelling, Victor addresses his listener thus:

> I see by your eagerness, and the wonder and hope which your eyes express, my friend, that you expect to be informed of the secret with which I am acquainted; that cannot be: listen patiently until the end of my story, and you will easily perceive why I am reserved upon that subject. I will not lead you on, unguarded and ardent as I then was, to your destruction and infallible misery. Learn from me, if not by my precepts, at least by my example, how dangerous is the acquisition of knowledge, and how much happier that man is who believes his native town to the world, than he who aspires to become greater than his nature will allow.
>
> (54-55)

Notice how Victor immediately recognizes Walton's "eagerness, and the wonder and hope which [his] eyes express" in response to his confession; and, despite the disclaimer of not wanting to "lead [him] on," notice Victor's plea for Walton to "listen patiently until the end of [his] story." According to Peter Brooks, the role of the storyteller lies less in the message evident in the story itself than in its reception, "less 'what [the story] says' than 'how [the story] communicates' " (77). Drawing from Roman Jacobson's formulations, Brooks elaborates that "at

issue is perhaps less the 'poetic' function of language than its 'phatic' and 'conative' functions: how, and by what means, the message is received, and with what results" (77). To a large extent, then, Victor's project aims not at "teaching" Walton a lesson. Rather, I would argue that Victor's objective lies in seducing his listener. In other words, while the poetic function of his story certainly offers an *exemplaria* of sorts, Victor nonetheless succeeds in securing — through seduction — Walton's undiminished attention. Victor's performance, moreover, echoes and repeats Waldman's seductive lecture which he earlier attends, thereby demonstrating the transferential nature of shared narratives in Shelley's multiframed narrative.

Beth Newman's "Narratives of Seduction and the Seductions of Narrative: The Frame Structure of Frankenstein" and Siobhan Craig's "Monstrous Dialogues: Erotic Discourse and the Dialogic Constitution of the Subject in Frankenstein" propose arguments similar to the one I am making with regards to the issue of seduction in Shelley's text. I would like now to draw from these essays and subsequently extend them into my discussion of male reproductive bodies and the concurrent strands of homoerotic desires informing such bodies.

Newman observes that Frankenstein shares structural affinities with Emily Brontë's Wuthering Heights and Henry James's The Turn of the Screw, primarily because:

> [i]n all three works storytelling itself is suspect; narrative has become . . . *a form of seduction*. It serves both as a way of seducing a listener, and as

> a means of *displacing* and *sublimating* desire that cannot be satisfied directly. As spoken narratives that get written down only by another teller, the stories in these fictions . . . cast suspicion as well on the medium through which their tellers pursue their aims of seduction — the speaking voice.
>
> (143-44; emphasis added)

Newman notes that the three narrators in Shelley's text — the monster, Victor, and Walton — engage in "an extended ventriloquism, a word-for-word repetition of another speaker's discourse" (146). The "extended ventriloquism" utilized by the three male voices further involves the exacting of promises from their respective listeners. According to Newman, as Victor nears the end of both his confession and his life — and as he pleads to his listener: "If I do [die], swear to me, Walton, that he [the monster] shall not escape, that you will seek him, and satisfy my vengeance in his death" (174) — it is evident that Victor's "real point, his true narrative purpose, is neither to instruct nor to delight, but to exact a promise" from his listener (154). Newman further remarks that Victor's strategy echoes those employed by the monster during his confrontation with his maker atop Montanvert: at this narrative moment, the monster makes a request to Victor to create a female companion for himself; and only through his oratorical skill does the monster finally gain "consent from [Victor,] who yields gradually and reluctantly" (156). As it is deployed by the various speaking-subjects in Frankenstein, the art of rhetoric thus functions as a strategy for the seduction of

the listening-subjects in Shelley's text. Nor are we, ourselves, immune in our positions as the reading-subjects of Shelley's text. After all, as Newman succinctly concludes: "[t]he whole narrative [of Frankenstein] has the structure of an elaborate seduction" (156).

In her essay, Craig similarly isolates the primacy of "speech" in the constitution of the (human) subject in Frankenstein. Juxtaposing Foucault's differentiation of an *ars erotica* versus a *scientia sexualis* with a feminist rewriting of the Bakhtinian concept of "the dialogic," Craig argues that both Victor Frankenstein and Robert Walton are explorers in science — the former, engaged in the pursuit of knowledge; the latter, engaged in the discovery of the "terra incognita." "[T]he explorer in science," according to Craig, "seek[s] to go beyond the known universe, becom[ing] [instead] the explorer of sexuality, a transgressor of boundaries in the erotic" (83). In Frankenstein, scientific discourses are thus often interchangeable with sexual discourses; and this discursive blurring of boundaries structures the relationship between Victor and Walton and, also, between Victor and the monster. Unlike Newman's otherwise insightful reading of Frankenstein as a "narrative of seduction," however, Craig's discussion explicitly foregrounds the existence of same-sex bonds between Victor and Walton and between Victor and the monster. In doing so, Craig begins to consider how, and to what extent, these same-sex bonds inform the homoerotic seductions in Shelley's text:

> Almost immediately [after meeting each other], they [Victor and Walton] appear to 'discover' an intense, obsessive erotic connection, albeit one that is acted out entirely through discourse. It could be argued that there is a sexual subtext throughout Frankenstein, that what is encoded in the scientific passions is in fact erotic passion. . . . Discovery of the 'terra incognita' of illicit homosexual desire is what both Victor and Walter attain, with each other and, for Victor, also with the monster.
>
> (84-85)

In particular, Craig notes that the monster's threat to his creator — upon finding that Victor has destroyed the female monster which he had begun to create: "I go; but remember, I shall be with you on your wedding night" [142] — "verbalizes the indissoluble bond between himself and Victor" (87-88). Craig elaborates that this threat articulates "an exchange of vows, an acknowledgment of the obsessive primacy of their bond" (88), echoing Newman's observation that the exacting of promises between speaker(s) and listener(s) functions primarily as a strategy which displaces and sublimates the homoerotic intentions inherent in such promissory exchanges. Craig continues with the conclusion that:

> A kind of symbolic marriage takes place between Victor and the monster, beginning when Victor willingly follows the monster into a hut and consents to hear his story. They establish their erotic-discursive bond on the glacier at Chamonix, and from this moment they are, in a sense, pledged exclusively to each other. Victor could never be a part of a

> 'normal' heterosexual marriage, as the monster could not find happiness with his Eve, because both are already 'coupled,' linked in all-consuming passion, and their bond has already been discursively consummated, through confessional speech. *They have had their wedding night.*
>
> (88; emphasis added)

Although both Newman and Craig properly devote much of their respective arguments on the same-sex bonds which exist between Victor and Walton and between Victor and the monster, neither one pays particular attention to tracing out more fully the implications of their own arguments. Newman, for example, observes that Mrs. Margaret Saville "is kept safely outside the scheme of the novel precisely because she is *reading*, because what she confronts is the written word" (159; emphasis original). Newman offers two reasons for this: first, because Walton merely offers her a transcription, what Margaret is exposed to is merely a "simulacrum, a representation of a monstrous story in a different medium"; second, because the story is "[d]eprived of the speaking voice, severed from its origins, [it] can no longer exercise its seductive hold, its ability to exact promises" (159). While I concur with Newman's observation that Margaret remains largely "outside" of the framing structures of Frankenstein, I remain hesitant in reducing the complexity of the transferential nature of shared narratives in Shelley's multiframed narrative.

Recall that after meeting and spending a brief period with each other, the two men immediately engage in an exchange, or rather, a "contractual agreement"

of sorts: after some coaxing from his listener, Victor promises to "commence his narrative the next day," and Walton resolves "to record, as nearly as possible in his own words, what [Victor] has related during the day" (37). Walton immediately acknowledges his self-conscious understanding of his role as a listener, admitting to "fe[eling] the greatest eagerness to hear the promised narrative, partly from curiosity, and partly from a strong desire to ameliorate [Victor's] fate" (37). In "The Storyteller," Walter Benjamin writes that:

> There is nothing that commends a story to memory more effectively than that chaste compactness which precludes psychological analysis. And the more natural the process by which the storyteller forgoes psychological shading, the greater becomes the story's claim to a place in the memory of the listener, the more completely it is integrated into his [*sic*] own experience, the greater will be his inclination to repeat it to someone else someday, sooner or later.
>
> (91)

Storytelling, according to Benjamin, differs from information or reportage (91) and, as such, "traces of the storyteller cling to the story the way the handprints of the potter cling to the clay vessel" (92). Referring to Benjamin's essay, Brooks concludes that "what may need to be scrutinized in narrative is less its 'message,' less its ostensible affirmations, and much more its interstices, its gaps, its moments of passage, the moment where something falls silent to indicate a

transference, the moment where one begins to be able to hear other possible voices in response" (86).

Hence, in his role as the listener of Victor's tale, Walton also acts as a mediating receptacle who "receives" the transferential nature of the narrative itself. In other words, Walton's voice is always present in the text, since he, himself, is engaged in the transcription of Victor's narrative. As he writes in the lines which directly precede Victor's narrative:

> This manuscript will doubtless afford you [Margaret] the greatest pleasure: *but to me, who know him, and who hear it from his own lips, with what interest and sympathy shall I read it in some future day!* Even now, as I commence my task, his full-toned voice swells in my ears; his lustrous eyes dwell on me with all their melancholy sweetness; I see his thin hand raised in animation, while the lineaments of his face are irradiated by the soul within. Strange and harrowing must be his story; frightful the storm which embraced the gallant vessel on its course, and wrecked it — thus!
>
> (38; emphasis added)

And, later, directly following the conclusion of Victor's narrative, Walton addresses his sister with: "You have read this strange and terrific story, Margaret; and do you not feel your blood congeal with horror, *like that which even now curdles mine?*" (174; emphasis added). Moments like these in the narrative demonstrate that, like Humphry Davy, who remains unnamed but nonetheless

present in Mary Shelley's preface and introduction and subsequently in Frankenstein, Walton, too, as the seduced listener and transcriber of the multiframed narratives in Frankenstein, is also *always* present.

In response to Newman's suggestion that Margaret remains relatively "safe" from the seductive mechanisms evident in Walton's transcription of Victor's narrative, I would instead argue that these moments of narrative self-consciousness shatter not only the framing structures of the text, but also the illusion of boundaries separating the various narratives from each other. To borrow from Newman's own formulation, then, I would argue that Walton's direct addresses to his sister illustrate how and to what extent the "extended ventriloquism" similarly implicates her, as the reader of the manuscript. In other words, Walton also *binds and exacts promises* from his sister: that, upon reading his manuscript, not only will she enjoy it, but that she will simultaneously be horrified by it. Walton's solicitous gesture to his sister thus *reproduces* the seductive advances made by the monster to Victor, and by Victor to himself (Walton). Moreover, Walton's prefatory comments to his sister hint that he, *himself*, will read the manuscript in a future place and time. Inasmuch as the letter is addressed to Mrs. Margaret Saville, it is also addressed to himself: Robert Walton. Indeed, as the author/addresser of the manuscript, Walton is also the first (if not the only and/or intended) reader/addressee of his letters to his sister — for, in beginning the entry dated "September 5th," he self-reflexively admits that "it is highly probable that these papers may never reach [Margaret]" (177).

If Walton engages in transcribing Victor's narrative merely as a self-indulgent exercise for posterity's sake, I would further observe that, in doing so, Walton exposes his solipsistic tendencies — ones which parallel Victor's own habits. That is, at times when Victor digresses into moral didacticisms, one certainly wonders if he is merely telling Walton his story *just* to hear his own voice.[15] If this is the case, it can then be argued that Victor's success in seducing his listener stems not so much from the details he offers, but rather as from the details he withholds. For example, Victor's description concerning the events preceding the actual construction of the monster is, in fact, a "non-description" that remains full of *absent* details about the monster's physical and material creation. All that Victor admits to, really, is his reverting back "to [his] old habits," that of "collect[ing] bones from charnel-houses" and returning to "[his] workshop of filthy creation," where "[he] brought [his] work near to a conclusion" (55). Nothing is actually revealed in this passage: thus it importantly and aptly demonstrates the Foucauldian nexus between speech and silence, and the anxieties attending what is spoken/represented and/or silenced/repressed in Shelley's text.

Warren Montag observes that, at this pivotal moment in Frankenstein, "[t]he narrative pauses at th[e] threshold; the reader is not conducted into the 'workshop' " (308). Nor, I would add, is Walton ever conducted into Victor's "workshop of filthy creation," for, as Montag astutely observes, "utterly absent from the narrative is any description of the process by which the monster was

created" (308). This absence of narrative descriptions markedly differs from the film versions of Shelley's tale,[16] Montag continues,

> in which the mystery of technology is reaffirmed through iconic figures of electric arcs and bubbling chemicals. . . . [In Shelley's Frankenstein,] [t]he process of production is evoked but never described, effectively presenting us a world of effects without causes. In this sense, Victor's *capacity for denial*, his ability to forget after the initial shock that his creation runs amok, resembles the movement of the text itself, which "turns away" at certain key points, omitting every description of the technology so central to the tragedy of Victor Frankenstein and his creation.
>
> (308; emphasis added)

I would concur with Montag that such a narrative absence is deliberate on Shelley's part, since "the omission recurs throughout the work with a regularity that renders it integral to the work as a whole" (308). Finally, Montag argues that "this omission appears as a gap in the narrative that is filled in or covered over by digression that is marked as a *deviation* by the narrative itself" (308; emphasis added).

Montag's identification of Victor's "capacity for denial" and the narrative's "deviation" is certainly astute, and offers observations which can be extended beyond those offered by his Marxist critique of Frankenstein. I would argue that the issues of denial and deviation are closely related — two points, so to speak, within the constellation of homoerotic desires structuring Shelley's text.

Recall, once more, Craig's discussion of the discursive consummation between Victor and the monster. Although I agree with Craig's suggestion that Victor and the monster are linked together in a tenuous relationship — or, in her words, that they are engaged in a "symbolic marriage" — I am disappointed that her discussion neglects to consider the ways in which Victor's own confession is largely a denial of his own past involvement in creating the monster who now haunts his present circumstances.[17] More importantly, such a denial on Victor's part foregrounds his misrecognition of the monster's threat: "I go; but remember, I shall be with you on your wedding-night" (142). As Victor later rehearses to Walton, upon his registration of the monster's threat, his immediate response is to exclaim: "Villain! before you sign *my* death-warrant, be sure that you are yourself safe" (142; emphasis added). Upon the monster's exit, Victor relapses into his own thoughts:

> All was again silent; but [the monster's] words rung in my ears. . . . I walked up and down my room hastily and perturbed, while my imagination conjured up a thousand images to torment and sting me. . . . I shuddered to think who might be the next victim sacrificed to his insatiate revenge. And then I thought again of his words — *"I will be with you on your wedding-night."* That then was the period fixed for the fulfilment of my destiny. In that hour I should die, and at once satisfy and extinguish his malice. The prospect did not move me to fear; yet when I thought of my beloved Elizabeth, — of her tears and endless sorrow, when

> she should find her lover so barbarously snatched from her, — tears, the first I had shed for many months, streamed from my eyes, and I resolved not to fall before my enemy without a bitter struggle.
>
> (143; emphasis original)

Implicated in such a dangerous and threatening circumstance, it is certainly plausible for Victor to misinterpret the monster's message. Indeed, it is certainly natural for Victor to perceive that the pronoun "you," addressed by the monster, is meant to interpellate him, and him only. Yet, considering that he admits to wondering as to "who might be the next victim sacrificed to his [the monster's] insatiate revenge," Victor's response essentially foregrounds his solipsistic tendencies.[18] After all, in Victor's own view, the creature's misdirected vengeance against himself has, by this time, been the cause of two deaths (little William's and Justine's). Why, then, does Victor not consider the monster's logic of "a bride for a bride"? Instead, Victor resigns *himself* to the prediction that *he* will meet *his* death on *his* wedding-night. Only after thinking of how his death would affect his current fiancée and soon-to-be widow, Elizabeth, does Victor consider "her tears and endless sorrow."

Victor persists in thinking this way, even as he recognizes the faulty (il)logic of his own perceptions. Such (il)logic, I would argue, exposes the always tenuous dynamics informing the erotic male triangle in Frankenstein, within which Victor, the monster, and Clerval are situated. Two particular episodes foreground the (il)logic informing the male erotic triangle in Shelley's text; and

both articulate Victor's persistent (mis)recognition of the male-male dynamics in Frankenstein. Consider Victor's recollection of Clerval's murder:

> He [the monster] had vowed *to be with me on my wedding-night*, yet he did not consider that threat as binding him to peace in the mean time; for, as if to show me that he was not yet satiated with blood, he had murdered Clerval immediately after the enunciation of his threats.
>
> (159; emphasis original)

Unlike Victor who still (mis)recognizes the monster's motives in killing his friend, for the monster, as the perpetrator of the crime, his murderous act foregrounds *his own recognition* of the homoerotic bond between Victor and Clerval. In murdering Clerval — whom the monster perceives as Victor's male "beloved" — the monster seeks to eliminate his rival in order to secure, wholly for himself, his creator's affections. The violence he directs at Clerval thus exposes the monster's jealous disposition towards what he views as potentially threatening the male-male bond between himself and Victor. Although misdirected and violent, the monster's actions are necessarily informed by Victor's own actions. In other words, I would argue that the monster *legitimately* and *correctly* perceives Clerval as a male rival, since Victor, too, encourages such a perception. Consider, for example, an earlier episode: after having been commissioned by the monster to create a female companion, Victor nonetheless neglects and postpones his task. Instead, Victor chooses to spend his time traveling abroad *with* Clerval, an intimate friend from whom he has long been

separated. At one point during their journeys in Scotland, Victor fears that his irresponsibility will potentially endanger Clerval's life. As he later recalls to Walton:

> Sometimes [during my travels with Clerval] I thought the fiend followed me, and might expedite my remissness *by murdering my companion*. When these thoughts possessed me, I would not quit Henry for a moment, but followed him as his shadow, *to protect him from the fancied rage of his destroyer*.
>
> (138; emphasis added)

Just as he later (mis)recognizes the monster's threat, Victor articulates a similar (mis)recognition at this moment. That is, in Victor's persistent (il)logic, the task of *not* providing the monster with a *female* companion is thus equated with the possibility of harm coming to Clerval, his *male* companion.[19]

For Victor, the creature's "threat" eventually manifests itself as a "promise" *to himself*. In other words, I would argue that Victor secretly and perversely desires to foster the homoerotic (and incestuous) bond between himself and his creature. Such a desire, moreover, can only emerge in his dreams; only in the realm of the unconscious, so it seems, can the double-nature of the creature's threat/promise ever articulate itself. For example, on his way back from Ireland, Victor dreams of "the fiend's grasp in [his] neck" (155). Victor's dream essentially foreshadows "the whole truth" behind his creature's threat/promise (163): on the wedding night, Victor indeed discovers that "the . . . mark of the

fiend's grasp was on [Elizabeth's] neck" (164). As Veeder remarks of this connection: "Victor in his nightmare moment *is* Elizabeth in her nightmarish death" (Mary 120; emphasis original). To borrow Victor's own language, then, the monster is, always has been, and always will be "his more than creature."[20]

Yet Victor can never fully articulate the same-sex desires bonding him to his creature (nor, for that matter, can he ever do so towards either Clerval or Walton). Therefore, homosexuality remains as "the love that dare not speak its name," to borrow from Lord Alfred Douglas's memorable declaration during the trials of Oscar Wilde in 1895.[21] However, as Foucault reminds us:

> Silence itself — *the things one declines to say, or is forbidden to name, the discretion that is required between different speakers* — is less the absolute limit of discourse, the other side from which it is separated by a strict boundary, than an element that functions alongside the things said, with them and in relation to them within over-all strategies.
>
> (27; emphasis added)

Similarly, then, in narrating his past to Walton, Victor selectively chooses not only the details to disclose, but also the words with which to describe such details. For, as Victor warns his listener at the outset of his narrative, it remains impossible for him to reveal "the secret with which [he] is acquainted" (54). Although "the secret" Victor teasingly alludes to is one which involves the animation of lifeless matter, I would argue that it also refers to the "open secret" of homosexuality.[22]

In suggesting this, however, I am fully aware of potentially committing an anachronism, since the term "homosexuality" was not coined until 1870 (Foucault History 43), over a half century after the first publication of Shelley's Frankenstein in 1818. Nonetheless, this does not diminish the reality that hostile attitudes towards "homosexuals" (i.e., sodomites) have always existed; in fact, as Louis Crompton observes in Byron and Greek Love, such attitudes escalated in the early nineteenth century:

> [T]he death penalty [for sodomy] in England seems to have been most rigorously enforced during the early nineteenth century. In the age of Castlereagh and Wellington, while Woodsworth, Coleridge, Byron, Shelley, and Keats lived and wrote, homosexuals suffered regularly upon the gallows or stood at the mercy of ill-wishers in public pillories.
>
> (14)

Homoerotic and homosexual desires are thus certainly present in Shelley's text, even though they are often disguised and subsumed under the homosocial rubric of male-male "friendship." Such interrelational dynamics importantly contribute to the pervasive "silence(s)" in Frankenstein, or what Sedgwick has identified as the trope of "unspeakability" that is characteristic of the gothic novel. Moreover, this gothic trope of "unspeakability" remains inextricably linked to the dynamics of homophobia, or what Sedgwick has otherwise termed as "homosexual panic" in her early study, Between Men.[23] In reference to Freud's discussion of Dr.

Schreber (the classic case history of a "homosexual," besides that of his discussion of Leonardo da Vinci), Sedgwick writes that:

> [T]he classic early Gothic contains a large subgroup [of novels] — Caleb Williams, Frankenstein, Confessions of a Justified Sinner, probably Melmoth, possibly The Italian — whose plots might be mapped point for point onto the case of Dr. Schreber: most saliently, each is about one or more males who not only is persecuted by, but considers himself transparent to and often under the compulsion of, another male. If we follow Freud in hypothesizing that such a sense of persecution represents the fearful, phantasmic rejection by recasting of an original homosexual (or even homosocial) desire, then it would make sense to think of this group of novels as embodying strongly homophobic mechanisms.
>
> (Between 91-92)

Extending Sedgwick's observation, I would argue that the example of Victor's (mis)recognition of the creature's threat/promise demonstrates an acute sense of his internalized homophobia. Victor obviously recognizes that the creature is "blackmailing" him, though he resists recognizing the terms of the threat and instead translates them into promissory terms. Therefore, in choosing to recognize that the monster means to kill *him* and *not* Elizabeth, Victor attempts to articulate, both to himself and to his listener, what is largely "unspeakable" in Frankenstein — namely, same-sex desires between men.

In conclusion, let me briefly return to the elusive "Doctor" that Shelley refers to in her preface and introduction, and trace out the critical implications of such competing dynamics between homophobia and same-sex desires in Frankenstein. According to Erasmus Darwin's formulation of the evolutionary process, there exist three distinct stages of reproduction: asexual or solitary paternal propagation, hermaphroditic, and sexual reproduction. Victor's creation of the monster literally serves as an analogy which demonstrates an example of hermaphroditic reproduction. In the Darwinian schema, hermaphroditic creatures are essentially able to impregnate themselves or each other: because Victor *obviously* creates the monster on his own (i.e., "manually"), it can thus be argued that he "gave birth" to the monster, indeed becoming the creator and source of a "new species" of beings (55). What I have been primarily concerned with in this chapter, however, are the subtle examples of solitary or paternal propagation in Frankenstein. In extending Newman's and Craig's arguments, I have shown that "discourse" often serves as a substitute for "intercourse" in Shelley's text. Sexual reproduction — or, more accurately, *heterosexual* reproduction — remains starkly absent in Shelley's text: neither the monster nor Victor are able to consummate their relationships with their respective (female) companions. This absence illustrates that the inherent silences in Frankenstein serve to displace pervasive anxieties of same-sex desires. Yet, regardless of the fact that Victor selectively chooses which details to disclose to Walton, his listener is equally capable of discerning and deducing the "hidden message" of his narrative. Victor insists that

Walton ought to "[l]earn from [him], if not by [his] precepts, at least by [his] example," because "the acquirement of knowledge" is dangerous (54, 54-55). The paradox, of course, lies in Walton actually heeding Victor's advice. As a listener of Victor's story, Walton learns about the dangers of scientific knowledge. As readers of Frankenstein, we learn that, as a matter of course, the scientific knowledge disclosed in Victor Frankenstein's narrative remains inextricably linked to sexual knowledge. Mary Shelley thus rewrites the Genesis story of creation; in particular, she focuses on a postlapserian world where "the apple was already eaten, and the angel's arm [already] bared" (158) to banish Victor and all of his companions from an all-male "paradise." In Shelley's post-Edenic fiction, therefore, the crimes her protagonists commit involve both the exhibition of the spectacle of the male reproductive body and the attempted articulation of male-male desires.

The Open Secret of Robert Louis Stevenson's

Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde[1]

I. A Preliminary Clue

In his essay, "Frankenstein, Detective Fiction, and Jekyll and Hyde," Gordon Hirsch reads Jekyll and Hyde (1886) "as a book formed in the surgery of Victor Frankenstein"; and, in particular, he identifies Stevenson's presentation of Edward Hyde — Henry Jekyll's "monstrous double" — as a "gothic signifier of repressed desire" that is analogous to the example of its predecessor, Frankenstein's monster (223).[2] Hirsch observes that "[b]oth protagonists [in Frankenstein and Jekyll and Hyde] decline to reveal too much in the way of scientific detail," and such a lack of details subsequently contributes to "the similarity in the representation, or description, or, perhaps more aptly, in the reluctance to emphasize the physical appearance of the antisocial double in both books" (225). Although it is a given that "[t]he double in each book is repulsive [and] revolting," Hirsch rightly maintains that "in each book it is the *impression* that counts rather than any particularized physical description" (225; emphasis original). "The horror in both books, then, resides in a kind of *absence* or *gap*," Hirsch contends, which subsequently leads him to conclude that "the key point is that the monstrous in both books by its very nature resists detailed description. *Because it is absent*, it

is both called forth in an act of desire and viewed as monstrous when it appears. It is impressive because not fully expressed" (226; emphasis added).

In turn, Hirsch's project connects Jekyll and Hyde to the genre of detective fiction, and his essay offers plenty of compelling evidence for such a reading. According to Hirsch, the "absence or gap" upon which both Frankenstein and Jekyll and Hyde are predicated thus functions additionally, in Stevenson's text, *as the evidence (or lack thereof)* which propels the detection of the mystery. Thus the difference between Frankenstein and Jekyll and Hyde in Hirsch's view, is that "Stevenson's [text displays] relatively greater willingness [than Shelley's text] to ignore physical detail altogether, because what is finally at stake, [Stevenson] recognizes, is an ethical and social horror, not a physical one" (226). Interestingly enough, Hirsch then foregoes wondering *why* this should be so — that is, he does not fully consider or problematize the interrelated nature between ethical/social horror and physical horror in Jekyll and Hyde. Hirsch writes:

> The weight of evidence argues that the monstrousness that is 'absent' and unexpressed in Hyde — we do not know, really, what he looks like and we are not told in much detail what it is he does — is suppressed because it is in fact violent and sadistic, *while Jekyll's secret 'pleasures,' in his life prior to the time of the story, probably are not.* Whatever other erotic components Hyde's acts may have, sadism seems to be the transcendent sin, appropriating to itself all other forms of desire.

> Perhaps this is the gothic novel's insight into how our culture construes repressed desire, as sadism or even murder.
>
> (227; emphasis added)

By identifying that Hyde's crimes articulate a sadistic streak, and by distinguishing this "transcendent sin" from that of Jekyll's unmentioned (and perhaps unmentionable?) "secret 'pleasures'," Hirsch inadvertently places a moral value judgment on the evident sexual subtext within Jekyll and Hyde. Although it is fair for Hirsch to suggest that Hyde's crimes are sadistic and violent — *because they are described* in the text: Hyde's trampling of the little girl (31); his striking of an unidentified woman offering him a box of lights (94); and his assault and subsequent murder of Sir Danvers Carew (46-47, 90-91) — it seems rather a curious assumption, at any rate, that Jekyll's unnamed though perhaps pleasurable secrets are neither sadistic nor violent in Hirsch's estimation. In doing so, Hirsch's argument enacts its own repression, and Jekyll's unarticulated "secret pleasures" (90) *remain* simply as (again, to borrow the doctor's own words) "*indescribable* sensations" (95; emphasis added).

This is a particularly dangerous critical strategy to adopt, especially because Jekyll's confession to Gabriel John Utterson in his "Full Statement of the Case" stresses the inherent duality of Jekyll/Hyde — that, indeed, "man is not truly one, but truly two" (82). Therefore, I find that, not unlike the text of Jekyll and Hyde itself, Hirsch falls prey to a tendency of further masking, rather than disclosing, what he sees as the possible "secret(s)" within Stevenson's story. To

be sure, Hirsch is not alone in this. As I will demonstrate later in this chapter, while much of the critical work on Jekyll and Hyde is certainly illuminating, some of the strategies employed in these discussions often tend either to obscure or ignore what is most crucial in its respective readings — namely, the issue of sexuality and, in particular, of male homosexuality in Jekyll and Hyde. The critical tradition thus inadvertently participates in a form of repression when it unproblematically assumes a clear distinction between the behaviours of Jekyll and his double, Hyde — often valorizing the former's, while condemning the latter's. By privileging the character of Jekyll at the expense of Hyde, the critical tradition of Stevenson's text displays its own mechanism of "repression," which foregrounds (to borrow Foucault's definition of the term and its characteristic features) "an injunction to silence, an affirmation of nonexistence, and, by implication, an admission that there [is] nothing to say about such things, nothing to see, and nothing to know" (History 4).

Borrowing the trope of detection from Hirsch's essay, the remainder of this chapter will resemble that of a "criminal" investigation. In "The Scene of the Crime," I will draw from various sources — contemporaneous reviews of Jekyll and Hyde, the author's correspondence to friends, and biographical details of Stevenson's life — in order to discuss the dynamics informing the open secret within and outside of Stevenson's text. The next section, "The Case of the Crime," traces the medicalization of sexuality and, in particular, the medicalization of *homo*sexuality. I will first address how the disciplines of

phrenology and physiology, which emerged at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, subsequently informed the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry, two later nascent scientific enterprises of the mid- to late-nineteenth century. Secondly, I will discuss how these diverse though interrelated medical and scientific discourses often translated into and hence informed legal discourses — in short, how the medicalization of the homosexual attends the (continued) criminalization of the sodomite (and the invert).[3] The final section, "Thresholds of Desire," will link the concomitant medicalization and criminalization of homosexuality to two major and related strands in Victorian ideology: first, the period's construction of and insistence upon the separation of public/private spheres; and, second, the rise of the professional class. Both of these are *gendered* ideological constructions, of course; and, moreover, the ideological construction of the professional class is gendered ***male***. I will argue that Jekyll and Hyde offers a critical commentary on both of these Victorian ideological notions: in particular, I will demonstrate how Stevenson's text foregrounds the permeable and shifting, if not also the imaginary, nature of the boundary separating public from private spaces. Reading the crossing and re-crossings of physical thresholds in Jekyll and Hyde as representing a nexus of same-sex desires, I will argue that Stevenson's novella demonstrates the blurring of the ideological threshold between "public prudery" and "private prurience." Finally, I will conclude with a brief discussion of how Jekyll and Hyde reinscribes

the Victorian ideal of the self-made *professional* man in its presentation of the self-made *homosexual* man.

II. The Scene of the Crime

Two years following the publication of Stevenson's novella, Henry James poses the following question in The Century Magazine (April 1888): "Is 'Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde' a work of high philosophic intention, *or simply the most ingenious and irresponsible of fictions?*" (877; emphasis added). As James's query indicates, the debate on whether or not Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde articulates, silences, and/or hints at the possibility of "monstrous desires" has, indeed, been a plaguing question for critics ever since the apparently inconspicuous little volume appeared in January 1886. Even "[a]fter a slow start [in sales,]" as one of Stevenson's biographers notes, "Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde [soon] irrupted into public consciousness with striking impact," thus assuring its author's literary reputation (Calder A Life Study 220). The very diversity of opinions Stevenson's novella immediately engendered remains a particularly striking feature of Jekyll and Hyde's critical heritage. For example, Sir Edward Tyas Cook — who later edited The Pall Mall Gazette (1890-92), The Westminster Gazette (1893-95), and The Daily News (1895-1901) — questioned the plausibility of Stevenson's plot and objected to the narrative detail of Jekyll's will. Although the book "is extremely clearly narrated" and "holds one's interest," Cook observed in an unsigned notice

in The Athenaeum (16 January 1886), "[Jekyll and Hyde] overshoots the mark, however, by being not merely strange, but impossible, and even absurd when the explanation is given" (100). An unsigned review in The Times (25 January 1886), on the other hand, enthusiastically praised Stevenson and his text:

> Nothing Mr. Stevenson has written as yet has so strongly impressed us with the versatility of his very original genius as this sparsely-printed little shilling volume. . . . Either the story was a flash of intuitive psychological research, dashed off in a burst of inspiration; or else it is the product of the most elaborate forethought, fitting together all the parts of an intricate and inscrutable puzzle. The proof is, that every connoisseur who the reads the story once, must certainly read it twice. . . . But we have said enough to show our opinion of the book, which should be read as a finished study in the art of fantastic literature.[4]
>
> (qtd. in Maixner 205)

I have introduced these two reviews into my discussion not only in order to rehearse the mixed but generally favourable reception of Stevenson's novella immediately after its publication, but also to contrast them with an unsigned review which appeared in The Saturday Review on 9 January 1886. In the first paragraph of this particular review, the writer compares Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde to both Edgar Allan Poe's "William Wilson" and Théophile Gautier's Le Chevalier Double. Remarking upon the similar use of "the double" motif in all three works, the writer observes that "Mr. Stevenson's narrative is not, of course,

absolutely original in idea," though the writer quickly offers the admission that "[p]robably we shall never see a story that in germ is absolutely original" (55). The writer then qualifies this statement by insisting that, indeed, "the possible combinations and possible methods of treatment [for storytelling] are infinite, and all depends on how the ideas are treated and combined [by the author]" (55). Thus ends the first paragraph of this particular review; the next paragraph begins with the following sentence:

> Mr. Stevenson's idea, *his secret (but a very open secret)* is that of the double personality in every man.
>
> (55; emphasis added)

The author of these lines is no other than Andrew Lang, a reader for Longman's, the publishers of Jekyll and Hyde, and, more importantly, an intimate friend of Stevenson's.[5] Lang's confident assertion/insertion importantly points to two things. On the one hand, all Lang really does in his review is reiterate the obvious "moral" of Stevenson's tale — that of Jekyll's own confession that "man is not truly one, but truly two." In this sense, then, the "secret" is certainly an open one, insofar as Lang's disclosure appears within a fairly innocuous context (i.e., a periodical review whose reading audience would be familiar with the text in question). On the other hand, however, Lang's parenthetical insertion offers an important clue for reading Jekyll and Hyde, insofar as it offers a glimpse — for those who want a peek — into Stevenson's private and personal life. In an intuitive leap, I sense that Lang's parenthetical suggestion signals the use of a

secret language, a linguistic code which might be used amongst friends. However, I am by no means saying that Lang's comment demonstrates an indiscretion which borders on betraying his friendship with Stevenson. Rather, what I am pointing to is the obvious, though masked (i.e., anonymous), privileged position from which Lang is able to assert that Stevenson's secret is an open one. In any case, whether or not such a linguistic code is actually being utilized, the playful yet confident tone of Lang's comment encourages others to "seek" what is hidden beneath. In other words, the (in)evident use of a secret linguistic code does not preclude a "general" reader (i.e., someone unacquainted personally with Stevenson) from potentially *deducing* a highly suggestive "hidden message" within Lang's seemingly aloof though nonetheless cryptic parenthetical comment.

The paradox of the "open secret" remains the same, however, insofar as whatever knowledge is being revealed in Lang's review, it is also simultaneously being hidden. The specialized sense of the term "open secret" I am here evoking comes from D. A. Miller's brilliant reading of Charles Dickens's David Copperfield in The Novel and the Police, where he points out that "it is evident that the need to 'keep secret' takes precedence over whatever social exigencies exist for keeping one or another secret in particular. Instead of the question 'What does secrecy cover?' we had better ask 'What covers secrecy?' " (207). According to Miller's formulation, secrecy therefore functions as

> the subjective practice in which the oppositions of private/public, inside/outside, subject/object are established, and the sanctity of their first term

> kept inviolate. And the phenomenon of the "open secret" does not, as one might think, bring about the collapse of those binarisms and their ideological effects, but rather attests to their fantasmatic recovery. In a mechanism reminiscent of Freudian disavowal, *we know perfectly well that the secret is known, but nonetheless we must persist, however ineptly, in guarding it*.
>
> (207; emphasis added)

Because secrecy operates in myriad and potentially contradictory ways, the disclosure of the open secret simultaneously ensures further enclosing the terms of that very secret. My primary strategy in this chapter, therefore, will be to foreground the difficulties involved in sifting out the clues, or rather, the dynamics of the open secret in relation to Stevenson and Jekyll and Hyde. For, as Jerrold E. Hogle correctly observes: "By now it should be apparent that, despite its claims, the 'Full' confession at the end of Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde does not explain *all the mysteries* left unsolved in the narratives preceding it" (161; emphasis added). Importantly, then, critics attempting to uncover the mysteries within Jekyll and Hyde are invariably *implicated* in the double-bind of the open secret of homosexuality at the heart of Stevenson's narrative, thus confirming Roland Barthes's observation that "[i]t is [indeed] impossible to write without labelling yourself" (Writing 7).

Having presented the variable possibilities of reading the open secret in general, and Stevenson's open secret in particular, here is yet another clue to the

mystery — one which points toward the open secret which exists "outside" of Stevenson's story as well. In a letter written in early March 1886 to John Addington Symonds, another intimate male friend, Stevenson mentions his reactions to having written Jekyll and Hyde:

> Jekyll is a dreadful thing, I own; but the only thing I feel dreadful about is that damned old business of the war in the members. *This time it came out*. I hope it will stay in, in future.[6]
>
> (Letters 220; emphasis added)

What, exactly, does Stevenson mean when he refers to "that damned old business of the war in the members"?[7] Why does Stevenson's comment present itself with such an acute sense of "dreadful" self-reflexive anxiety? And why is Stevenson's anxiety inextricably linked to a concomitant desire to prevent any such future occurrences from "coming out"? Moreover, although it is quite possible that Stevenson is here using a shorthand version of Jekyll and Hyde in referring to his text as simply "Jekyll," his slippage is nonetheless quite telling and certainly worth investigating. That is, why *is Jekyll* the "dreadful thing" that "came out"? — and not Hyde, as in the story? To what extent, then, does Stevenson's slippage indicate the pervasive anxiety of same-sex desires in Jekyll and Hyde? And to what extent does this intertextual anxiety reflect a more general tendency within Victorian culture to repress and/or express homosexual desires?[8]

III. The Case of the Crime

"[M]an is not truly one, but truly two" — thus confesses Henry Jekyll in his "Full Statement of the Case." Although Jekyll's confession is certainly a personal one, it also conveys the pervasive anxiety of sexual duality which occupied the Victorian imagination towards the end of the nineteenth century. As Karl Miller notes of this phenomenon in relation to Stevenson and Jekyll and Hyde:

> If there can be no certainty about Stevenson's sexual uncertainty or ambivalence, it is certain that this was the time for such a thing. Late Victorian duality may be identified with the dilemma, for males, of a choice between male and female roles, or of a possible union of such opposites. The Nineties School of Duality framed a dialect, and a dialectic, for the love that dared not speak its name — for the vexed question of homosexuality and bisexuality.[9]
>
> (216)

In his Lectures on Literature, Vladimir Nabokov similarly notes the evident dualism in Jekyll and Hyde, and in a footnote to an annotated copy of his discussion, Nabokov insists that "[t]he dualism [in Stevenson's novella] . . . is not [one of] 'body and soul' but [rather of] 'good and evil' " (181). Nabokov's footnote remains problematical for two reasons, however: not only is he being reductive when he insists on a singular binary of "good and evil," but he is also seriously misinformed when he rejects the potential existence of a conflict between "body and soul" in Jekyll and Hyde. In his otherwise entertaining essay,

then, Nabokov neglects to consider the extent to which nineteenth-century science reconceptualized the notion of the human "soul" in relation to the human "body," and how these scientific discourses subsequently percolate in Jekyll and Hyde. For, as Stephen Heath rightly points out in "Psychopathia Sexualis: Stevenson's Strange Case": "It is significant in this context that doctors and medical science are so important in the story [of Jekyll and Hyde], that it is indeed a *case*" (102; emphasis original).

At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, as Anne Harrington observes in Medicine, Mind, and the Double Brain, new discoveries in phrenology and physiology competed with, and hence challenged, prior metaphysical and theological discourses on the issue of "the soul." According to Harrington, "[e]arly in the nineteenth century, the phrenologists, led by the Austrian anatomist Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1826), were among the first to take the growing body of evidence as they found it and map out the human soul boldly upon the convolutions of the cerebral hemispheres" (7). Although Gall's formulations specifically divided the pineal gland into two separate yet equal parts, his findings nonetheless informed subsequent projects on the brain and its functions. In particular, as Gall's insistence on "hemisphere symmetry and simultaneous functioning increasingly came to be accepted as the twin preconditions for a healthy mind," Harrington continues, "it began equally to be argued that certain forms of insanity might result from independent, incongruous action between the two sides of the brain" (17). For nineteenth-century

phrenologists, then, the "double brain" informed the construction of the "dual subject," a *diseased* subjectivity often struggling to reconcile the terms between sanity and madness.

Whether or not Stevenson's novella conjures a subject of madness is certainly debatable, but the subject is indisputably introduced in the course of Jekyll and Hyde. In his self-assigned role as "Mr Seek" (38), Utterson twice observes the *potential* for madness in two of his intimate friends — first in Jekyll, and then in Dr Hastie Lanyon. Upon rereading the strange terms which Jekyll outlines in his will, Utterson attempts to account for his friend's bizarre decision to leave everything to Hyde; and his contemplations lead Utterson to reflect about Jekyll: "I thought it was *madness* . . . and now I begin to fear it is disgrace" (36; emphasis added). Later, upon Lanyon's refusal to disclose anything further to Utterson about Jekyll's conduct, the lawyer observes that "so great and unprepared a change in [his physician friend, Lanyon] pointed to *madness*; but in view of Lanyon's manner and words, there must lie for it some deeper ground" (58; emphasis added). As I will elaborate later in this chapter, these two examples foreground the notion that madness — both as a medical "disease" and a social "dis-ease" — is inextricably linked to the scandalous and disgraceful knowledge of same-sex desires in Jekyll and Hyde. For my more immediate purposes, however, I want to discuss briefly the association of "morality" with "disease" as delineated in these examples — an association which also characterized much of the scientific and medical discourses of the nineteenth century.

In his informative essay, "Rationales for Therapy in British Psychiatry, 1780-1835," William F. Bynum points out that, in a post-Freudian age such as ours, it remains difficult to consider that, prior to Freud's influence, which formalized the separation of psychiatry from neurology (36), scientists and medical practitioners alike often conflated the concepts of the "soul" with that of the "mind":

> One reason that medical treatment for madness might seem odd [today] is the fact that eighteenth-century theories of mind took far less cognizance of the brain than our theories do. Their universe was more nearly Cartesian than ours in their separation of mind from brain, and, more important, their conflation of the philosophical and medical concept of *mind* with the theological concept of *soul*.
>
> (38; emphasis original)

Bynum further observes that the development and practice of "moral therapy" forms "one of the high points in the history of psychiatry" (36), and that such a practice entailed the "virtual equation of [the] *moral* with [the] *psychological*" (37; emphasis original). For many nineteenth-century medical practitioners, then, Gall's findings were often interpreted in two opposing ways. As Bynum explains, there are "two diametrically opposed reasons why a person during this period might believe that psychiatric disorders are primary diseases of the brain":

> If one held to the theological identity of mind and soul, then, . . . such a belief protected the mind as an ontological entity from the ravages of

> disease, decay, and mutability. On the other hand, if one held that the mind is the function of the brain, totally dependent on that organ, and that all mental functions result from, or at least accompanied by, physiological processes, then mental derangements might naturally be thought to have a corresponding structural malformation or derangement.
>
> (49)

Phrenologists, notably, subscribed to the latter point-of-view, whereby the mind was seen as a function of the brain and therefore totally dependent upon the pineal gland. They posited a causal link, therefore, between mental illness and a corresponding neurological malfunctioning.

Although early nineteenth-century phrenology never fully succeeded in establishing itself as a reputable scientific enterprise, this "pseudo-science" (Gilmour 139) was nonetheless important in shaping the emergent disciplines of psychology and psychiatry, which were further developed throughout the century. As Roger Cooter rightly maintains in his essay, "Phrenology and British Alienists," "the science of phrenology forms an essential starting point for a broader historical synthesis of nineteenth-century psychiatry" (59-60). Cooter notes, in particular, the effects of Gall's findings, which "effectively undermined the Cartesian framework by constructing a *physiological* psychology based on the brain as the organ of the mind. The dichotomy between mind and body was thus endangered, and the study of mind became united with neurology on the one hand and with the biology of adaptation on the other" (69; emphasis original).[10] More

importantly, for my purposes, phrenology provided the basis for broader social implications within Victorian ideology, for, as Cooter points out, "[w]hat emerged from these [scientific] debates was the characterization of phrenology as a tool for legitimating radical change and reform" (66).[11]

If nothing else, the Victorian age was indeed a period of "radical change and reform." Perhaps the most notable example of Victorian social reform is the legislation of the Contagious Diseases Act of 1864.[12] At the centre of this mid-nineteenth century debate on sanitary reform, morality, and sexuality is the issue of desire itself, of course. Desire, however, is always gendered *male* for many Victorians, as the journalist-cum-medical authority William R. Greg asserts in his essay on "Prostitution," which appeared in the July 1850 issue of The Westminster Review:

> In this point [concerning desire] there is a radical and essential difference between the sexes: the arrangements of nature and the customs of society would be even more unequal than they are, were it not so. In men, in general, the sexual desire is *inherent* and *spontaneous*, and belongs to the condition of puberty. In the other sex, the desire is dormant, if non-existent; always till excited by undue familiarities; almost always till excited by actual intercourse.
>
> (456-57; emphasis added)

In spite of Greg's humanitarian efforts to reinscribe the figure of the prostitute as an object for compassion, his views nonetheless betray a masculinist strategy of

essentializing sexual difference. Inherent within such a masculinist strategy are two interrelated yet paradoxical assumptions. Greg asks his readers — a middle-class reading audience standing in for a homogenous British citizenry — to work actively in eradicating the social problem of prostitution: he identifies the moral (ir)responsibility of educational and religious institutions (and even nature!) to answer for the "ungovernability" of male sexual desire (478-81). Yet, according to Greg, the eradication of prostitution can only be accomplished by policing and regulating the supposedly nonexistent sexual desire of women by medical and legal authorities alike (482-83).

But what about homosexual desire? Did it even exist? If so, was it regulated as well? To borrow Steven Marcus's appellation: what about those "other Victorians" — the homosexuals? The answer to all of these questions, of course, is in the affirmative. As Jeffrey Weeks notes: "It is striking that the social purity campaigners of the 1880s saw both prostitution and male homosexuality as products of undifferentiated male lust" (Against 21). Unlike male *hetero*sexual desire, however, *homo*sexual desire was neither "inherent" nor "spontaneous." Rather, the *private* articulation of homosexual desire was "unnatural"; and whenever it surfaced into the *public* domain, it was also "scandalous." As William A. Cohen observes:

> If the most scandalous scandal is unquestionably the sex scandal, then the scandal most sexual is arguably the male homosexual one. In post-Enlightenment Western Europe, the male homosexual has required

> scandal in order to come into being. *Public* homosexual identities were formed in large measure through the revelation, via scandal, of *private* sexual activities between men; unmentionable even according to its ancient legal definition (*crimen inter Christanos non nominandam*), male-male sex has traditionally been the locus for scandals considered to be so heinous as to be designated truly unspeakable — and never more so than in the nineteenth century.
>
> (75; emphasis added)

While Victorian Britain was certainly an age preoccupied with sexual scandals in general,[13] three specific homosexual scandals of the later nineteenth century are of notable importance. In 1870, widespread newspaper coverage focused its sensationalist attention on the arrest and trial of Ernest Boulton and Frederick Park for conspiracy to commit sodomitical acts. Two decades later, in 1889-90, the "Cleveland Street Affair" irrupted into public consciousness, a controversy which alerted the nation to the illicit goings-on of a West End male brothel, whose roster of clients included several highly placed men (including Prince Albert Victor, the second heir to the throne). And, later, in 1895, there was Oscar Wilde's now infamous trial, which eventually sentenced the writer to Reading Gaol for two years' imprisonment for committing "acts of gross indecency."[14]

As these events indicate, then, there occurred a representational shift during the last three decades of the nineteenth century, whereby the figure of the homosexual was reinscribed from a sociomedical sexual taxonomy to that of a

juridical subject. According to Weeks, during this time, "in Britain (as also in Germany and elsewhere) the reconceptualisation and categorisation (at first medical and later social) coincided with the development of new legal and ideological sanctions, particularly against male homosexuality" (Against 17). The "Cleveland Street Scandal" and Wilde's trials thus mark an important juncture in fin-de-siècle jurisprudence, not least because both events involved the prosecution of individuals under Section 11 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. This legislation — otherwise known as the Labouchère Amendment — was passed by Parliament in May 1885 and went into effect in January 1886, the same month as Jekyll and Hyde's publication. The appearance of Stevenson's novella, therefore, marks the appearance of another "double," so to speak, where the medicalization and criminalization of homosexuality now went hand-in-hand. To use Foucault's oft-quoted observation: indeed, "[t]he sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species" (History 43).[15]

IV. Thresholds of Desire

In "The Shadow on the Bed: Dr. Jekyll, Mr. Hyde, and the Labouchère Amendment," Wayne Koestenbaum comments on the significance of the coincidental double "appearance" of the Labouchère Amendment and Stevenson's novella. In reference to Stevenson's letter to John Addington Symonds, where Stevenson articulated the explicitly sexual subtext of Jekyll and Hyde by mention

of "that damned old business of the war in the members," Koestenbaum suggests that the author, himself, acknowledged that Jekyll and Hyde "is a parable of warring preferences, of 'members' uncertain of their inclination — Members of Parliament and sexual members" ("Shadow" 34). For Koestenbaum, then, "[t]he true shadow on the bed appears to be Stevenson himself":

> [Stevenson] wrote Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde and Treasure Island in bed; for Stevenson, the bed doubled as a writing desk. His bed is where the forces of heterosexual law and homosexual writing collide, where the demands of marriage and the demands of writing intersect.
>
> ("Shadow" 43)

Koestenbaum's argument thus foregrounds the permeability of the border which separates public from private spaces for the author of Jekyll and Hyde. In other words, Stevenson's *public* reputation as a "man of letters" is entirely dependent upon the composition of his stories within the *private* confines of middle-class domesticity (and *in bed*, no less!).[16]

William Veeder similarly comments on the significance of Stevenson's correspondence to Symonds in his essay, "Children of the Night: Stevenson and Patriarchy." In his combined Freudian and Marxist reading of Jekyll and Hyde, Veeder notes that "[b]ecause members of the psyche are at war, other members must be [as well] — family members, members of society, genital members. The resulting casualty is not simply Jekyll/Hyde but culture itself" ("Children" 108). Veeder thus reads Jekyll and Hyde as, first, a general commentary on Victorian

patriarchal social organizations and, also, as a particular critique of the rising and *gendered* professional class. According to Veeder,

> [t]he site of Jekyll and Hyde is . . . not simply London or Edinburgh[17] but the larger milieu of late Victorian patriarchy; the focus of the story is less on Jekyll's attitude toward Hyde than on the way that the Jekyll/Hyde relationship is replicated throughout Jekyll's circle. Lanyon, Enfield, and Utterson participate so thoroughly in Jekyll/Hyde that they constitute an emblematic community, a relational network, which reflects — and thus allows us readers a perspective on — the networks of male bonds in late-Victorian Britain. This network marks a psychological condition as a cultural phenomenon.
>
> ("Children" 108)

In reading Jekyll's circle of male companions as emblematic and, indeed, even symptomatic of a larger cultural occurrence, Veeder rightly argues that "the professional is a screen for the domestic" in Jekyll and Hyde, and he locates numerous examples in Stevenson's text where, "[r]ather than entertaining at clubs, old friends invite one another home" ("Children" 135, 108). According to Veeder, then, Stevenson's all-male narrative, replete with members of the professional class, successfully collapses the Victorian notion of separate spheres in Jekyll and Hyde.

Veeder, moreover, reads Jekyll and Hyde as a text which enacts multiple Freudian dramas of "Oedipal conflict and sibling rivalry," and he convincingly

links Stevenson's text to the author's relationship with both his parents ("Children" 122). According to Veeder, Stevenson was raised, on the one hand, to respect the rising professional class, of whom his father, Thomas Stevenson, was a member; yet, on the other hand, young Louis always maintained a sense of "nostalgia for the gentry Balfours of his mother's line" ("Children" 110, 111). Veeder writes:

> Patriarchy, as Stevenson considers it, is essentially *bourgeois*. These men [in Jekyll and Hyde: i.e., Jekyll, Utterson, Lanyon, Enfield] are not products of ancient families and land tenure. Their bonds are formed through the educational process ('old mates both at school and college' [36]), which prepares men not for the aristocratic pleasures of leisure and sport but for the middle-class ideals of hard work and public service. 'Name' is important because it constitutes not continuity of title but hard-earned respect.
>
> ("Children" 111; emphasis original)

The articulation of "the middle-class ideals of hard work and public service" thus informs the construction of the professional class — a group identity that is constituted by its membership of individual "self-made" men.[18] The Victorian notion of the self-made (professional) man has particular resonance for Jekyll and Hyde, since Stevenson's text, I would argue, reinscribes this notion via its presentation of Jekyll/Hyde as the self-made *homosexual* man.

To a large extent, Veeder successfully demonstrates that Jekyll and Hyde indeed critiques the privileging of professional men in a predominantly patriarchal society. However, I am disappointed that Veeder often insists on reducing Stevenson's complex representation of the Victorian division of public and private spaces and its relation to gender ideology. At the outset of his essay, Veeder confesses that two particular questions motivate him to write about Jekyll and Hyde: "Why are there, for all practical purposes, no women in Stevenson's novella? And why are the major characters, Jekyll, Utterson, and Lanyon, all professional men as well as *celibates*?" ("Children" 107; emphasis added). Posing these questions is undoubtedly important for any reading of Jekyll and Hyde. But the major flaw in Veeder's argument, I think, resides in his conflation of the "bachelor" with that of the "celibate." For Veeder to suggest that the bachelors in Jekyll and Hyde are synonymously celibates forecloses, I would argue, the numerous possibilities of reading the highly-nuanced *sexual* subtext of Jekyll and Hyde, along with its characterization of the self-made homosexual man.[19]

Besides which, the open secret of (homo)sexuality at the very core of Stevenson's text represents a more pervasive cultural practice, for, as the historian Brian Harrison explains of fin-de-siècle British society:

> [T]his was an age of bachelors, or of married men who spent a large part of their lives as if they were bachelors: the London clubs — recruited from a number of ancillary male institutions in the public schools, Oxford and

> Cambridge colleges and professional institutions — *catered amply for their needs*.
>
> (97; emphasis added)

The bachelor lifestyle of the fin-de-siècle thus attracted both single and married men. Indeed, to quote a typically Wildean observation from The Picture of Dorian Gray: "Nowadays all the married men live like bachelors, and all the bachelors like married men" (178). Since this is the case, why do the single and supposedly celibate men in Jekyll and Hyde favour entertaining each other at home, when the institution of "Clubland" was simultaneously available to them? Whatever motivation contributes to such seemingly non-descript and traditional *male* rituals is certainly worth investigating, not least because Jekyll and Hyde is a singular example within a larger phenomenon known as "bachelor literature." As Koestenbaum observes of this literary corpus:

> [W]riters such as Oscar Wilde, John Addington Symonds, H. Rider Haggard, Henry James, and Robert Louis Stevenson — some self-identified as homosexual, some not — forged a literature we might call *bachelor* because of its concern with the male communal fantasies of resolutely unmarried men. Stevenson was not a bachelor: he was married to Fanny Osborne, eleven years his senior and mother of three children from a previous marriage. Nor was Oscar Wilde, strictly speaking, a bachelor. Fin-de-siècle bachelor literature may have been written by

> married men, but it enacted flight from wedlock and from the narrative conventions of bourgeois realism.
>
> ("Shadow" 32-33; emphasis original)

The historical and literary evidence thus foregrounds the acute anxieties which Victorian men experienced when the categories of gender, class, and sexuality intersected in multiple and complicated ways in the construction and negotiation of private and public identities. For male writers, especially, these anxieties are articulated in their textual representations of the permeable and shifting, if not also the imaginary, nature of the border separating the public from the private, the professional from the domestic.

Veeder's argument is guilty of yet another conflation — one which confuses misogyny with homosexual desire. Even when Veeder attempts to account for the absence of women in Stevenson's text by rightly pointing to the prevalent misogyny in Jekyll and Hyde, his "chivalrous" (?) attempt backfires and ends up being homophobic. Consider Veeder's simplistic notion that the "patriarchs in Jekyll and Hyde are too misogynistic to wed [and this] may explain why there are so few women in the novella, but it does not explain why patriarchs are misogynistic" (143). "To begin to answer this question," Veeder continues, "I must complicate things further. *Men antagonistic to women are attracted to men*" (143; emphasis added). Rather than complicating the issue, Veeder's claim simply reduces it to an misinformed assumption that misogyny equals homosexuality. As such, rather than disclosing or uncovering the possible

motives or secrets in Stevenson's text, Veeder instead further encloses and displaces them. To be fair, however, Veeder concludes by observing that "[h]omosexual inclinations are as occluded as they are intense in Jekyll and Hyde, because patriarchs contribute to their culture's repression of inversion, even as they incline toward it" (143). In this sense, then, Veeder's reading of Jekyll and Hyde echoes the narrative elements in Stevenson's text itself, since I find his essay often "as occluded as [it is] intense." Yet despite what I see as Veeder's (unexamined?) tendency to conflate particular terms and their meanings, his otherwise brilliant essay remains a valuable critical contribution. And I would like to extend, in particular, Veeder's discussion of the elision of inner and outer spaces in Jekyll and Hyde and incorporate it into my current project.

At the outset of his narrative, Stevenson foregrounds the complex dynamics structuring the metaphorical ideology of separate spheres, and, by doing so, he subsequently interrogates the masculinist tendencies in gender ideology as well. By titling the opening chapter of Jekyll and Hyde as (the) "Story of the Door," Stevenson *invites* his readers to accompany him in (t)his endeavor. Thus Richard Enfield's question to Utterson — "Did you ever remark that door? . . . It is connected . . . with a very odd story" (30-31) — functions as an extratextual and mimetic invitation, on the part of the author, to the reader(s) of Jekyll and Hyde. Therefore, inasmuch as doors function as *entrances* (*into* the story), they are also *the story/stories* (hence the title of the opening chapter).

The primacy of doors as thresholds in Jekyll and Hyde, and their relation both to the architectural structure of Jekyll's house and to Jekyll's secret, has been duly and variously noted by several critics.[20] Heath, for example, argues that "[t]he basic narrative is one of discovery, that of the double identity of Jekyll-Hyde . . . and the organising image for this narrative is the breaking down of doors, learning the secret behind them" (95). Extending Heath's observation, Elaine Showalter points out that "[t]he narrators of Jekyll's secret attempt *to open up the mystery of another man*, not by understanding or secret sharing, but by force" (110; emphasis added). "The first chapter is called 'The [*sic*] Story of the Door'," Showalter continues, "and while Hyde, as the text repeatedly draws our attention, has a key to Jekyll's house, Utterson makes violent entries, finally breaking down the door to Jekyll's private closet with an axe, as if into what Jekyll calls 'the very fortress of identity' [83]" (110). Veeder, in particular, comments on "Utterson's long obsession with Hyde's power [over Jekyll]," an obsession which "is brought into *violent focus* on th[e] particular night by the revelation of Hyde's key" and one which displays "obviously erotic aspects of *whipping out and going in*" ("Children" 146; emphasis added). Importantly, Showalter's and Veeder's arguments foreground the contrast between, on the one hand, Hyde's actual possession of the key to Jekyll's house, and, on the other, Utterson's lack of one. The language that Showalter and Veeder use in their respective arguments, moreover, aptly captures the highly sexualized nature of "the key" and its relation to "the door(s)." Utterson's eventual "forced entry" into

Jekyll's private sanctuary thus betrays, for lack of a better term, a sense of the lawyer's "key-envy."

I introduce the term "key-envy" with its obvious resonance to the psychoanalytic notion of *Penisneid*, also often loosely translated as "penis-envy" in English. According to the psychoanalytic model, penis-envy (for females) and castration anxiety (for males) are necessary psychosocial experiences which ensure the individual's proper (i.e., "healthy" and "normal") processing of and entry into the patriarchal symbolic order. As Elizabeth Grosz explains:

> The processes by which the phallus, a signifier, becomes associated with the penis, an organ, involves the procedures by which women are systematically excluded from positive self-definition and a potential autonomy. The relations each sex has to the phallus *qua* signifier map the position(s) each occupies as a feminine or masculine subject in the patriarchal symbolic order.
>
> (116)

Utterson's sentiments of "key-envy," which he directs towards Edward Hyde *for* possession of Jekyll's key, thus bears strong resemblance to the process of systematic exclusion of female subjects from the symbolic order — an exclusion which presupposes women's "*lack*" of a penis/phallus.

The subject of inclusion/exclusion, moreover, bears a direct relation to the issue of "permission" in Jekyll and Hyde. Permission obviously means consent or authorization — in the case of Stevenson's novella, I have in mind the

articulation/silencing of sanctioned versus taboo human sexual behaviours. The term, however, also gestures towards the crossing and trespassing of physical thresholds — the act(s) of *permitting* one another to enter certain premises. In Jekyll and Hyde, I would argue that the permission to speak and the permission to enter are inextricably linked to the issue of homosexual desires. Let me elaborate on this by again referring to "Children of the Night," where Veeder argues:

> Utterson is thus attracted to, as well as emulous of, Edward Hyde. Once Hyde gets Jekyll's will, he becomes that will. He becomes in effect what has always attracted Utterson to Jekyll. That Hyde can be seen as the penis of Jekyll was proposed years ago by Dr. Mark Kanzer.[21] Though I believe Kanzer is close to the mark, his argument — that Hyde is small and deformed — seems weak. Kanzer describes as anatomical what is symbolic. *Hyde is Jekyll's phallus*. Or rather, Hyde represents two contradictory perceptions of patriarchy: the patriarchal claim to phallic presence, to power, control, will; and . . . the opposite, the patriarchal sense of itself as *absent*, the reality of *impotence* and *dysfunction*.
>
> ("Children" 146-47; emphasis added)

Veeder is right to stress that what is at play in Jekyll and Hyde is not the penis, since the anatomical male organ, the signified, simply represents the overdetermined signifier of patriarchal privilege within the symbolic order, the phallus. Veeder's argument that the phallus represents two contradictory perceptions is also an important point, primarily because it foregrounds the

indeterminate nature of the phallus itself. The phallus is, indeed, suspect in Stevenson's novella — absent, impotent and, even, dysfunctional.[22] Unfortunately, however, Veeder neglects to connect what he sees as the (im)potency of the phallus to his earlier argument that Jekyll and Hyde represents the elision of public and private spaces. Consider, for example, Veeder's comment that "[c]ritics have noted how the very different faces of the house — patrician entrance and ratty back door — reflect Jekyll's two roles of patriarch and nightstalker. As these are the two roles of one man, however," Veeder continues, "Stevenson cannot allow even an architectural dichotomy to remain intact. *Front and back, which seem so different, are also alike*" ("Children" 121; emphasis added).

In contradistinction to Veeder, who notices the similarities between the two entrances to Jekyll's house, I would instead stress the obvious differences between them. Stevenson, himself, foregrounds the contrast in his descriptions: unlike the main entrance to Jekyll's house, "which wore a great air of wealth and comfort" (40) and which was equipped with a knocker, the backdoor is described as follows:

> [The adjacent side of the building in which Jekyll's house stood] was two storeys high; showed no window, nothing but a door on the *lower* storey and a blind forehead of discoloured wall on the upper; and bore in every feature the marks of prolonged and sordid negligence. The door, which was equipped with neither bell nor knocker, *was blistered and distained.*

> Tramps slouched into *the recess* and struck matches on the panels; children kept shop upon the steps; the schoolboy had tried his knife on the mouldings; and for close on a generation no one had appeared to drive away these *random visitors* or to *repair these ravages*.
>
> (30; emphasis added)

Throughout the passage, the description of the backdoor to Jekyll's house gets increasingly detailed: first, the door on the *lower* storey is simply described as "b[earing] in [its] every feature the marks of prolonged and sordid negligence"; the markings on the door are then described as "blistered and distained"; and finally, in addition to its lack of "neither bell nor knocker," we are told that the door also forms a "recess," which offers shelter to its numerous "random visitors" (tramps and schoolboys) who have vandalized and "ravage[d]" its surface. Indeed, with such an appearance, any passerby on this "by street in a busy quarter of London" would easily "remark that door," even without someone like Enfield pointing it out to her/his attention (30). Moreover, as Stevenson elaborates via Enfield's explanation to Utterson: "There is no other door, and nobody goes *in or out* of that one, but, once in a great while, the gentleman of my adventure" (33; emphasis added). The backdoor to Jekyll's house, therefore, is strictly associated with the doctor's double, Edward Hyde.

I have belaboured the physical appearance of Jekyll's backdoor and its relation to Hyde in order to argue that Hyde represents Jekyll's anus, rather than just solely representing Jekyll's phallus, as Veeder proposes. My suggestion is

informed by Stevenson's physical descriptions of Jekyll's backdoor and, also, by Guy Hocquenghem's theory of the "sublimated anus" in his early and influential study, Homosexual Desire. Drawing from Freud's delineation of the anal stage as a pivotal stage in the formation of the self/subject, Hocquenghem argues that:

> The anus has no social position except [in] sublimation. The functions of this organ are truly private; they are the site of the formation of the person. The anus expresses privatisation itself. The analytic case-history (and we cannot help seeing "anal" in "analytic") presupposes that the anal stage is transcended so that the genital stage may be reached. But the anal stage is necessary if detachment from the phallus is to take place. In fact sublimation is exercised on the anus as on no other organ, in the sense that the anus is made to progress from the lowest to the highest point: anality is the very movement of sublimation itself.
>
> (96)

Unlike the phallus which serves a social (hence public) function in the constitution of the (male) subject, the anus simply performs an excremental (hence private) purpose. Herein lies the primary difference between the "sublimated anus" and the "phallic signifier," according to Hocquenghem: "The constitution of the private, individual, 'proper' person is 'of the anus'; the constitution of the public person is 'of the phallus' " (97). Also important for my current project is Hocquenghem's observation that, although "[i]t may be said that homosexuals are not alone in making a desiring use of the anus" (97), the

common assumption remains that "[t]he desiring use of the anus made by homosexuals is the chief, if not the exclusive one" (98). Therefore, to the extent that "[o]nly homosexuals make such constant libidinal use of this zone," Hocquenghem argues that "[h]omosexual desire *challenges* anality-sublimation because it *restores the desiring use of the anus*" (98; emphasis added). Going back to Stevenson's physical descriptions of Jekyll's backdoor in light of Hocquenghem's argument, it now becomes particularly salient that Hyde — not unlike the actual threshold from which he enters and exits from — indeed represents Jekyll's anus. In devoting such attention to the primacy of Jekyll's backdoor — the "Story of *the* Door" from which the entire narrative of Jekyll and Hyde depends — Stevenson thus skillfully deconstructs the overdetermined nature of the phallus as the privileged signifier within the symbolic order. And in doing so, Stevenson instead privileges the anus as the locus of both social power and homosexual desire in his all-male narrative.

Hocquenghem's delineation of the sublimated anus additionally provides an entry, so to speak, into more closely examining the dual notion of permission which I introduced earlier in the chapter. Let us begin with the issue of consent/authorization as it relates to the articulation/silencing of sanctioned versus taboo sexual behaviours. According to Enfield (En*d*field?), "the well-known man about town" (29), he happened to witness the accidental collision between a man and a young girl, upon his "coming home from some place at the end of the world" on the night (early morning, really) in question (31). "[A]nd then came

the horrible part of the thing," continues Enfield to Utterson, "for the man trampled calmly over the child's body and left her screaming on the ground. It sounds nothing to hear but it was hellish to see" (31). In his account to Utterson, Enfield selectively chooses, on the one hand, to tone down the details concerning Hyde's trampling of the little girl ("[i]t sounds nothing to hear," *now*) and, on the other, to sensationalize other details ("but it was hellish to see," *then*). Enfield's ambivalence thus privileges his own subject-position as an *immediate* witness to Hyde's unprovoked violence, in contradistinction to Utterson, with whom he offers a *mediated* account of the scene. In many ways, then, Enfield and his point(s)-of-view represent a narrative *threshold* for Utterson and, subsequently, for readers of Jekyll and Hyde.

This narrative threshold, moreover, demonstrates the extent to which the *permission* to speak of something (in this case, to recount Hyde's pedestrian crime) is inextricably linked to the very act of *admission* (in the sense of the term as an acknowledgment, confession, or revelation; and, as I will discuss later, as the process or right of entering). In other words, the dual nature of *verbal* permission/admission functions to authorize certain details over other ones. After eliciting a non-committal though highly judgmental response of "Tut-tut!" from Utterson (32), Enfield concurs with his listener and continues on with his narrative:

> 'Yes, it's a bad story. For my man was a fellow that nobody could have to do with, a really damnable man; and the person that drew the cheque is the

> very pink of proprieties, celebrated too, and (what makes it worse) one of your fellows who do what they call good. *Blackmail*, I suppose; an honest man paying through the nose for some of the capers of his youth. *Blackmail House* is what I call that place with the door, in consequence . . . .'
>
> (32-33; emphasis added)

As Enfield concludes, however, even naming the building in question "Blackmail House" is insufficient, "far from explaining all" the details informing the "Story of the Door" (33). Just as Enfield momentarily inclines "to a vein of musing," the following dialogue ensues between the two men:

> From this [Enfield] was recalled by Mr Utterson asking rather suddenly: 'And you don't know if the drawer of the cheque lives there?'
>
> 'A likely place, isn't it?' returned Mr Enfield. 'But I happen to have noticed his address; he lives in some square or other.'
>
> '*And you never asked about — the place with the door?*' said Mr Utterson.
>
> 'No, sir: I had a delicacy,' was the reply. 'I feel very strongly about *putting questions*; it partakes too much of the style of the day of judgment. . . . No, sir, I make it a rule of mine: *the more it looks like Queer Street, the less I ask.*'
>
> 'A very good rule, too,' said the lawyer.
>
> (33; emphasis added)

Although the conversation between Utterson and Enfield displays, at first glance, a simple question-and-answer exchange, their dialogue makes evident the admission/permission nexus upon which information is shared. Even with Utterson's repeated offer of *permission* to speak ("And you don't know if the drawer of the cheque lives there? . . . And you never asked about — the place with the door?"), Enfield's *admission* merely states that a sense of "delicacy" prevented him from inquiring further into the matter. Moreover, Enfield's sense of delicacy and his rule (that "the more it looks like Queer Street, the less he ask[s]") far exceed the parameters of gentlemanly etiquette in conversational skills, insofar as they foreground the extent to which decorum and desire are inextricably linked to each other. The term desire not only refers to the desire to know and thus gain information, but, as I will argue, it also alludes to homosexual desires in Jekyll and Hyde. Appropriately enough, Karl Miller's observation — that " '[o]dd,' 'queer,' 'dark,' 'fit,' 'nervous' . . . are the bricks which had built the house of the double" (241) — definitely applies to Stevenson's text, insofar as we are easily directed, as readers, to locate the address of homosexual desires in Jekyll and Hyde: Blackmail House on Queer Street.

Thus far my focus has been on the verbal axis of the permission/admission nexus. In such a model, however, there is also a physical axis as well, whereby the *permission* to enter physical spaces directly relates to the very act of gaining *admission* into such spaces (i.e., the process or right of entering).[23] Jekyll and Hyde undoubtedly offers numerous examples that describe the physical acts of

crossing and re-crossing thresholds, with or without proper permission/admission. One of the earliest instances of this occurs in the opening chapter, "Story of the Door": Hyde, after being confronted by Enfield and the mob of witnesses, agrees to "avoid a scene" and asks the crowd to "name [its] figure" so as to compensate the injuries suffered by the little girl (32). As Enfield later describes it to Utterson: "The next thing was to get the money; and where do you think he carried us but to that place with the door? — [whereby Hyde] whipped out a key, went in, and presently came back" outside to confront the crowd (32). Although Hyde briefly enters through and immediate exits from the door, his combined action figures as an act of partially legitimating his subject-position. For, in bearing "a cheque for the balance of [ninety pounds] . . . and signed with a name that [Enfield] can't mention" (32), Hyde begins to gain a pseudo-reputable (though still suspect) subject-position. Because the cheque bears "a name at least very well known and often printed" (32), Hyde's position shifts markedly: Hyde no longer remains as simply the perpetrator of a nocturnal crime; rather, he now begins to acquire some sort of cultural capital or social mobility, which his gaining of permission *and* admission into Enfield's chambers clearly indicate. In short, Henry Jekyll's reputable name provides an access to propriety (and even breakfast the next morning!) for the social outcast, Edward Hyde.

In turn, such a subtle transformation — on the part of Hyde and on the part of Enfield's perception(s) of Hyde — helps us to understand more fully Enfield's

inability to answer Utterson's query: "What sort of a man is he [Hyde] *to see?*" (34; emphasis added).

> 'He is not easy to describe. There is something wrong with his appearance; something displeasing, something downright detestable. I never saw a man I so disliked, and yet I scarcely know why. He must be deformed somewhere; he gives a strong feeling of deformity, although I couldn't specify the point. He's an extraordinary-looking man, and yet I really can name nothing out of the way. No, sir; I can make no hand of it; I can't describe him. And it's not want of memory; for I declare I can see him this moment.'
>
> (34)

I would argue that Enfield's inability to describe accurately Hyde's physical appearance marks an important (mis)recognition, on the former's part, of another sort of "well-known man about town." Enfield remains perfectly cognizant that Jekyll's relationship to Hyde potentially represents an instance of blackmail, made especially evident by his speculations to Utterson that Jekyll is "an honest man paying through the nose for some of the capers of his youth." In addition, however, I would argue that Enfield similarly and willingly desires to *mis*recognize and reject the figure of Hyde *because* of such a (self-) recognition. Walking the streets alone at night, Enfield's reputation is undoubtedly as morally suspect as Hyde's. According to Enfield, on the night in question, he walked along "street after street . . . till at last [he] got into that state of mind when a man

listens and listens and begins to long for the sight of a policeman" (31). Indeed, why is Enfield out and about during the same time as Hyde? And why does his desire for the materialization of an officer mask, to a large extent, a displaced sense of paranoia? I pose these questions in order to argue that Enfield's admission suggests an important clue which is often overlooked by critics of Jekyll and Hyde: namely, that the scene of Hyde's crime, the by street of Jekyll's residence, represents a potential cruising-ground for "well-known [men] about town," a setting that is additionally associated with (routine?) institutional surveillance. Perhaps this is why Enfield describes Hyde as "deformed somewhere," or, at the very least, that "he gives a strong feeling of deformity" (34). The cliché of "it takes one to know one" certainly rings true in this case. In other words, the subsequent feeling of "gentlemanly fellowship" between Enfield and Hyde which Veeder makes notice of ("Children" 117), gestures, additionally, towards a membership or affiliation that is based *not* on class or gender alone, but on same-sex desires as well.

Immediately after this episode, Utterson returns to "his bachelor house in sombre spirits" (35). There, in the privacy of his own domestic space, Utterson retrieves from his safe "a document endorsed on the envelope as Dr Jekyll's will, and [sits] down with a clouded brow to study its contents" (35). As readers, we are immediately informed not only of the terms of Jekyll's will, but also of the source of the attorney's despondency and melancholia:

> This document [of Jekyll's will] had long been the lawyer's *eyesore*. It offended him both as a lawyer and as a lover of the sane and customary sides of life, to whom the fanciful was the immodest. And hitherto it was his *ignorance of Mr Hyde* that had swelled his indignation; now, by a sudden turn, it was his ***knowledge***.
>
> (35; emphasis added)

Enfield's account of Hyde (or, perhaps, Enfield's inability to describe more fully the physical "eyesore" that is Hyde) motivates Utterson to admit that Jekyll's will indeed represents a scandalous and disgraceful liaison between Henry Jekyll and his double/heir, Edward Hyde. To say the least, Utterson's newly-discovered knowledge only motivates the lawyer to investigate further into the matter, and he decides to visit Dr Lanyon with the aim of procuring more information.

Both Enfield's narrative and the late-night visit to Dr Lanyon trigger, for Utterson, a highly-charged homoerotic dream-sequence. Unable to sleep, Utterson willingly surrenders to his "engaged, or rather enslaved" imagination, "and as [the lawyer] lay and tossed in the gross darkness of the night and the curtained room, Mr Enfield's tale went by before his mind in a scroll of lighted pictures" (37):

> He would be aware of the great field of lamps in a nocturnal city; then of the figure of a man walking swiftly; then of a child running from the doctor's; and then these met, and that human Juggernaut trod the child down and passed on regardless of her screams. *Or else* he would see a

> room in a rich house, where his friend [Jekyll] lay asleep, dreaming and smiling at his dreams; and then *the door* of that room would be opened, the curtains of the bed plucked apart, the sleeper recalled, and, lo! there would stand by his side a figure to whom power was given, and even at that dead hour he must *rise* and do its bidding. The figure [of Hyde] in these *two phases* haunted the lawyer all night; and if at any time he dozed over, it was but to see it glide more stealthily *through sleeping houses*, or move the more swiftly, and still the more swiftly, even to dizziness, through wider labyrinths of lamp-lighted city, and at every street corner crush a child and leave her screaming.
>
> (37; emphasis added)

I quote Utterson's dream at length because of its nuanced displacement of same-sex desires. In crossing the boundary separating the conscious from the unconscious, Utterson's dream simply foregrounds, in the first phase, the rehearsal of Enfield's narrative. The second phase of his dream, however, remains highly charged with homoerotic tension, whereby Utterson places himself in the position of Hyde — the intruder of his own dream *and* the intruder who trespasses into Jekyll's bedchamber. Utterson, in essence, vicariously becomes a voyeur of *Hyde's* voyeurism. For Utterson, his dream articulates what Showalter has forcefully identified as the lawyer's "rape fantasies of a faceless figure" (110). Only in his unconscious, so it seems, can Utterson permit/admit the existence of his homoerotic desires for Jekyll and, to a different extent, for Hyde. Enslaved by

his unconscious imaginations, Utterson finally gains both the permission and admission to enter through the door leading into Jekyll's bedchamber, thus articulating a homoerotic desire that is often left unacknowledged in his waking moments.

Actually, Utterson's sublimated homoerotic desires eventually *do* surface in Jekyll and Hyde. In his self-assigned role as "Mr Seek," we are told that "Mr Utterson began to haunt the [back]door in the by street of shops" and "by all lights and at all hours of solitude or concourse, the lawyer was to be found on his chosen post" (38). In addition to his role as a voyeur of the dream-sequence, Utterson now becomes a stalker, patiently waiting for the chance encounter with the subject of his constant vigil and "nightly patrols" (38). After an undisclosed period of waiting, we are told that Utterson finally encounters the figure of Hyde. At once vaguely registering "what manner of man he had to deal with," Utterson then "stepped out [from the entry of the court] and touched [Hyde] on the shoulder as he passed" (39). And after confirming Hyde's identity, Utterson admits his case:

> 'I see you [Hyde] are going in. . . . I am an old friend of Dr Jekyll's — Mr Utterson, of Gaunt Street — you must have heard my name; and meeting you so conveniently, *I thought you might admit me* [inside].'
>
> (39; emphasis added)

Although Utterson's request is largely a pretense disguising his more urgent desire to register Hyde's facial features, it is nonetheless a telling example which

displays the first of many instances, in Jekyll and Hyde, whereby the lawyer seeks to gain the admission/permission to enter particular spaces. Utterson's wish to gain admission/permission to enter through the backdoor fails, however; and, after engaging in a brief and somewhat heated exchange with the lawyer, Hyde "unlock[s] the door and disappear[s] into the house" (40).

I would argue that Utterson's desire to gain admission/permission into various domestic spaces crucially structures Jekyll and Hyde. The fact that Utterson repeatedly attempts to gain entry into particular spaces is certainly important to stress, as is the fact that he consistently fails to do so, based solely *on his own means*. Consider the episode following Hyde's murder of Sir Danvers Carew: being fully convinced that the various evidence points to Hyde's involvement in the crime (the maid's testimony, Carew's letter addressed to himself, the broken walking-stick), Utterson leads the police officer to Hyde's lodgings in Soho. Upon their arrival at the address, Utterson and the officer meet "[a]n ivory-faced and silvery-haired old woman [who] opened the door" (49). Even though Utterson clearly states to the housekeeper that he and the officer "wish to see [Hyde's] rooms," his admission nonetheless fails to gain them the permission to enter, for "the woman . . . declare[d] [that] it was impossible [for them to do so]" (49). His failure prompts Utterson to inform the housekeeper of the identity of his companion as "Inspector Newcomen of Scotland Yard" (49). This information eventually allows Utterson and the officer to pass through the threshold into Hyde's lodgings, thereby demonstrating that it is *the inspector* who

represents legal authority, and *not* Utterson himself, a gentleman whose professional identity as a lawyer proves inadequate.

As I note earlier in my argument, critics have correctly observed the importance of Utterson's forced entry into Jekyll's closet. Yet, to my knowledge, no critic has acknowledged how the final episode (with Poole and Utterson on one side of the threshold, and Jekyll/Hyde on the other) importantly resonates with the passages involving Jekyll/Hyde and Lanyon. Contained within the chapter entitled "Dr Lanyon's Narrative" is a letter "addressed in the hand of [Lanyon's] colleague and old-school companion, Henry Jekyll" (74). The contents of Jekyll's letter to his friend, dated on "the ninth of January," clearly instruct Lanyon — with minute and careful specifics — "to postpone all other engagements for to-night" (74). As Lanyon himself admits to Utterson in his own letter, "[u]pon the reading of [Jekyll's] letter, I made sure my colleague was insane; but till that was proved beyond the possibility of doubt, I felt bound to do as he requested" (75). Heeding Jekyll's instructions point-for-point, Lanyon recounts "[driving] straight to Jekyll's house," where he finds Poole (in the company of a locksmith and a carpenter) already waiting for him (76). Having accomplished "the first-part of [his] service," Lanyon then returns home to await the arrival of an unidentified man in order to fulfill the second-part of Jekyll's request, as outlined in his letter: "At midnight, then, I [Jekyll] have to ask you [Lanyon] to be alone in your consulting-room, *to admit with your own hand into the house* a man who will present himself in my name, and to place in his hands the drawer that you will

have brought with you from my cabinet" (75; emphasis added). In asking Lanyon personally "to admit" Hyde into his consulting-room, Jekyll essentially secures, for his double, the permission/admission to enter a space otherwise forbidden to such a "disreputable" figure as Hyde. Even in his desperation, Jekyll's forethought demonstrates a justified precaution which prevents Lanyon from potentially refusing Hyde's entry into a "respectable" domestic space. Importantly, then, the instructions contained within Jekyll's letter to Lanyon enact a subtle *doubling* of the permission/admission nexus. On the one hand, we are told that Lanyon is to "keep [Jekyll's] letter in . . . hand for consultation" (74) and that, upon Lanyon's arrival at Jekyll's house, he similarly discovers that Poole "had received by the same post . . . a registered letter of instruction [from his master, Jekyll]" (76). On the other hand, as I have argued, Jekyll's letter to Lanyon acts to guarantee Hyde's admission into Lanyon's consulting-room. In a parallel and doubling fashion, therefore, Jekyll's letter secures for both Lanyon and Hyde the permission and admission to enter particular spaces which would, in different circumstances, otherwise exclude them.[24]

The juxtaposition of the details of "Dr Lanyon's Narrative" with Utterson's later violent entry into Jekyll's closet foregrounds the extent to which letters and doors represent similar devices of enclosure and disclosure. As Heath rightly maintains of Jekyll and Hyde: "doors are broken down but everything must be enclosed, discovering and telling the secret are perilous [acts]" (96). After hearing Poole's account of the events which led to Jekyll's self-imposed

quarantine in his closet, Utterson makes a final request to his friend: "Jekyll, . . . I demand to see you. . . . I give you fair warning, our suspicions are aroused, and I must and shall see you . . . if not by fair means, then by foul — *if not of your consent, then by brute force!*" (69; emphasis added). Here, Utterson explicitly demands Jekyll's permission (or, rather, his "consent") to enter into the locked closet. The verbal admission articulated from beyond the threshold verifies, for Utterson and Poole, Hyde's presence: "Utterson, . . . for God's sake, have mercy!" (69). Importantly, though, this verification of "the voice" beyond the door also functions as a rejection which refuses to permit/admit the lawyer from entering (69). Hence, this dual confirmation and rejection motivate Utterson's instruction for Poole to break down the closet door (69). Moreover, two things remain particularly striking about this passage. First of all, since the manservant had been instructed by Jekyll to obtain the help of a locksmith and a carpenter for the purposes of permitting Lanyon's entry into the closet, during a previous occasion, why does he not currently prepare himself in the same manner? Secondly, even after inclining to believe that Hyde is hiding in Jekyll's closet, and being fully aware that Hyde *only* (ever) uses the backdoor, why does Utterson instruct both the footman and the knifeboy to take "their post at the laboratory door" in case "anything should be amiss, or any malefactor seek to escape by the back"? (68).

As I have suggested earlier, Hyde figuratively represents Jekyll's anus. As such, here, Utterson's "preservation" of the backdoor (i.e., leaving it intact and whole) similarly demonstrates the extent to which Stevenson privileges the anus,

over the phallus, as the locus of both social power and homosexual desire. In contrast to the "wreck of the [closet] door," whose "lock [was] burst in sunder" (69), we are informed that "the [back]door in the by street . . . [remains] locked" (71). "[A]nd lying near by on the flags, [Utterson and Poole] found the key [which once belonged to Hyde], *already stained with rust*" (71; emphasis added). Thus Utterson's consistent "key-envy" — a fantasmatic desire to be Jekyll's favourite which can only subliminally surface in his dreams — eventually proves to be a fruitless endeavour for the lawyer, after all. Although Utterson remains determined to maintain that the key "does not look like [it has been recently] use[d]," Poole's insistence that "it is broken . . . much as if a man had stamped on it" soon convinces the lawyer otherwise (71).[25] Utterson's illusions are thus finally shattered: to reword Veeder's argument (about Hyde), Utterson eventually realizes that the "possession of the key to Jekyll's place (in every sense) [*does not put*] into his hands the prerequisites of patriarchy — ownership, access, [and] ultimately the power to reify the nonself" ("Children" 147).[26]

Yet, insofar as Stevenson's novella privileges the anus over the phallus, via its presentation of the permeable nature of the physical/ideological thresholds separating the public from the private, Lanyon's and Jekyll's suicides remain perplexing issues.[27] Herein lies, once again, the paradox of the open secret structuring Stevenson's text. On the one hand, both "Dr Lanyon's Narrative" and "Henry Jekyll's Full Statement of the Case" indeed provide — for Utterson and, also, for readers of Jekyll and Hyde — some answers to the Jekyll/Hyde

relationship. On the other hand, however, not unlike the backdoor to Jekyll's house, it can be argued that the mystery behind the relationship between Jekyll and his double, Hyde, similarly remain(s) "intact." Importantly and paradoxically, the preservation of such an open secret is made particularly evident with Lanyon's and Jekyll's respective confessions: both are documents that perform the written "admission" of Jekyll/Hyde's duality, but they are also documents that foreground the denial of "permission" with which to articulate such a duality. In many ways, then, just as the mystery of the Jekyll/Hyde relationship remains unsolved and unsolveable, same-sex desires similarly persist to be unmentioned and unmentionable secrets in Jekyll and Hyde.

The paradox of the open secret, therefore, reveals how "public prudery" and "private prurience" function in simultaneously disclosing and obscuring Jekyll and Hyde's presentation of the self-made *homosexual* man. A close examination of Jekyll's "Full Statement of the Case" reveals the doctor's prevalent use of architectural images in describing the "sheltering" of his subjectivities. Referring to "the two natures that contended in the field of [his] consciousness," Jekyll regrets that "[i]f [only] each [of his two natures] . . . could but be *housed* in separate identities, life would be relieved of all that was unbearable" (82; emphasis added). During his scientific experiments with an unspecified substance, Jekyll discovers that "[his] natural body [was but] the mere aura and effulgence of certain of the powers that made up [his] spirit"; and that this drug was capable of substituting "a second form or countenance," "none the

less natural to [Jekyll] because they were the expression, and bore the stamp, of lower elements in [his] soul" (83). Even as he recognizes the dangers inherent to conducting such an experiment, Jekyll nonetheless continues with his scientific project, and he recalls in his confession to Utterson:

> I hesitated long before I put this theory to the test of practice. I knew well that I risked death; for any drug that so potently controlled and shook *the very fortress of identity*, might by the least scruple of an overdose or at the least inopportunity in the moment of exhibition, utterly blot out that *immaterial tabernacle* which I looked to it to change.
>
> (83; emphasis added)

Jekyll's earlier desire to "house" his twin natures thus gets translated into a more urgent and conflicting recognition that, while his identity resembles that of a "fortress," such an architectural stronghold is but a simulacrum of an "immaterial tabernacle," a temporary and make-shift shelter in which reside his dual subjectivities *as* Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. Indeed, the contradictory image of fortress and tabernacle, in Jekyll's "Full Statement of the Case," aptly captures the notion that the physical and corporeal "shelter" which houses one's soul/spirit is but "the trembling immateriality, the mist-like transience, of this seemingly so solid body in which we walked attired" (82).

It is important to note that Stevenson's representation of the human soul in Jekyll and Hyde is not a notion based solely upon Christian theology, since he himself possessed and articulated certain iconoclastic views.[28] Because of this

very reason, Foucault's distinction between the soul of Christian theology and the modern soul, in Discipline and Punish, is worth observing in the context of Jekyll and Hyde. According to Foucault, the soul of Christian theology, "born in sin and subject to punishment," differs from that of the modern soul, "born rather out of methods of punishment, supervision and constraint" (Discipline 29), thus creating a subject who is

> already in himself [*sic*] *the effect of a subjection more profound than himself.* A 'soul' inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a political economy; *the soul is the prison of the body.*
>
> (Discipline 30; emphasis added)

Although Foucault's study specifically traces the ideological effects attending "the birth of the prison," his identification and definition of a modern soul nonetheless reveal an important clue for reading Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde. I would argue that in Stevenson's novella, "the soul is [indeed] the prison of the body." That is, according to Foucault's formulation, the soul is not housed within the body, as Christian theology maintains; instead, the modern soul shelters and even *imprisons* the body. Accordingly, then, Jekyll's public identity insufficiently covers over his private/secret identity as Hyde because it is Hyde's identity that instead shelters and *imprisons* Jekyll's. Because Jekyll rightly perceives that he would be socially ostracized, were he to disclose publicly his

Hyde, it is Hyde, therefore, who, according to Jekyll's "Full Statement of the Case," consistently and/or increasingly dictates the terms of Jekyll's public conduct.

Jekyll/Hyde, himself/themselves, recognize(s) this crucial conflict between body and soul and, more importantly, between public and private identities. Such a recognition, moreover, is accompanied by a similar recognition of the intricate dynamics structuring "public prudery" and "private prurience." As Jekyll recalls in his confession, regardless of his "sincere renunciation [of Hyde]" (91), "[t]here comes an end to all things; the most capacious *measure* is filled at last; and this brief condescension to my evil finally destroyed the balance of my soul" (92; emphasis added). The term "measure" in the passage is fraught with manifold definitions: most obviously, the term refers to Jekyll's action to achieve some end (i.e., his renunciation of Hyde) and, hence, to his own estimation of his own conduct (i.e., his behaviour as Jekyll/Hyde). However, "measure" also refers to a physical vessel of sorts (i.e., the body/soul duality inherent to Jekyll/Hyde), which, in effect, *measures* and determines the degrees of both Jekyll's and Hyde's aberrant and dissident behaviour. In short, the "filling in" mentioned in the "Full Statement of the Case" certainly foregrounds an act of self-perception, on the part of Jekyll/Hyde; but equally important, however, the act also foregrounds an ideological and physical threshold, from which others perceive a relationship between Jekyll/Hyde.

I have termed this internal/external perception of the Jekyll/Hyde relationship as "public prudery" and "private prurience" — that is, both the doctor and the culture which he inhabits equally participate in measuring the behaviours which inform one's public and private identities. The most notable evidence of this internal/external perception occurs during a particular outing in Regent's Park, when Jekyll discovers that he is capable of *self-transformation* — from Jekyll into Hyde — even without the aid of any drug:

> After all, I reflected, I was like my neighbours; and then I smiled, comparing myself to other men, comparing my active goodwill with the lazy cruelty of their neglect. And at the very moment of that vainglorious thought, a qualm came over me, a nausea and the most deadly shuddering. These passed away, and left me faint; and then as in its turn the faintness subsided, I began to be aware of a change in the temper of my thoughts, a greater boldness, a contempt of danger, a solution of the bonds of obligation. I looked down; my clothes hung formlessly on my shrunken limbs; the hand that lay on my knee was corded and hairy. I was once more Edward Hyde. A moment before I had been safe of all men's respect, wealthy, beloved — the cloth laying for me in the dining-room at home; and now I was the common quarry of mankind, hunted, houseless, a known murderer, thrall to the gallows.
>
> (52-53)

This passage is notable because the Regent's Park episode resembles that of an earlier occurrence — described memorably by the doctor: "Yes, I had gone to bed [as] Henry Jekyll, [but] I had awakened [as] Edward Hyde" (88). While the earlier episode of self-transformation occurs in the privacy of the doctor's own bedchamber, the obviously public setting of the second episode foregrounds the futility of Jekyll's renunciation of Hyde, his other(ed) identity. Indeed, Jekyll and Hyde are one and the same, simply because both *are* men of reputation — the former, deserving and "safe of all men's respect, wealthy, [and] beloved"; the latter, "the common quarry of mankind, hunted, houseless, [and] a known murderer."

Although it is never explicitly stated, Dr Jekyll's identity as Mr Hyde obviously hints at homosexual desires. As such, the Victorian notion of the self-made professional man gets reinscribed in these two episodes, literally and metaphorically, as the self-made homosexual man in Stevenson's representation of Jekyll/Hyde. The lack of any chemical substance during these moments of self-transformation underscores a "naturalizing" process, to the extent that an external substance is no longer required to induce Jekyll's "throes of change" into Hyde (97). Because there occur two distinct episodes of Jekyll's self-transformation into Hyde, the boundary separating public from private spaces dissolve. Moreover, since Jekyll's transformations into Hyde are also witnessed by others, so too does the boundary separating public prudery and private prurience dissolve. During an "Incident at the Window," Utterson and Enfield

"[witness] . . . but for a glimpse" (61) Jekyll's transformation into Hyde. Yet despite the two men's consistent curiosity regarding Jekyll's relationship with Hyde, when actually confronted with the key to the mystery, neither one willingly acknowledges it. Discarding such a vital clue, both Utterson and Enfield instead resort to "silence" as they leave the scene of the crime, answering only with "horror in their eyes" (61). Such a gesture echoes an earlier plea made by Lanyon, yet another witness to Jekyll's transformation: "I could not think that this earth contained a place for sufferings and terrors *so unmanning*; and you can do but one thing, Utterson, to lighten this destiny, and that is to respect my *silence*" (58; emphasis added). All the male figures intimately connected with Henry Jekyll thus choose to ignore what is always already there, and always already known: the fact that Henry Jekyll is Edward Hyde, and vice versa. Undoubtedly, Stevenson's depiction of Hyde as a criminal figure foregrounds the "otherness" of Jekyll's double. Yet such a marginalization also attempts to represent what is unrepresentable, to make articulate what is unspeakable — the crime of homosexual desire. As Jekyll insists in his confession, what constitutes the "undignified" and "monstrous" nature of Hyde is certainly not an individual crime (86). For all the "well-known [men] about town" in Jekyll and Hyde are equally capable of facing a similar catastrophe: as vessel-like beings wandering "to and fro about the streets of the city" (94), these men need prepare themselves for "a dreadful shipwreck," an accident which will eventually force them to admit/permit Jekyll's dictum, "that man is not truly one, but truly two" (82).

The Consumption of Desires in Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray

I. An Economy of Split Subjectivities

Even though Henry Jekyll undoubtedly insists, in his "Full Statement of the Case," that "man is not truly one, but truly two," he also continues with the suggestion that such a notion of dual subjectivities is potentially susceptible to a further process of splitting or fracturing; and the doctor "hazard[s] the guess that man will be ultimately known for a mere polity of multifarious, incongruous and independent denizens" (82). And even though Jekyll maintains that "the [current] state of [his] own knowledge" prevents him from a first-hand discovery of such a process, he also confidently predicts that "[o]thers will follow [him], others will [eventually] outstrip [him] on the same lines" (82). In many ways, the doctor's astute yet modest "guesswork" in Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde materializes itself as a "prophecy," several years later, with the publication of Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890, 1891).[1] According to the narrator of Wilde's novel, in leading a Jekyll/Hyde-like double life of his own self-fashioning, Dorian Gray

> used to wonder at the shallow psychology of those who conceive the Ego in man as a thing simple, permanent, reliable, and of one essence. To him, man was a being with myriad lives and myriad sensations, a complex multiform creature that bore within itself strange legacies of thought and

passion, and whose very flesh was tainted with the monstrous maladies of the dead.

(143)

Since Wilde considered his contemporary, Stevenson, to be a "delicate artist in language" (Letters 314), it is not surprising that the above passage from Dorian Gray resonates, rather obviously, with Jekyll and Hyde. Like Jekyll/Hyde, then, Dorian similarly finds the concept of a singular and coherent subjectivity (i.e., "the Ego in man") an anathema. Indeed, Wilde's young protagonist firmly and contrarily believes in what he identifies as a form of "insincerity," the "method by which we can multiply our personalities" (142-43).[2]

Several critics have already and duly paired together Jekyll and Hyde with Dorian Gray, though their critical opinions vary dramatically. For example, while Karl Miller identifies Stevenson and Wilde as two notable literary "queer fellows," whose respective works display the fin-de-siècle preoccupation with the theme of duality (209-44), John Herdman instead observes that Jekyll and Hyde and Dorian Gray illustrate the decline of the double motif that was hitherto prevalent in nineteenth-century fiction (127-52). And while Nathan Cevro unproblematically overstates the case when he insists that "Wilde goes Robert Louis Stevenson one better [because Dorian] is tellingly moral and spiritual in his Christian version of the 'double-pipe' personality of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" (19), Chris Baldick more carefully notes that Dorian Gray "is in many ways the aesthete's version of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde" (148).[3] In Epistemology of the

Closet, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick also offers a brief but compelling gloss on the parallels between Jekyll and Hyde and Dorian Gray:

> In The Picture of Dorian Gray as in, for instance, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, drug addiction is both a camouflage and an expression for the dynamics of same-sex desire and its prohibition: both books begin by looking like stories of erotic tension between men, and end up as cautionary tales of solitary substance abusers. The two new taxonomies of the addict and the homosexual condense many of the same issues for late nineteenth-century culture: the old antisodomitic opposition between something called nature and that which is *contra naturam* blends with a treacherous apparent seamlessness into a new opposition between substances that are *natural* (e.g., 'food') and those that are *artificial* (e.g., 'drugs').
>
> (Epistemology 172; emphasis original)

Sedgwick's succinct observation that Dorian Gray portrays "solitary substance abusers" introduces, quite nicely, the link between consumption and subjectivity in Wilde's novel. Or, put another way, Sedgwick usefully foregrounds the dialectical interrelationship between the subject of consumption *and* the consuming subject in The Picture of Dorian Gray. My project aims at extending Sedgwick's worthwhile suggestion.

In this chapter, I will argue that Wilde's first and only full-length prose fiction attempts to articulate same-sex desires through its language of consumerist excess — a linguistic style that is evident throughout Dorian Gray, but

particularly so in Chapter 11. Centrally located in Wilde's twenty-chapter novel, Chapter 11 simultaneously interrupts and propels the plot of Dorian Gray in a typically Wildean, paradoxical fashion. On the one hand, insofar as Wilde replaces narrative action and dialogue with a condensed, enumerative prose style that describes, instead, Dorian's neurotic obsession with music, colourful jewels, and embroidered fabrics and tapestries, Chapter 11 indeed interrupts the plot of Dorian Gray. On the other hand, however, Wilde's rich and minutely-detailed descriptions in Chapter 11 paradoxically propel the plot of Dorian Gray as well. In spite, or perhaps more accurately, *because* of its digressive style, Chapter 11 serves the "economical" purpose of *explicating* Dorian's "moral decline" in relation to the larger context of the novel itself. In part, then, my project aims at reading Chapter 11 of Wilde's novel as a fine delineation of Dorian's aesthetic and highly-subjective interpretation of Lord Henry's code of a "new Hedonism" (22, 130). The espousal of such a code — both an epistemology and a lifestyle — requires the privileging of pleasure, sensation, and personal experience. Equally important, the primary axioms of such a code are made substantial for the naïve proselyte, Dorian, by the "yellow book" that Lord Henry sends him, "the *strangest book* that [the young man] ha[s] ever read" (125; emphasis added). As I will demonstrate later, in the "yellow book," Dorian finally discovers, in writing, the meaning of Lord Henry's early and memorable Paterian formula: "Yes . . . that is one of the great secrets of life — to cure the soul by means of the senses, and the senses by means of the soul" (20). Wilde's novel narrates Dorian's

experiential translation of all that he encounters on the pages of the mysterious text in question, thus codifying, for himself, Lord Henry's seductive argument that "[t]he only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it" (18).[4]

To the extent that a "fiscal" model usefully connects together the subject of consumption with the consuming subject in Dorian Gray, the remainder of this chapter will extend the metaphor (though, thankfully, with no spread sheets!). In "Marketing Subjectivities," I will discuss Wilde as a pivotal character in fin-de-siècle Britain — that is, I will approach the figure of Wilde as both person and persona. Drawing from the biographical details of Wilde's life and, in particular, from the Wilde trials of 1895, I will foreground the dialectical patterns informing Wilde's person(a)s and The Picture of Dorian Gray. The next section, "The Science of Consumption," will discuss the corresponding development of, on the one hand, the scientific disciplines of sexology, psychology, and psychoanalysis at the end of the nineteenth century, and, on the other, a culture of consumption in fin-de-siècle Britain (and Europe). In the final section, "Dorian Gray as Story and Case History," I will focus on Chapter 11 of Wilde's novel. I will compare the narrative structure of the "yellow book" and Chapter 11 of Dorian Gray with that of the "case history" (i.e., autobiographical testament) included in the scientific studies of Havelock Ellis and Sigmund Freud. My comparative approach will discuss the ways in which sexological and psychological assumptions of non-procreative (inverted and homosexual) desire inflect and inform the narrative *of* Dorian Gray *in* Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray. The last section of my

chapter primarily aims at discovering how the narrative strategies inherent in sexological, psychological, and psychoanalytic case histories correlate with, or at least partially resemble, the non-linear narrative structure of Chapter 11. I will conclude this section with a reading of Chapter 11 as a "symptomatic" articulation of Freud's theory of compulsion as it is outlined in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.[5]

II. Marketing Subjectivities

In Wilde's "The Decay of Lying" (1889), Vivian admits to Cyril that, however paradoxical the notion, "it is none the less true that Life imitates art far more than Art imitates life" (74). The Picture of Dorian Gray perhaps best demonstrates this paradoxical truism. Wilde's presentation of the intergenerational, same-sex relationship between Lord Henry Wotton and Dorian Gray in his novel — and to a different extent, between the painter Basil Hallward and his muse, Dorian — resembles, in many ways, the author's own charismatic influence over, and his problematic relationships with, the young(er) men in his life.[6] The private homosocial, homoerotic, and homosexual bonds which Wilde cultivated, and which he attempted to represent obliquely in Dorian Gray, were eventually made public in 1895, and they resulted in a scandal that led to Wilde's sentencing to Reading Gaol for committing acts of gross indecency. Dorian Gray represents a fictional translation of many of the aesthetic views on Art, Life, and Morality

which Wilde articulates, elsewhere, in his letters and essays. Wilde's perspectives in his many writings, I would argue, demonstrate an uncanny prescience that anticipates the jurisprudential nightmare the man of letters would later experience. Documenting these views *alongside* a reading of Dorian Gray, therefore, makes particularly salient the decadent and aesthetic representations of same-sex desires in the novel itself. In short, I will negotiate the biographical details with the textual, with an aim at elucidating the poetic (in)justice existent in both Wilde's life and his works.

Any project that specifically addresses the issue of same-sex desires in relation to Wilde's life and works needs to be attentive to two competing strategies, Ed Cohen suggests. On the one hand, critics of Dorian Gray, in particular, "must examine the ways that Wilde's novel moves both with and athwart the late Victorian ideological practices that naturalized male heterosexuality," but doing so only "without descending to a crude biographical explanation" ("Writing" 75). On the other hand, as Cohen remarks in his study of the Wilde trials, it is an indisputable fact that "Wilde was and remains . . . central to late-nineteenth-century sexual iconography precisely because he became the figure around which new representations of male sexual behavior in England coalesced" (Talk 99). With these critical strategies in mind, my project essentially seeks to balance — by simultaneously confirming and debunking — Basil Hallward's assertion, addressed to Lord Henry in the opening chapter of Dorian

Gray, that "[w]e [still?] live in an age when men [*sic*] treat art as if it were meant to be a form of autobiography" (11).

A private correspondence of Wilde's provides a useful entry for investigating the interrelated nature of split subjectivities evident in both The Picture of Dorian Gray and Wilde's life. In a letter postmarked on 12 February 1894 to Ralph Payne, a young man who had written to the author of Dorian Gray to inquire after the title of the "yellow book" recommended by Lord Henry to Dorian, Wilde replies as follows:

> Dear Mr Payne, The book that poisoned, or made perfect, Dorian Gray does not exist; it is a fancy of mine merely.
>
> I am so glad you like that strange coloured book of mine: *it contains much of me in it. Basil Hallward is what I think I am: Lord Henry what the world thinks of me: Dorian what I would like to be — in other ages, perhaps.*
>
> Will you come and see me?
>
> . . . But perhaps you are busy? Still, we can meet, surely, some day. Your handwriting fascinates me, *your praise charms me*. Truly yours
>
> OSCAR WILDE
>
> (Letters 352; emphasis added)

Wilde's congenial response to Payne's *qu(e)ery* nicely elucidates the public/ private identities of both the author and his protagonists in Dorian Gray. In his

letter, Wilde essentially captures and consequently foregrounds the economy of split subjectivities inherent in both his life *and* novel: because of his artistic role, Wilde first affiliates himself with the painter Basil Hallward; Wilde then acknowledges how the general public tends to conceive of him as more suitably matched for the role of Lord Henry; and, finally, Wilde articulates his desire to be identified with Dorian Gray, the young and impressionable protagonist in his novel.

In his letter to Payne, Wilde's candidness with a perfect stranger largely confirms his typically narcissistic temperament, a characteristic feature of his already established public(ized) reputation in the British press by this time. As Richard Ellmann comments in his biography of Wilde, the years following the magazine and book appearances of Dorian Gray had engendered a copious amount of reviews in various nineteenth-century periodicals; and, as such, the early 1890s represented a period of years that undoubtedly "announced the age of Dorian" (305). During this time, Wilde's novel served to redefine the aesthetic movement that had already gained particular currency during the 1880s: "In the eighties," writes Ellmann, "aestheticism suffered for lack of example: Dorian Gray filled the need" (305). Ellmann also notes that "[t]he group of young men who followed Wilde swelled with his [literary] success [i.e., Dorian Gray]" (307), and the direct result emboldened Wilde randomly to invite his adoring male fans to visit him, as his letter to Payne clearly indicates. Therefore, it is easy to surmise, and fair to assume, that the notorious (i.e., scandalous) success of Dorian

Gray contributed to and fed Wilde's own solipsistic tendencies. To say that perhaps a sense of vanity — or what Ellmann identifies as "narcissistic socialism" (305) — characterized Wilde's public/private person(a)s is to understate the case. For this is the same man who claims in "Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young" — Wilde's 1894 contribution to the Oxford undergraduate publication, The Chameleon — that "[t]o love oneself is the beginning of a lifelong romance" (3). Though certainly offered tongue-in-cheek, Wilde's witty aphorism contains a degree of truth that encapsulates much of the writer's solipsistic sentiments.

Wilde's letter to Payne displays a highly personalized style, moreover, and it presents an intimacy that is worth contrasting with an earlier letter of Wilde's, addressed to the editor of the Scots Observer.[7] Writing in response to being charged with contributing a "false [work of] art," and with writing a "story . . . which deals with matters only fitted for the Criminal Investigation Department" (qtd. in Letters 265), Wilde adopts a Foucauldian style of reverse discourse when he admits in self-defense: "Your critic then, sir, commits the absolutely unpardonable crime of trying to confuse the artist with his subject-matter" (Letters 266). Wilde's letter to the editor of the Scots Observer (9 July 1890) basically *insists* on separating the artist from the work of art itself. But his later private correspondence to Payne (12 February 1894) clearly indicates otherwise: it instead foregrounds Wilde's attachment to, and subsequent identification with, the characters in Dorian Gray. In short, Wilde's confession to Payne that the novel

"contains much of [him] in it" blatantly contradicts his earlier letter to the editor of the Scots Observer. A flippant conclusion, then: Mr Charles Whibley, the reviewer in question for the Scots Observer, fails in praising Dorian Gray in his review; for the sensitive Wilde, such an act not only lacks charm, but reason enough for the artist not to extend an invitation for the critic at all. More seriously, however, the obvious contrast between these two letters underscores, definitively, Wilde's complex sense of self-reflexivity in his epistolary writings.[8]

Juxtaposing both letters highlights Wilde's *monopolization* of a personal understanding that internal and external perceptions intersect, in complex and multiple ways, in the construction and negotiation of his public/private subjectivities. Wilde, as usual, possesses an acute sense of public relations: in other words, he realizes that the appearance of his letter in the Scots Observer will not only defend his role as an artist, but it will sufficiently redeem, and perhaps even elevate, his role as a well-known person(a) in the general public's estimation. According to Regenia Gagnier in her study, Idylls of the Marketplace: Oscar Wilde and the Victorian Public, the Scots Observer review "provoked a two-month running controversy on the relevance of moral concerns to artworks" (59). For Wilde, controversy was but a form of self-promotion, a strategy for the marketing of his person(a)s. Moreover, as Wilde's letter to Payne also suggests, "the book that poisoned, *or* made perfect, Dorian Gray" could very well describe The Picture of Dorian Gray itself. That is, these two letters can be read as representing (the) two reading audiences of Dorian Gray — one, a homosexual

community that found the text extremely suggestive, and hence attractive (i.e., "perfect"); and the other, a middle-class group of journalists that found the text similarly suggestive, but repulsive (i.e., "poisonous"). As Gagnier correctly observes of these two disparate audiences: "in the absence of named sins in Dorian Gray and [Wilde's other] stories, the middle-class journalists found the presence of the sin they despised and the members of the homosexual community found the presence of the sin they loved" (157).

Gagnier's study convincingly connects Wilde with his commodified role in the Victorian public imagination; and her conclusions, therefore, inform my argument that Wilde's negotiation of his private and public person(a)s displays a marketing strategy of sorts. "In his double life," Gagnier remarks, "Wilde established a balanced economy that pervaded not only his view of nature but art and production as well" (158-59). In Gagnier's estimation, moreover, Wilde easily and consistently transferred the terms of art for art's sake into an alternative creed of sex for sex's sake (159). In particular, Gagnier refers to Chapters 22 and 23 of Frank Harris's 1930 biography, Oscar Wilde: His Life and Confessions, where Wilde and Harris "debate the merits of homosexual versus heterosexual love" (159). Gagnier summarizes that "Wilde's basic argument is against the unaesthetic bodies of Victorian women, particularly when they are pregnant, and the fact that their function as producers of children has wrenched from women the possibility of so-called nonpurposive, that is merely pleasurable, passion" (159). Although Wilde's problematic assumption that the bodies of Victorian women are

"unaesthetic" exposes a misogynist tendency that is obvious in much of his published and epistolary writings, Gagnier goes on to explain that "[t]his argument [of Wilde's] is . . . typical of the defenses of homosexuality in the period's literature" (159).[9] Though such a critical tendency is disturbing, Wilde's argument nonetheless points to an economy of split subjectivities that counters hegemonic assumptions governing the productive nature of art and the reproductive nature of (hetero)sexual desires. In other words, the self-engendered and self-reproductive split subjectivities, inherent in both Wilde's life and works, thus threaten to destabilize middle-class notions of art and sexuality. During the fin-de-siècle, therefore, the debates of art for art's sake and sex for sex's sake were mutually constitutive. On the one hand, according to Gagnier, "the Victorians advocated sexuality for the state at the expense of the citizen's sexual freedom and pleasure. This sexuality for the state . . . made up an ethos of productivity for art and sexuality" (159). On the other hand, as Gagnier notes, such an "ethos was directly contrary to art for art's sake and 'nonpurposive' sex" (159). In essence, concludes Gagnier, "both sides of the Victorian debate on sex proffered implicit or explicit economic metaphors or theories of 'production' " (159).

Central to Wilde's espousal of an aesthetic code of art for art's sake, and his concomitant code of sex for sex's sake, is a gendered form of excessive consumerism. Wilde and his set certainly adhered to such a consumerist practice, but so did a larger homosexual community as well. According to Gagnier, such

"an evident [practice of] male consumerism" ranged "from pornography to a specialized tourism" (140):

> [A] [homosexual] 'life-style' — the neologism has come to represent precisely the convergence of such phenomena — of identifiable costume and predictable presents (cigarette cases, sleevelinks, etc.), holidays (in Paris, Monte Carlo, Naples, etc.), and ostentatious dining out at all hours (at the Café Royal, Willis's, Savoy, etc.). All this suggests that the 'idleness' of these men was not simply a protest against an ethos of productivity or reproduction but was also another form of *conspicuous consumption*, in this case the consumption of time as 'leisure.'
>
> (140-41; emphasis added)

As Gagnier demonstrates, the consumption of time is certainly a pivotal element of the homosexual lifestyle during the fin-de-siècle.[10] And it is also a pivotal element in Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray: in fact, it can be persuasively argued that Dorian's wish ("If it were only the other way! If it were I who was to be always young, and the picture that was to grow old! For that — for that I would give everything! [25]) metaphorically represents the young man's desire to "purchase" time indefinitely.

It is important to stress, however, that the consumption of time during the fin-de-siècle was by no means *simply* an indication of excessive leisure, not least because the concept itself was a preoccupation with the Victorians throughout the nineteenth century. Because the categories of gender and class (and, in a different

way, the categories of race, ethnicity, and nationality) necessarily intersected in the construction of the "gentleman," Victorian notions of "masculinity" ("manly" versus "unmanly" behaviour) were subsequently problematized in the very concept of leisure. Consider, for example, Charles Kingsley's attack of the Oxford Movement (or Tractarianism), first initiated by John Henry Newman in the 1840s and later continued by Walter Pater in the 1860s:

> In all that school, there is an element of foppery, even in dress and manners; a fastidious, maundering, die-away effeminacy, which is mistaken for purity and refinement; and I confess myself unable to cope with it, so alluring it is to the minds of an effeminate and luxurious aristocracy.
>
> (1: 260)

Kingsley's revulsion of the Oxford Movement foregrounds the complex intersection of class privilege, masculine behaviour, and intellectual elitism which, together, inform his social exclusion from and hostility towards Tractarianism. My intent is not to conflate Kingsley's use of "effeminacy" with same-sex desires, though I am interested in foregrounding the widespread conflation of the two terms *during the Victorian era*. For, as Richard Dellamora persuasively observes: "In the nineteenth century, 'effeminacy' as a term of personal abuse *often* connotes male-male desire, a threat of deviance that seems to haunt gentlemen should they become too gentle, refined, or glamourous" (199; emphasis added).[11] What remains implicit to Dellamora's comment is that the

Victorians, themselves, often conflated the multiple sociocultural appellations available to them in their construction and negotiation of masculine subjectivities. In short, excessive leisure certainly made available — for the Victorian gentleman, the dandy, and the homosexual — ample opportunities for variously manly and less-than-manly men to consume time.

At the same time that Wilde was composing The Picture of Dorian Gray, he was also writing "The Critic as Artist," first published in The Nineteenth Century (July and September 1890). The famous dialogue between Gilbert and Ernest consists of two parts: the first, "A Dialogue: With Some Remarks Upon the Importance of Discussing Everything"; and the second, "A Dialogue: With Some Remarks Upon the Importance of Doing Nothing." The two subtitles of Wilde's "The Critic as Artist" encapsulate, to a large extent, the paradoxical themes of Dorian Gray. That is, in Wilde's novel, Lord Henry Wotton, Basil Hallward, and Dorian Gray engage in discussions of *everything*; at the same time, however, aside from Dorian's portrait by Hallward, these three men basically *do* nothing *except* engage in the leisurely activity of conversation. As Cohen remarks, middle-class journalists found especially offensive Dorian Gray's "portray[al] [of] a sphere of art and *leisure* in which male friendships assume primary emotional importance and in which traditional male values (*industry*, earnestness, morality) are abjured in favor of the aesthetic" ("Writing" 76; emphasis added). Wilde perhaps anticipated such a reception, insofar as he commented to Mrs Beatrice Allhusen (a writer friend), in a letter written in early 1890: "I have just finished my first long

story [Dorian Gray], and am tired out. *I am afraid it is rather like my own life — all conversation and no action.* I can't describe action: my people sit in chairs and chatter" (Letters 255; emphasis added).

Wilde's mock-modest evaluation of his writerly abilities proves to be highly ironic, not to mention tragic, since his life would eventually turn out to be full of action as a consequence of the 1895 trials. A further irony and tragedy rest in the fact that, "[d]uring the trials . . . Wilde's own works, particularly The Picture of Dorian Gray and 'Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young,' [were] used as evidence against him" (Gagnier 146). Hence, Wilde's public role as a man of letters and his private role as a homosexual — or, more accurately, as a sodomite — were indistinguishable from each other during the trials.[12] This is particularly evident in the Marquis of Queensberry's plea to the court. According to Queensberry, "Oscar Fingal O'Flahertie Wills Wilde was a man of letters and a dramatist of prominence and notoriety and a person who exercised considerable influence over young men" (qtd. in Cohen Talk 128); and his plea continued with the charge that:

> the said Oscar . . . Wilde in the month of July in the year of Our Lord One thousand eight hundred and ninety did write and publish and cause and procure to be printed with his name upon the title page thereof a certain *immoral and obscene work* in the form of a narrative entitled 'The Picture of Dorian Gray' which said work was designed and intended by said Oscar . . . Wilde and was understood by the readers thereof to describe the

> relations, intimacies, and passions of certain persons of sodomitical and unnatural habits, tastes, and practices.
>
> (qtd. in Cohen Talk 128; emphasis added)[13]

As Ed Cohen observes of Queensberry's plea: "Here, Wilde's text becomes the pretext for the assertion that his sexual practices were relevant *public* knowledge"; and "[b]y proposing a hermeneutic that fixes the literary work as a form of (in this case, counterhegemonic) sexual didacticism, Queensberry's defense sought to hold the author morally and legally responsible for the implications of his writing" (Talk 128; emphasis added). During the trials, therefore, the defense aimed at disclosing, for the court and for the general public, the private/public interrelationship between Wilde's life and his creative works. As such, the trials resurrected, in many ways, the earlier periodical responses to The Picture of Dorian Gray. The sensational journalistic representations of Wilde during and after the trials, therefore, make particularly salient Wilde's prescient admission, in his letter to Ralph Payne, that "Lord Henry [is] what [and how] the world thinks of me" (Letters 352).[14]

III. The Science of Consumption

In Idylls of the Marketplace, Gagnier observes that "[b]oth Wilde and his critics . . . were situated in the context of public images and self-advertisement: the journalists *posing* as the gentleman guardians of public morality, Wilde

advertising himself as the subtle dandy-artist of higher morality" (57; emphasis added). Considering that Wilde registered his profession as a Professor of Aesthetics when he went down to London from Oxford in 1878 (Gagnier 11), Wilde was unarguably no stranger to self-promotional strategies. Yet, it can be conversely argued that, in his life and works, Wilde's dandiacal and aesthetic posturings were promoted, and made further accessible to the general public, *via* the advertising of the journalists themselves. As Max Beerbohm reminisces in A Peep into the Past (1923): "Oscar Wilde! I wonder to how many of my readers the jingle of this name suggests anything at all? Yet, at one time, it was familiar to many and if we search back among the old volumes of Punch, we shall find many a quip and crank at its owner's expense" (9). Reversing Gagnier's choice of verbs, therefore, demonstrates that Wilde's life, trials, and works, on the one hand, and the journalism of the fin-de-siècle, on the other, mutually engaged in a promotional dialectic of advertising. And this dialectical pattern in Wildeiana necessarily involved the consumption of Oscar Wilde as both person and persona.[15]

Although Wildean critics have rightly focused their attention on the consumption of Wilde's person(a)s,[16] no study has yet considered connecting, "scientifically," the subject of consumption with the consuming subject in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Also, aside from Charles Blinderman's observations — that, generally, Darwinism "was part of the network of ideas leading to the full expression of Decadence"; and that, more specifically, the central image (i.e., the

portrait) and conclusion of Dorian Gray are "faithful" representations of Thomas Henry Huxley's speculations on protoplasm and cell theory (485) — no study has yet considered connecting the relationship between science and aestheticism. Though a complete delineation of the scientific and aesthetic movements of the fin-de-siècle is beyond the scope of my project, I remain committed to investigating Wilde's understanding of nineteenth-century science and his subtle references to it in Dorian Gray. According to Philip E. Smith, Wilde was well-informed with the various scientific doctrines of the nineteenth century: "Wilde's [Oxford] notebook entries on topics such as 'the Unity of the Principle of Life,' 'The Protoplasmic Hierarchy,' 'Limits of the Investigation of Nature,' and 'The Realistic assumptions of modern science' demonstrate his interest in the details of contemporary scientific debates" (30). Perhaps Wilde had these notebooks in mind during the composition of Dorian Gray, for his narrator similarly makes mention of Dorian's engagement with the pursuit of scientific knowledge: ". . . and for a season [Dorian] inclined to the materialistic doctrines of the *Darwinismus* movement in Germany, and found a curious pleasure in tracing the thoughts and passions of men to some pearly cell in the brain, or some white nerve in the body, delighting in the conception of the absolute dependence of the spirit on certain physical conditions, morbid or healthy, normal or diseased" (133).[17]

In situating the description of Dorian's scientific "dabblings" in Chapter 11, specifically, Wilde foregrounds the extent to which his young protagonist's

various studies — ranging from the disciplines of science, theology, and music, on the one hand, to the less "formal" disciplines of perfumes, jewels, and textiles, on the other — are, technically, indistinguishable from each other. As such, I would argue that Chapter 11 serves as a narration of Dorian's variously promiscuous though undoubtedly intellectual "affairs." Importantly, then, the passage from Chapter 11 highlights the inextricable link between epistemological/ material subjects *for* consumption and *the* consuming subject: in other words, the consumption of information and the accumulation of material goods *by* Dorian Gray. As I will elaborate in the next section, in characterizing Dorian as the consuming subject *par excellence*, Wilde essentially connects excessive consumerism with a dissident male sexual identity. For, as Lord Henry wryly remarks to Basil and Dorian: "Yes, we are *overcharged* for everything nowadays. . . . Beautiful *sins*, like beautiful *things*, are the privilege of the rich" (78; emphasis added).

In Consuming Desire, Lawrence Birken traces the development of sexual science (primarily sexology but, also, psychology and psychoanalysis) and, correspondingly, the rise of a culture of consumption in the West during the last decades of the nineteenth century. According to Birken, the late-nineteenth-century writings of various economists hailed the "marginalist revolution" in the discipline of political economy (22). The marginalist views of W. Stanley Jevons, Leon Walras, Karl Menger, Alfred Marshall, and J. B. Clark, Birken explains, "signaled the partial emergence of a new complex of values tied to the movement

of Western culture *beyond* the productivist legacy of the Enlightenment," an epistemological tradition whose followers included Adam Smith, David Ricardo, John Stuart Mill, and Karl Marx (22; emphasis original). As Birken succinctly argues: "For Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill, [and] Marx, . . . , *production* was the ultimate end of economic activity; for Jevons, Walras, Menger, Marshall, and Clark, *consumption* was the end" (22; emphasis added).

Birken further connects this political economic shift, from a productivist to a marginalist epistemology, with that of another science of the fin-de-siècle — namely, sexology:

> The emergence of sexology, at the very time when the marginalist paradigm was conquering the domain of political economy, is perhaps the most dramatic evidence of the shift from a productivist to a consumerist world view among intellectual circles on both sides of the Atlantic during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. If the marginalists were ready to concede that the entire economic system as they saw it was but a means to satisfy the desires of individual consumers, sexual scientists such as Krafft-Ebing and Freud were intent on finding the laws that governed those desires.[18]
>
> (40)

Although Birken aims at foregrounding the epistemological affinities in political economy and sexology, he first points out a major difference between the two sciences. While neoclassical economics had "destroyed the natural law of

property" at the end of the nineteenth century, writes Birken, the discipline of sexology was just then "constructing a new natural law of desire" (40-41). As Birken elaborates, to the extent that marginalism "had finally banished from political economy the moralism implicit in the distinction between productive and unproductive consumption, the sexologists attempted to reintroduce that moralism by positing a distinction between *productive* and *unproductive* desire" (41; emphasis added).

The epistemological similarities between the two sciences, however, outweigh this primary difference. Neoclassical economists and sexologists, for example, equally shared the underlying assumption that individuals are, principally, consumers. "Just as marginalist thought sought to explain production from the perspective of consumption," writes Birken, "sexology attempted to investigate reproduction from the point of view of desire" (41). Moreover, Birken comments that "sexual science closely associated desire with 'spending,' assuming an innate tendency to spend or discharge energy. Defining energy itself as scarce, sexologists believed that the act of consumption involved a depletion of nervous energy and its transformation into activity. In contrast, the building up of energy was associated with the deferral of consumption" (42). Birken's study thus foregrounds the connection between *desire* and *discharge* in fin-de-siècle sexological discourses (42).

Although sexologists considered libidinal energy to be a nonreproducible substance, they did not assign a finite amount of such energy to individual sexual

beings. The issue of infinite libidinal energy, in turn, bears a direct relation to the law of "falling marginal utility," which Birken identifies as yet another similarity between the marginalist paradigm in political economy and the consumerist paradigm in sexology, psychology, and psychoanalysis.

> According to this law [of falling marginal utility], which . . . was an underlying assumption of psychoanalysis as well as of marginalist economics, *the number of objects of desire is potentially unlimited but desire directed toward any one object soon falls off because desire itself is scarce.* In the context of the hierarchy of wants distinguishing normal from perverse desire, the concept of falling marginal utility would imply that if more pressing (normal) desires are satiated, less pressing (perverted) desires will come to the fore.
>
> (48; emphasis added)

The law of falling marginal utility which Birken foregrounds in his study, I would argue, offers an innovative critical approach for reading The Picture of Dorian Gray. In many ways, Wilde's contrasting representations of heteronormative and dissident desires in his novel — respectively, between Dorian's love affair with the actress Sibyl Vane and the young man's later fetishistic and materialistic consumption in Chapter 11 — subtly exposes the fin-de-siècle's tendency to mercantilize the subject of sexuality.

Let us begin by considering the episode involving Dorian's temporary obsession with Sibyl Vane. On an afternoon after Dorian's first meeting with

Lord Henry, the younger man pays a visit to the latter's house in Mayfair. After Lord Henry flippantly (and characteristically!) advises Dorian "[n]ever [to] marry at all," Dorian admits to his mentor: "I don't think I am likely to marry, Harry. I am too much in love" (46). Without much coaxing from his friend, Dorian then rehearses to Lord Henry the details of his meeting with Sibyl Vane. According to Dorian, for days after he had first encountered Lord Henry in Basil Hallward's studio, he was preoccupied "with a wild desire to know *everything about life*" (48; emphasis added). Being "determined to go in search of some adventure" one evening, and "fe[eling] that this grey, monstrous London . . . must have something [in store] for [him]," Dorian "[goes] out and wander[s] eastward, soon losing [his] way in a labyrinth of grimy streets and black, grassless squares" in the East End of London (48). A couple of hours into his search of London's "myriads of people, its sordid sinners, and its splendid sins," Dorian, by chance, "passe[s] by an absurd little theatre, with great flaring gas-jets and gaudy play-bills" (48). And, in front of the theatre stands "[a] hideous Jew," Mr Isaacs, who hails Dorian with the invitation: "Have a box, my Lord?" (48). Even though Dorian finds Mr Isaacs distasteful and ostentatious, he nonetheless accepts the man's invitation. As Dorian recalls to Lord Henry, in retrospect: "You will laugh at me, I know, but I really went in and *paid a whole guinea* for the stage-box. To the present day, *I can't make out why I did so*; and yet if I hadn't — my dear Harry, if I hadn't, I should have missed the *greatest romance* of my life" (48; emphasis added).

The theatre production on this particular evening is Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, with Sibyl Vane performing the role of the Bard's virginal heroine. Sibyl, being "the loveliest *thing* [Dorian] had ever seen in [his] life" (50; emphasis added), immediately enchants the young man; and Dorian faithfully continues to see her perform:

> '. . . Night after night, I go to see her play. One evening she is Rosalind, and the next evening she is Imogen. I have seen her die in the gloom of an Italian tomb, sucking the poison from her lover's lips. I have watched her wandering through the forest of Arden, disguised as a pretty boy in hose and doublet and dainty cap. She has been mad. . . . She has been innocent. . . . I have seen her in every age and in every costume. *Ordinary women never appeal to one's imagination.* They are limited to their century. No glamour ever transfigures them. One knows their minds as easily as one knows their bonnets. One can always find them. There is no mystery in any of them. . . . They are quite obvious. But an actress! How different an actress is! Harry! why didn't you tell me that the *only thing* worth loving is an actress?'
>
> (50-51; emphasis added)

Unlike "[o]rdinary women [who] never appeal to one's imagination," Dorian finds the actress Sibyl Vane to be "glamour[ous]" and "myster[ious]." As Rachel Bowlby succinctly summarizes: "Initially, Sybil [*sic*] appeals [to Dorian] by appearing as anyone *but* Sybil Vane" (179; emphasis added). Sibyl's protean

personalities — her multiple, ever-changing roles as Shakespeare's heroines — are certainly attractive to Dorian. But Dorian's attraction to Sibyl Vane exists *only* because the actress literally *embodies* his more romantic longing for "some [kind of] adventure," his "search for beauty," that which is "the real secret of life" (48). Insofar as Sibyl performs the requisite changes in her professional role as an actress, Dorian remains sufficiently entertained. At the moment that Sibyl ceases to perform, however — or, more accurately, at the moment that she ceases to perform in accordance to Dorian's criteria — the fickle young man loses all interest in the relationship (80-92).

The Sibyl Vane episode in The Picture of Dorian Gray presents an obvious example of what Gayle Rubin identifies as the "traffic in women," a patriarchal practice that commodifies women as objects (of desire). According to Mrs Vane, in her gentle remonstrance to her daughter: "You [Sibyl] must not think of anything but your acting. Mr. Isaacs has been very good to us, and we owe him money" (60). To the extent that the Vane women are indebted to Mr Isaacs, Sibyl and her talents are, essentially, "commodities" in the marketplace. Mr Isaacs, however, is not the only man who considers women as property. Lord Henry, for instance, after hearing out Dorian's narrative of his "sacred" meeting with Sibyl (51), comments: "It is only the sacred things that are worth touching, Dorian. . . . But why should you be annoyed? I suppose *she will belong to you someday*" (51-52; emphasis added). To the extent that Lord Henry's comment is certainly misogynist, it nonetheless remains appropriate, contextually, since it is addressed

to Dorian himself. For in his consistent patronage of the establishment where Sibyl performs, Dorian quintessentially "purchases" the talents, if not also the body ("flesh and blood" [81]) of the actress herself. Though the acquisition of "the greatest romance of [Dorian's] life," it is perhaps worth adding, comes at a rather extravagant price: "a whole guinea for the stage-box" each night Dorian patronizes Mr Isaac's theatre.

It can certainly be argued that Wilde's characterization of Dorian's treatment of Sibyl strongly suggests a sense of the author's misogyny — particularly evident with the young man's insistence on qualifying the "price" of his affections towards Sibyl in *monetary* terms; but also evident in Sibyl's suicide which quintessentially *re*-establishes the all-male fictional world in Dorian Gray. But Wilde's well-established, dual roles as both dandy and playwright, by the time of Dorian Gray's appearance, complicate this assumption. The figure of Sibyl Vane similarly embodies two roles: as woman, as actress. Both Wilde (as dandy/man of letters) and Sibyl (as woman/actress), therefore, represent *products* for consumption within the public sphere. For, as Gagnier reminds us: "The images of the dandy, the gentleman, and the woman — comprising the relatively primitive form of the cult of personality in the 1890s — cannot be divorced from an advertising, *consumerist culture*" (51; emphasis added).

Gagnier's worthwhile reminder connects nicely to Birken's argument that the fin-de-siècle witnessed not only the development of a consumerist culture, but also the emergence of sexology as a science of consumption. In particular, I want

to return briefly to Birken's delineation of the law of "falling marginal utility" that is evident in both economic and sexological discourses. According to Birken, both of these discourses considered individuals to be, first and foremost, consumers. For sexologists, in particular, then, *sexual* beings are consumers of desire. "[T]he number of objects of desire is potentially unlimited but desire directed toward any *one object* soon falls off because desire itself is scarce," Birken rehearses, and "[i]n the context of the hierarchy of wants distinguishing *normal* from *perverse* desire, the concept of falling marginal utility would imply that if more pressing (normal) desires are satiated, less pressing (perverted) desires will come to the fore" (48; emphasis added).

Birken's explanation helps to elucidate the Sibyl Vane episode in The Picture of Dorian Gray. Sibyl indeed represents, for Dorian, his *one object* of desire. And because of her role as an *actress*, she also simultaneously represents Dorian's multiple *objects* of desire. Sibyl, however, refuses her Prince Charming's *subjection* (i.e., her subject-position as both object and objects of his desire) and determines "never to act well again" (85). Not surprisingly, then, when Sibyl ceases to perform capably, she "produces no effect" on Dorian (86). In Dorian's callous explanation to Sibyl: "You are nothing to me now. . . . You have spoiled the romance of my life. How little you can know of love, if you say it mars your art! Without your art you are nothing" (87). At this moment, Sibyl's Prince Charming ceases to find her charming. In naming his sole female character Sibyl Vane, and in including the episode early on in his novel, Wilde deliberately

hints at Dorian's future: Sibyl's "sibylline" nature subtly *foreshadows* Dorian's promiscuous and neurotic obsessions in Chapter 11; and her last name offers an appropriate pun that anticipates Dorian's cultivation of his "vanity," a personal retreat into solipsism that is suggestively narrated in Chapter 11. The figure of Sibyl Vane thus forecasts a crucial thematic structuring Dorian Gray. In currently satiating his "normal" desire in the figure of Sibyl Vane, Dorian will eventually discover his "other" desires later on in life. To borrow from Birken, then, I would argue that Wilde underscores the extent to which Dorian's "less pressing *(perverted)* desires . . . come to the fore" in Chapter 11 of Dorian Gray.

IV. Dorian Gray as Story and Case History[19]

At one point during their first meeting, Lord Henry asks Dorian to entertain thinking about "the great sins of the world" which "take place in the brain" (18). The older man seductively encourages Dorian to consider, specifically, the "passions that have made [him] afraid, [the] thoughts that have filled [him] with terror, [the] day-dreams and sleeping dreams whose mere memory might stain [his] cheek with shame — " (18). Unable to endure the older man's verbal solicitations, Dorian entreats him: "Stop! . . . stop! you bewilder me. I don't know what to say. There is some answer to you, but I cannot find it. Don't speak. Let me think. Or, rather, let me try not to think" (18). Dorian then falls

into a private reverie in an attempt to reconcile Lord Henry's "few words . . . — words spoken, by chance, no doubt, and with a wilful paradox in them" (18):

> Music had stirred him like that. Music had troubled him many times. But music was not articulate. It was not a new world, but rather another chaos, that it created in us. Words! Mere Words! *How terrible they were! How clear, and vivid, and cruel! One could not escape from them.* And yet what a subtle magic there was in them! They seemed to be able to give a plastic form to formless things, and to have a music of their own as sweet as that of viol or of lute. Mere words! *Was there anything so real as words?*
>
> (19; emphasis added)

Dorian's attraction to and repulsion of "mere words" present his nascent comprehension of the paradoxical nature of language in relation to the construction of identities: both its terrible power to define and its magical power to transform. As he reflects to himself: "Yes; there had been things in his boyhood that he had not understood. He understood them now" (19). I would argue that this crucial moment represents, figurally, Dorian's entry into language, for "[l]ife suddenly became fiery-coloured to him" as a consequence of Lord Henry's conversation (19). However, it is important to clarify that the linguistic order into which Dorian enters is not the Lacanian symbolic order *per se*. Instead, I would argue that, at this moment, Dorian finally comprehends and thus begins to employ a Foucauldian style of reverse discourse. According to Foucault, during

the nineteenth century, the proliferation of sexology and its corresponding taxonomies of peripheral, dissident sexualities afforded an opportunity for the cultural invention of the homosexual subject (History 43). Moreover, as Foucault explains, such a construction was accompanied by, and perhaps even enabled, the formation of a reverse discourse, whereby "homosexuality began to *speak in its own behalf*, to demand that its legitimacy or 'naturality' be acknowledged, *often in the same vocabulary*, using the same categories by which it was medically disqualified" (History 101; emphasis added).

Wilde, himself, was skillful in deploying this discursive strategy in his writings. For example, in his subversive political essay, "The Soul of Man Under Socialism," first published in The Fortnightly Review in February 1891, Wilde contemplates a vast range of topics — from Individualism and Socialism to Art and Public Opinion. A particular rumination on Art and Public Opinion vividly resonates with Dorian's responses to Lord Henry's intoxicating influence. "[O]ne of the results of the extraordinary tyranny of authority," Wilde philosophizes in "The Soul of Man," "is that *words* are absolutely *distorted* from their proper and simple meaning, and are used to express the *obverse* of their *right signification*. What is true about Art is true about Life. . . . Under Individualism people will be quite *natural* and absolutely unselfish, and will *know the meaning of words*, and realize them in their free, beautiful lives" (49-50; emphasis added).

As a skillful wordsmith in his professional role as man of letters, Wilde fully realizes (and necessarily so!) the sociopolitical power and value of words,

and their concomitant effects in the deployment of language. Hence, in his essay, Wilde applauds other artists like himself — those who refuse to alter their standards or to conform their work in order to gain favourable popular opinion. For Wilde, *both* "[p]opular authority and the recognition of popular authority are fatal" (44). "The future is what artists are," Wilde insists, even though "[i]t will, of course, be said that such a scheme as is set forth here [in this essay] is quite unpractical, and goes *against human nature*" (48; emphasis added). "Human nature," in this instance, obviously refers to individual tastes and preferences in the sphere of art; but the phrase additionally refers to the realm of sexuality, primarily since Morality and Popular Opinion equally inform both Art and Sexuality. Besides which, as Wilde reminds his readers in his essay, "[t]he only thing that one really knows about human nature is that it changes" (48). "The Soul of Man Under Socialism" was written, in part, as a response to the journalistic scandal which had criticized the appearance of Wilde's Dorian Gray in Lippincott's Monthly Magazine. As such, it comes as no surprise that his essay operates dualistically — attacking the popular press and, simultaneously, defending the role of art/artists in society. Nor is it surprising, consequently, that the reverse-discourse style of "The Soul of Man Under Socialism" bears particular relevance to Wilde's novel. The Picture of Dorian Gray indeed represents the complex vicissitudes which accompany the multiple changes in human nature. In other words, I would argue that Wilde's characterization of his young protagonist

offers, especially in Chapter 11, a portrait of the dandy as a case history — and, more specifically, a case history which goes *against nature*.

Although reading Dorian Gray as a case history of same-sex desires can certainly yield productive conclusions, I do not hesitate in admitting that this critical strategy provokes, in equal measure, some frustration. Even the most skillful and persuasive of critics remain perplexed about the issue of same-sex desires in Dorian Gray. Is it present and, therefore, obvious? Or, is it absent, but only vaguely so? To what extent can we (or should we) read the decadent and/or aesthetic representations in Dorian Gray as *possible* (or necessary) references to same-sex desires? Gagnier, for example, observes that "the decadence of Dorian Gray lay in what the novel *did not* include and was therefore external to the text" (58; emphasis original). In a similar vein, Cohen wonders: "what does it mean to say that [Dorian Gray] is 'about' homosexuality anyway?" ("Writing" 75). What follows in the remainder of this chapter, therefore, is my attempt to interrogate the *conundrum* of Dorian Gray — namely, whether or not same-sex desires are present and/or absent in Wilde's text and what that means.

To begin this, I would like to consider the symbolic function of the notorious and yet mysterious "yellow book" in Wilde's novel — which, significantly, Lord Henry sends to his young friend as a consolation gift immediately after Dorian discovers the suicide of his love interest (124-25). Not unlike the text of Dorian Gray itself, then, I would argue that the "yellow book" presents a similar conundrum to readers of Wilde's novel.[20] On the one hand, The

Picture of Dorian Gray certainly includes a lean synopsis (126-27) of this particular "novel without a plot," a book which is "simply a psychological study of a certain young Parisian" (125). On the other hand, however, aside from these details, all that we *really* know about the "yellow book" is that, "for years, Dorian Gray could not free himself from the influence of this book. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he never sought to free himself from it" (126). As readers, we realize that this book crucially informs, without a doubt, the formation and concomitant degeneration of Dorian's subjectivity. Indeed, we could even do without the narrator's redundant reminder, later on, that "Dorian Gray had been *poisoned* by [this very] book" (146; emphasis added).

But what the book *actually* contains remains largely open to conjecture. As such, I would argue that the "yellow book" in Dorian Gray parallels, and yet paradoxically differs from, the narrative structure of the "case history" included in the sexological and psychological writings of Ellis and Freud. Consider Wilde's narrator's observation that, for Dorian Gray, the book in question "seemed to him to contain the story of his own life, written before he had lived it" (127). In many ways, then, Dorian identifies *with* the autobiographical style of the "yellow book," a testimonial style which also characterizes the case histories in Ellis and Freud. But, if Dorian views the "yellow book" as an autobiography of sorts, in contradistinction, Ellis and Freud instead view these first-hand testimonies as "conjectural narratives." Early on in Sexual Inversion, one of two studies in volume two of his Studies in the Psychology of Sex (1897), Ellis feels obligated

to justify his methodology — that of presenting a series of case histories — to his audience:

> It may be proper, at this point, to say a few words as to the *reliability* of the statements furnished by homosexual persons. This has sometimes been called into question. Many years ago we used to be told that inverts are such lying and deceitful degenerates that it was impossible to place reliance on anything they said. It was also usual to say that when they wrote autobiographical accounts of themselves they merely sought to mold them in the fashion of those published by Krafft-Ebing [in Psychopathia Sexualis]. More recently the psychoanalysts have made a more radical attack on all histories not obtained by their own methods as being quite unreliable, even when put forth in good faith, in part because the subject withholds much that he either regards as too trivial or too unpleasant to bring forward, and in part because he cannot draw on that unconscious field within himself, wherein, it is held, the most significant *facts* of his own sexual history are *concealed*.[21]
>
> (2: 89; emphasis added)

In continuation, Ellis attempts to disregard the suspicions of his colleagues by maintaining that "[t]he histories which follow [in Sexual Inversion] have been obtained in various ways and are [therefore] of varying degrees of value" (91). Value (i.e., the reliability of his sources), however, remains highly subjective, even for Ellis himself:

> Some [of the case histories] are of persons whom I have known very well for very long periods, and concerning whom I can speak very positively. A few are from complete strangers whose good faith, however, I *judge* from internal evidence that I am able to *accept*. . . . A fair number were written by persons whom I do not myself know, but who are well known to others in whose *judgment* I feel *confidence*. Perhaps the largest number are concerned with individuals who wrote to me spontaneously in the first place, and whom I have at intervals seen or heard from since, *in some cases during a very long period, so that I have slowly been able to fill in their histories,* although the narratives, as finally completed, may have the air of being written down at a single sitting.
>
> (2: 91; emphasis added)

From Ellis's explanation of his methodology, it is clear that "time" plays a crucial role in determining the "truth value" of a particular case history. That is, Ellis perceives that the invert's autobiographical testament "becomes" more reliable, contextually, the longer he maintains his role as sexologist in determining the validity of his subject-matter's (case) history. The subject of temporality importantly also structures Freud's delineations of the pleasure principle.

Wilde similarly incorporates, I would argue, the issue of time as a strategy for "filling in" the details of Dorian's life in Chapter 11. Even prior to the narrator's descriptions of Dorian's "moral decline" in Chapter 11, Wilde cleverly offers a foreshadowing of his young protagonist's case history. After his first

meeting with Dorian, Lord Henry seeks to obtain some "useless information" (32) about his new friend from his Uncle George, Lord Fermor. After being acquainted with the histories of Dorian's parents, via Lord Fermor's narrative, Lord Henry thanks his uncle for the information. "I always like to know everything about my new friends, and nothing about my old ones" (34), Lord Henry amusingly comments, just prior to leaving Lord Fermor's. Yet despite his flippancy, Lord Henry's desire to discover Dorian's story and (case) history is genuine, for the narrator enlightens us with his self-reflections immediately after this interview: "So *that* was the *story* of Dorian Gray's parentage. Crudely as it had been told to him, it had yet stirred him by its suggestion of a strange, almost modern romance" (35; emphasis added).

Lord Henry thus assigns a narrative teleology to Dorian's absent/present story and case history. Yet, as I have already intimated, another absent/present narrative in Dorian Gray is the "yellow book" itself, a text in which "[o]ne hardly kn[ows] . . . whether one [is] reading the spiritual ecstasies of some mediæval saint or the morbid confessions of a modern sinner" (125). And because it is a central image in Chapter 11, the "yellow book" crystallizes the chapter's style as an *explication du texte* — an enumerative style that carefully and exhaustively details Dorian's variously neurotic consumerist obsessions. According to Donald Lawler in his study on Wilde's revisions of Dorian Gray, Chapter 11 "serves a number of artistic purposes" (77):

> Not only does [Chapter 11] show the life of pleasure to which Dorian had taken in his desire to raise sensation to the level of thought and spirit, but also this chapter suggests, in its variety of interests and its experiments in raising self-indulgence to an occult science, ***the slow passage of time, more than eighteen years.***
>
> (77; emphasis added)

What remains particularly striking is that the crowded descriptions in Chapter 11 are, ironically, highly *economical*. That is, Wilde's enumerative and purple prose style skillfully condenses a period of almost two decades into the space of twenty pages. This strategy renders more explicit the excessive consumerism which Dorian engages in during this period of time. The chapter, therefore, subtly foregrounds the consumption of material goods (and, also, Dorian's pursuit of experience and knowledge), as well as the consumption of time.[22]

Lawler also makes note of two particular sentences that are crucial to Wilde's revisions of the conclusion to Dorian Gray — in particular, Dorian's decision to destroy the painting with the knife previously employed in the stabbing of Basil Hallward. In the Clark typescript, Wilde adds: "It [the portrait] would kill the past, and when that was dead he [Dorian] would be free"; and, for the Ward, Lock and Company publication, Wilde adds: "It [the portrait] would kill this monstrous soul-life and, without its hideous warnings, he [Dorian] would be at peace" (223). The addition of these two sentences, Lawler contends, "stresses the internal and psychological rather than the external and circumstantial

[i.e., Dorian's desire to remove the incriminating evidence of the painting]" because "[t]hese lines express Dorian's passion for liberation from the past and freedom from the symbol of his accusing conscience and from guilt" (34). Although I hesitate in fully embracing Lawler's reading — primarily because it identifies Wilde as somewhat didactic, a reading that remains debatable — I concede to his point that Wilde's revisions to the conclusion of Dorian Gray are of vital importance.

With the evidence that Lawler documents in his study on the thematic and stylistic changes of Dorian Gray, one of Wilde's typically amusing proposals comes to mind. In the 5 June 1889 issue of The Pall Mall Gazette, Wilde suggests an alternative method for book reviewing and, for that matter, for book reading period:

> There is a great deal to be said in favour of reading a novel backwards. The last page is, as a rule, the most interesting, and when one begins with the catastrophe or the *dénouement* one feels on pleasant terms of equality with the author. It is like going behind the scenes of a theatre. One is no longer taken in. . . . One knows the jealously-guarded secret, and one can afford to smile at the *quite unnecessary anxiety* that the puppets of fiction always consider it their duty to display.
>
> (qtd. in Schmidgall 12; emphasis added)

What if we were to consider adopting, seriously, Wilde's innovative approach in reading his *own* novel? As readers, we would discover, along with the servants

and the police officer, the body of "a dead man, in evening dress, with a knife in his heart"; and above the body, we would all observe the "splendid portrait of [Dorian Gray] . . . in all the wonder of his exquisite youth and beauty" (224). In short, if we adopt Wilde's alternative proposal for book reviewing/reading, we soon enough discover that The Picture of Dorian Gray essentially narrates the death of the dandy. And in doing so, we would immediately acquire, without the "quite unnecessary anxiety" required of book reviewing/reading, a form of "fore-pleasure." In other words, if we were to read Dorian Gray's conclusion *first*, we would relinquish (to borrow from Roland Barthes) the attendant "pleasure of the text." And, in doing so, we would instead opt for an immediate (i.e., earlier) discovery of the "end-pleasure," the resolution to Dorian Gray. Wilde's suggestion of an alternative reading practice, however, articulates a characteristic sense of alienation that can never be fully disguised underneath a cloak of wit. "The late-Victorian dandy in Wilde's works and in his practice is the human equivalent of aestheticism in art," Gagnier contends, "he is the man *removed from life*, a living protest against vulgarity and *means-end living*" (7; emphasis added). Significantly, replacing the appellation "dandy" with either the term "invert" or "homosexual" would not significantly alter Gagnier's argument.

Like the coupling of dandy with invert/homosexual during the fin-de-siècle, other couplings offer similar connections in Freudian theories of sexuality — namely, desire and discharge, and fore-pleasure and end-pleasure. According to Freud's catalogue of dissident desires in Three Essays on the Theory of

Sexuality (1905), perversions (such as homosexuality, fetishism, scopophilia, exhibitionism, sadism, and masochism) are but "abortive *beginnings* and preliminary stages of a firm organization of the component instincts" of a heteronormative sexuality (63; emphasis added). In support of this observation, Freud differentiates perversions from heteronormative genitality on the basis of what he defines as "end-pleasure."

> This last pleasure is the highest in intensity, and its mechanism differs from that of earlier pleasure. It is brought about entirely by *discharge*: it is wholly a pleasure of satisfaction and with it the tension of the libido is for the time being extinguished.
>
> (Three Essays 76; emphasis added)

In conceptualizing a theory of "end-pleasure," Freud privileges the deferral of desire: that is, a postponement of pleasure that aims at allowing the "proper" satiation of one's libidinal tensions. In Freud's formulation, then, only in accommodating such a deferral can one be ensured of properly reaching climax. Equally important, only the deferral of pleasure can ensure an individual's achievement of normative sexuality.

Contrastingly, the privileging of "fore-pleasure" in the sexual process endangers normative desire. The absence of a stage of postponement would then result in a premature issuance of pleasure, a sure indication of the perversion of sexual desire. According to Freud:

> The attainment of the sexual aim can clearly be endangered by the mechanism in which *fore-pleasure* is involved. This danger arises if at any point in the prepatory sexual processes the fore-pleasure turns out to be too great and the element of tension too small. The motive for proceeding further with the sexual process then disappears, the whole path is cut short, and the prepatory act in question takes the place of the normal sexual aim. . . . *Such is in fact the mechanism of many perversions, which consists in lingering over the prepatory acts of the sexual process.*
>
> (Three Essays 77; emphasis added)

According to Freud's formulation, then, normative sexuality issues in climax, a discharge that first requires the deferral of pleasure. And, accordingly (to paraphrase the Freudian formula crudely), premature ejaculation indicates the perversion of (heteronormative) desire. With this in mind, I would argue that Wilde's suggestion of reading a text backwards nicely *inverts* Freud's privileging of "end-pleasure" at the expense of "fore-pleasure." For Wilde, when one reads a text backwards, "one feels on pleasant terms of equality with the author," "one is no longer taken in" by the "quite unnecessary *anxiety*" involved in the reading process. Reading backwards thus *releases* the reader from experiencing the attendant anxiety — or, equally applicable, the attendant tension — which precedes the eventual discovery of "the catastrophe or the *dénouement*" of the text. Hence, Wilde's inversion not only privileges an alternative reading practice, but, in effect, an alternative sexual practice as well. For in gaining a "fore-

knowledge" of the text's conclusion, the reader experiences an earlier pleasure instead, a "fore-pleasure" that interrupts the normative reading process itself. Wilde's suggestion of a reversed reading-practice, moreover, constitutes a form of "textual rear-entry" that resonates with Stevenson's privileging of the backdoor in Jekyll and Hyde. The deviation from a normative reading practice, therefore, makes available other pleasures. For, according to Barthes: "The more a story is told in a proper, well-spoken, *straight-forward* way, in an even tone, the easier it is to *reverse* it, to blacken it, to read it inside out. . . . This reversal, being a pure production, wonderfully *develops* the pleasure of the text" (Pleasure 26; emphasis added).

Wilde's young protagonist, himself, subscribes to this alternative reading practice in relation to the "yellow book." According to the narrator in Chapter 11:

> It was with an almost cruel joy — and perhaps in nearly every joy, as certainly in every *pleasure* — that [Dorian] used to *read the latter part of the book*, with its really tragic, if somewhat over-emphasized, account of the sorrow and despair of one [the book's protagonist, the young Parisian] who had himself lost what in others, and in the world, he had most dearly valued.
>
> (127; emphasis added)

This description foregrounds how Dorian cannot but be attracted to read — *and to re-read* — "the latter part of the [yellow] book." "The pleasure of the text is that moment when my body pursues its own ideas," Barthes ruminates, "for my body

does not have the same ideas as I do" (Pleasure 17). In many ways, Dorian's reading practice embodies Barthes's erudite reflection. Dorian cannot but help identify with certain passages in the text, for in (re-) reading them, he increasingly gains a particular *pleasure* with the text's "somewhat over-emphasized . . . account[s]." Or better yet, Dorian gains a textual "fore-pleasure" in his reading practice — a pleasure that affords him *repeated* opportunities to identify with the hero of the "yellow book," a fictional character who "bec[omes] to [Dorian] a kind of *prefiguring* type of himself" (127; emphasis added).

In his essay entitled "End Pleasure," Paul Morrison persuasively critiques "[t]he Freudian narrative of psychosexual development, which . . . construes homosexuality as a simple failure of teleology, as sexual impulses that have yet to find resolution and stabilization . . . in proper object choices and organ specificity" (55). Similarly, in The Freudian Body, Leo Bersani notes that, à la Freud, the perversions of adults (including, but not limited to, homosexuality) are comprehensible *only* as "the sickness of *uncompleted narratives*" (32; emphasis added). Morrison's and Bersani's respective arguments usefully highlight the inextricable connection between Freud's schematizations of (human) psychosexual development and (textual) narratology. In many ways, then, their critiques of Freudian psychoanalysis can apply to a reading of Dorian Gray's Chapter 11 *as* a "case history." According to the narrator of Wilde's novel, Dorian occupies much of his time with "mysterious and prolonged *absences* that g[i]ve rise to such *strange conjecture* among those who [are] his friends" (128;

emphasis added). Dorian's "mysterious and prolonged *absences*" thus motivate his friends — and, also, the larger social sphere frequented by Dorian — to "fill in" the details of his life via "strange conjecture." But these absences can also refer to the structure of Chapter 11 itself, insofar as the chapter essentially "fills in" the narrative "gaps" within Dorian Gray. In other words, Wilde structures Chapter 11 as an "update" of the particulars which explains the formation, negotiation, and degeneration of Dorian's private/public subjectivities. Wilde presents two clues for readers to anticipate discovering the "update" structure of Chapter 11. First, the obvious "gap" between the end of Chapter 10 and the beginning of Chapter 11 strongly signals the interruption of Dorian Gray's narrative sequence. Secondly, the opening clause of the first sentence in Chapter 11 — "For years. . ." (126) — points to the passing of time, to the condensation of narrative chronology. The enumerative prose style of Chapter 11 thus replaces and "fills in" the absences of narrative plot and dialogue in Chapter 11.[23]

In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud delineates a sophisticated theory of the pleasure principle that introduces "the final phase of his views" on psychoanalysis (Richards 272). Several of Freud's conclusions in this study are particularly relevant to my current project of reading Chapter 11 of Dorian Gray as a "case history" — most notably, the Freudian concept of the "compulsion to repeat" as a psychical mechanism which informs the development of neurosis. As Freud articulates it:

> What psychoanalysis reveals in the transference phenomena of neurotics can also be observed in the lives of some normal people. The impression they give is of being *pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some 'daemonic' power*; but psychoanalysis has always taken the view that their fate is for the most part *arranged by themselves and determined by early infantile influences*. The compulsion which is here in evidence differs in no way from *the compulsion to repeat* which we have found in neurotics. . . .
>
> (11: 292; emphasis added)

According to Freud, compulsive, repetitive behaviour characterizes neurosis in both neurotics and "normal people." Although this particular passage discusses the symptomatic affinities between "true" neurotics and "normal people," my concern is not with discovering *if* Dorian Gray is *indeed* neurotic. For the sake of argument, let me position the figure of Dorian Gray as somewhere in between "normalcy" and "true" neurosis on this Freudian continuum. In short, allow me to figure Dorian as a compulsive subject of one sort or another.

With this in mind, let me first focus on Freud's view of fate in relation to persons exhibiting the compulsion to repeat. In many ways, Dorian's behaviour in Wilde's novel displays his "impression [that he is] . . . being pursued by a malignant fate" — namely, by the portrait itself. "I can't explain to you, Basil, but I must never sit to you again," Dorian comments to his friend, because "[*t*]*here is something fatal about a portrait. It has a life of its own*" (117;

emphasis added). But as Freud explains, the articulation of such paranoia, on the part of the compulsive subject, is a misinformed assumption. Rather, "psychoanalysis has always taken the view that their [the compulsive subjects'] fate is for the most part arranged by themselves and determined by early infantile influences." This is certainly true in Dorian's case, since the young man's predicament in Wilde's novel undoubtedly results from *his own* hasty and vain wish for a supernatural arrangement which would allow him to remain always young and unblemished:

> 'How sad it is! I shall grow old, and horrible, and dreadful. But this picture will remain always young. It will never be older than this particular day of June. . . . If it were only the other way! If it were I who was to be always young, and the picture that was to grow old! For that — for that — I would give everything! Yes, there is nothing in the whole world I would not give! I would give my soul for that!'
>
> (25-26)

Continuing with his diatribe — or, more accurately, with his childish "temper tantrum" — Dorian insists on being "jealous of everything whose beauty does not die" (26). For Dorian, his unprovoked jealousy of an inanimate object stems from his *paranoid* fear that the portrait "will mock [him] some day — mock [him] horribly!" (26).

Genuinely shocked by Dorian's outburst and unexpected behaviour, Basil charges Lord Henry with corrupting his impressionable friend:

'This is your doing, Harry,' said the painter, bitterly.

Lord Henry shrugged his shoulders. *'It is the real Dorian Gray — that is all.'*

'It is not.'

'If it is not, what have I to do with it?'

'You should have gone away when I asked you,' [Basil] muttered.

(27; emphasis added)

Lord Henry's refusal to acknowledge his role in influencing Dorian is, of course, disingenuous to a large extent. Though Dorian remains intimidated by Lord Henry's presence from the very beginning — according to the narrator, the young man is "afraid of [Lord Henry], and [is] ashamed of being afraid" (21) — Dorian nonetheless hangs on the older man's every word and gesture. "There was something in [Lord Henry's] low, languid voice that was absolutely fascinating. His cool, white, flower-like hands, even, had a curious charm" for Dorian (21). Lord Henry's palpable presence perplexes Dorian, not least because his fear of the older man is coupled with a homoerotic attraction. "Why had it been left for a stranger *to reveal him to himself?*," wonders the newly-initiated member of the New Hedonist Club of Men (21; emphasis added), thus confirming Basil's suspicions of Lord Henry's sway over Dorian Gray.

At the same time, however, Lord Henry's denial of his power over Dorian is also partially warranted. Though it can be argued that perhaps Dorian would not have uttered his wish, had he never encountered Lord Henry in the first place,

the fact remains that it *is* Dorian's *wish* to remain forever young. Though my interest is not with delineating the fine nuances between the notions of predestination/fate and free will/individual choice (a debate as old the Bible itself!), a brief discussion of Dorian's struggle in coming to terms with Basil's portrait remains crucial in any reading of Wilde's novel. Dorian engages in the first of his many mysterious escapades immediately following his rejection of Sibyl Vane, primarily in order to forget his recent involvement with the actress (88-89). Upon his return home on this particular occasion, Dorian chances to pass by the portrait of himself. When "his eye fell upon the portrait Basil Hallward had painted of him," Dorian "started back as if in surprise" (89), the narrator informs us.

> Finally [Dorian] came back, went over to the picture, and examined it. In the dim arrested light that struggled through the cream-coloured silk blinds, the face appeared to him to be a little changed. The expression looked different. One would have said that there was a touch of cruelty in the mouth. It was certainly strange.
>
> (89-90)

Feeling both fearful of and fascinated with the portrait's altered expression, Dorian vows "to make reparation" for his cruel behaviour towards Sibyl (95). And he decides that the portrait, henceforth, "would be a guide to him through life, would be to him what holiness is to some, and conscience to others, and the fear of God to us all" (95). Soon after making such promises to alleviate his

conscience, however, Dorian discovers (from Lord Henry) that Sibyl has committed suicide as a result of his rejection of her. At this moment, Dorian is positioned at a psychological and moral impasse:

> [Dorian] felt that the time had really come for making his *choice*. Or had his choice already been made? Yes, life had decided that *for him* — life, and his infinite curiosity about life. Eternal youth, infinite passion, pleasures subtle and secret, wild joys and wilder sins — *he was to have all these things*. The portrait was to bear the burden of his shame: that was all.
>
> (105; emphasis added)

In resigning his life to a preordained fate and, concomitantly, in relinquishing his free will, Dorian essentially refuses to accept responsibility for his (im)moral actions, both in the present and for the future. Dorian continues to live in this fashion for close to two decades, willingly and willfully "gr[owing] more and more enamoured of his own beauty, more and more interested in the corruption of his own soul" (128). Lord Henry's influence over Dorian, Basil's portrait of Dorian, and Dorian's decisions and actions, in and of themselves, thus contribute to the development of what Freud identifies as symptomatic characteristics of the compulsively neurotic subject.

Chapter 11 of Wilde's novel focuses on describing Dorian's compulsion to engage in repeating the multiple experiences and pleasures which life has to offer him. For Dorian, "Life itself was the first, the greatest, of the arts, and for it all

the other arts seemed to be but a *preparation*" (129; emphasis added). All of Dorian's various interests and pursuits, then, are mere prepatory stages in anticipation of the Ultimate Experience and Pleasure. Though Dorian's compulsive behaviour displays his repeated tendencies to consume, learn, and accumulate, it also demonstrates his reverent observation of *rituals*. "[A]s has been said of [Dorian] before, no theory of life seemed to him to be of any importance compared with life itself. He felt keenly conscious of how barren all intellectual speculation is when separated from action and experiment. He knew that the senses, no less than the soul, have their spiritual mysteries to reveal" (133). Life, then, comprises itself as a series of actions and experiments. In his attempt to discover the mysteries of the soul, as well as of the senses, Dorian adheres to a systematic approach, a ritualistic pattern, in leading his life.

Dorian's activities, therefore, demonstrate "symptomatic" behavioural patterns in accordance to Freud's discussion of the compulsive subject. "[W]e can discern in [the compulsive subject]," Freud remarks, "an essential character trait which always remains the same and which is *compelled to find expression in a repetition of the same experiences*" (Beyond 11: 293; emphasis added). Compare Freud's explanation with the narrator's description of Dorian's "curiosity about life which Lord Henry had first stirred in him": "The more [Dorian] knew, *the more he desired to know*. He had mad hungers that grew more ravenous as he fed them" (128; emphasis added). The narrator's explanation of Dorian's infinite sexual appetite demonstrates the young man's strict adherence to

Lord Henry's earlier advice: "The only way to get rid of a temptation is to yield to it. Resist it, and your soul grows sick with longing for the things it has forbidden to itself . . ." (18). Lord Henry's code of a New Hedonism thus forms an underlying structure for The Picture of Dorian Gray and, more specifically, for Dorian's negotiation of his subjectivities in Wilde's novel. Freud, I suspect, had a somewhat similar objective in mind when he began to delineate, towards the end of the nineteenth century in Vienna, a theory of pleasure as a structuring epistemological foundation for the discipline of psychoanalysis. For, according to yet another one of Lord Henry's entertaining though puzzling comments to his friends, Basil and Dorian: "*Pleasure* is the only thing worth having a *theory* about" (77; emphasis added).

Dorian's compulsive behaviour in Chapter 11, largely resulting from his reading of the "yellow book," can be traced back to the Sibyl Vane episode. After rejecting Sibyl, Dorian composes a letter of apology to his beloved as a gesture of (self-) absolution and as an act of (self-) penitence. As the narrator describes it:

> Finally, [Dorian] went over to the table and wrote a passionate letter to the girl he had loved, imploring her forgiveness, and accusing himself of madness. He covered page after page with wild words of sorrow, and wilder words of pain. There is a luxury in self-reproach. When we blame ourselves we feel that no one else can blame us. It is the confession, not the priest, that gives us absolution. When Dorian had finished the letter, he felt that he had been forgiven.

Does Dorian's composition of the letter represent a sincere attempt to make amends for his recent beastly behaviour? Or, does it merely display a characteristic solipsism that remains misguided in its assumption that an act of self-flagellation can easily substitute for genuine remorse? These questions remain unanswerable in many ways, not least because Dorian's letter to Sibyl *never* gets sent — or, more accurately, it never gets read. For immediately after the composition of the letter, Lord Henry arrives at Dorian's house with the sole purpose of consoling his young friend's recent loss. Upon his arrival, however, Lord Henry discerns that his letter has yet to be opened by its recipient, and he is forced to disclose the contents of his earlier dispatch to Dorian — namely, the news of Sibyl's death. I would argue that Lord Henry's visit presents Dorian with two separate but interrelated discoveries: not only does Dorian discover the news of Sibyl's death, but he also discovers that, in not opening Lord Henry's letter addressed to himself, he has relinquished an *earlier* opportunity of learning the truth. Hence, the two men's letters — one addressed *to* Sibyl, the other containing news *of* Sibyl — represent a similar interruption in the process of exchanging information. With a "cry of pain" (97), Dorian finally realizes the emotional dangers inherent to a non-reading practice — a deferral of "fore-knowledge" that, in this case, is always already *après le fait*.

In his next dispatch to Dorian, Lord Henry attaches a note with a message "simply to say that he [is] sen[ding] [Dorian] the evening paper, and a book that

might interest him" (124). In light of his previous experience with Lord Henry's correspondence, Dorian not surprisingly refuses to defer the act of reading, and immediately submits to read not only the note and the newspaper on the "Inquest of an Actress," but also the book included in the mailing. As the narrator describes it:

> [Dorian's] eye fell on the yellow book that Lord Henry had sent him. What was it, he wondered. . . . [A]nd taking up the volume, flung himself into an armchair, and began to turn over the leaves. After a few minutes he became absorbed. It was the strangest book that he had ever read. Things that he had dimly dreamed of were suddenly made real to him. Things of which he had never dreamed were gradually revealed.
>
> (125)

With such an immediate absorption, it is no wonder that Dorian continually adheres to reading *and* re-reading "the latter part[s] of the [yellow] book" (127). To the extent that the "yellow book" signals the beginning of Dorian's obsessive/ neurotic reading practice, this episode hence crucially foreshadows his later development of a compulsive consumption of the narratives of other human lives in Chapter 11.

According to Foucault, "[f]rom the Christian penance to the present day, sex was a privileged theme of confession" (History 61). During the later part of the nineteenth century, the conjunction between "truth" and "sex" — "the transformation of sex into discourse" — began to crystallize with the emergence

of sexology and psychoanalysis, two psychological sciences whose disciplinary methodologies privileged the confessional mode (History 61). Importantly, then, tracing the development of Dorian's "symptomatic" behaviour from the Sibyl Vane episode to the systematic and ritualistic patterns of his activities in the centre of Wilde's novel reveals the primacy of the confessional act in Chapter 11 of Dorian Gray. The chapter, I would argue, serves two interrelated purposes: first, as a confessional (auto)biography of Dorian Gray; and, also, as an illustration of the young man's growing fascination with the act of confession, in general, that makes particularly salient his desire to *consume* the narratives of other human lives.

In the first instance, the narrator's omniscient perspective in Chapter 11 not only "fills in" the absent details and particulars pertaining to Dorian's negotiation of his subjectivities, but it essentially *confesses* and subsequently *makes known* Dorian's darkest desires. According to the chapter's descriptions/ confessions, Dorian increasingly strives to create, for himself, "a world in which things would have fresh shapes and colours" (130). Such a world can only materialize with repeated consumptions, as is displayed by Dorian's many and various intellectual and consumerist preoccupations in Chapter 11. Not surprisingly, the first of these is Dorian's fetishistic fascination with the Roman Catholic faith and, namely, with the ritual of confession itself. According to the narrator in Chapter 11, Dorian often fantasizes about "sit[ting] in the dim shadow of one of [the black confessionals] and listen[ing] to men and women whispering

through the worn grating the true story of their lives" (132-33). Though Dorian's earlier letter to Sibyl Vane foreshadows his current engagement with the confession as a "ritual of discourse" (Foucault History 64), the young man's obsession with consumption in Chapter 11 shows a nascent understanding of the dialectical dynamics informing and structuring this discursive ritual. Earlier in his letter to Sibyl, Dorian firmly believes in the conviction that: "When we blame ourselves we feel that no one else has a right to blame us. *It is the confession, not the priest, that gives us absolution*" (96; emphasis added). In Chapter 11, however, Dorian's desire to "witness" verbally "the true stor[ies] of [other people's] lives" marks a shift in his subject-position. In fantasizing about being an interlocutor in the confessional act, Dorian essentially places *himself* in the position of a priest-like figure. Such a self-positioning, therefore, helps Dorian to realize that *both* the priest and the confession are but two separate but interrelated parts structuring the dialectical dynamics of the confessional act. For, as Foucault so rightly insists, the confession is "a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence . . . of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession" (History 61). For Dorian, his consumption of knowledge strives to consume the narratives of other human lives and incorporate them for his own story. According to such an epistemological form of cannibalism, "[t]here [are] times when it appeared to Dorian Gray that the whole of history was merely the record of his own life. . . . It seem[s] to him that in some mysterious ways their lives had been his own"

(144). To the extent that the term "fiction" means *both* "to make" and "to make up" in its Latinate etymology (J. Hillis Miller 68), Dorian *fictionalizes* "the true story of [other people's] lives." For Dorian, this method of narrative appropriation informs *his* own ontological development, *his own fiction(s)*. For not only will other people's lives provide the evidence of his existence, but they will additionally justify his compulsive desires to consume. In the self-construction of his own story, the narrator provides the absent/present details of what Lord Henry calls the "suggestion of a strange, almost modern romance" (35). The fragments of Chapter 11, therefore, constitute Dorian's (auto)biography — or, what Wilde entitles The Picture of Dorian Gray — the story of a young man's compulsive, consuming desires to experience Life fully.

Gay Science, Queer Science

Following his stabbing of Basil Hallward, Dorian Gray seeks the assistance of a now-estranged male friend, Alan Campbell, to dispose of the painter's body. But when Campbell discovers his task, he entreats Dorian: "Stop, Gray. I don't want to know anything further. Whether what you have told me is true or not true, doesn't concern me. I entirely decline to be mixed up in your life. *Keep your horrible secrets to your self*" (168; emphasis added). But Dorian persists in pleading his case, insisting that:

> 'Alan, they will have to interest you. This one will have to interest you. . . . You are the one man who is able to save me. . . . *Alan, you are scientific. You know about chemistry, and things of that kind. You have made experiments.* What you have got to do is destroy the thing that is upstairs — to destroy it so that not a vestige of it will be left. . . . You, Alan, must change him, and everything that belongs to him, into a handful of ashes that I may scatter in the air.'
>
> (168; emphasis added)

Unfamiliar with "chemistry, and things of that kind," and unaccustomed to conducting "experiments" for himself, poor Dorian seeks the help of someone "scientific." For in not having the likes of someone like Victor Frankenstein or Henry Jekyll around, Dorian must make do with an alternative person acquainted

with scientific knowledge, specifically, someone able to "penetrate into the recesses of nature, and show how [Nature] works in [its] *hiding* places" (Frankenstein 50; emphasis added).

For Dorian, the case is clear: no questions need be asked, but the evidence must be destroyed via the intervention of scientific knowledge. But the murderous crime in Dorian Gray hints at a far graver reality as well — namely, the sin of same-sex desires. In the elimination of evidence, the dual nature of the crime/sin of (male) homosexuality thus persists to be a secret, flourishing in the realm of the unknown and the unknowable. This particular episode in Dorian Gray importantly foregrounds the collusion of the subject of science and the homosexual subject in preserving the open secret of homosexuality. Both, Janus-like, operate within a paradoxical nexus that simultaneously encloses and discloses the knowledge of the open secret. "In this light, it becomes clear that the social function of secrecy," writes D. A. Miller in his formulation of the open secret, "is not to conceal knowledge, *so much as to conceal knowledge of the knowledge*" (206; emphasis added).

In "The Gay Science," Foucault proposes "a radical break, a change in orientation, objectives, and vocabulary" as a strategy for the productive interrogation of the subject of homosexuality (qtd. in Fuss 7). In this project, "Split Subjects and Other(ed) Victorian Bodies," I have kept this seductive Foucauldian dictum in mind. At the same time, I have also been motivated with an equal commitment to delineating "the use and abuse of research into

homosexuality," to borrow from the subtitle of Simon LeVay's Queer Science. A dual strategy of "gay science, queer science," I remain convinced, productively interrogates the paradox informing the subject of homosexuality *and* the homosexual subject(s). For as Diana Fuss lucidly points out: "Paradoxically, . . . the historical moment of the first appearance of the homosexual as a 'species' rather than a 'temporary aberration' also marks the moment of the homosexual's disappearance — into the closet. That the first coming out was also simultaneously a closeting; that the homosexual's debut onto the stage of historical identities was as much an egress as an entry" (4).

Explicitly and/or implicitly, "Split Subjects and Other(ed) Victorian Bodies" has consistently been guided by the assumption that paradoxes are always productive ones. Regardless of its often frustrating, "unsolveable" nature (its dialectical mechanism of enclosure and disclosure), the paradox of the open secret eventually produces one disclosure after an*other*. My own *qu(e)eries* in this project, therefore, have delineated the paradoxical nature of same-sex desires as they are represented in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, Robert Louis Stevenson's Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, and Oscar Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray. In investigating the (in)evident representations of various scientific discourses, my project has foregrounded the multiple repercussions of science within a larger cultural context of the Victorian period. Indeed, my project has demonstrated that the subject of science and the (male) homosexual subject were

often strange, though definitely appropriate, bedfellows during the nineteenth century.

Notes

Chapter One

[1] Elllen Moers, "Female Gothic," included in Literary Women. Rpt. in George Levine and U. C. Knoepfmacher (eds.), The Endurance of Frankenstein. All page references to Moers's essay will be from this collection.

[2] Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, "Horror's Twin: Mary Shelley's Monstrous Eve," included in The Madwoman in the Attic; Kate Ellis, "Monsters in the Garden: Mary Shelley and the Bourgeois Family," in The Endurance of Frankenstein; U. C. Knoepflmacher, "Thoughts on the Aggression of Daughters," in The Endurance of Frankenstein; Mary Poovey, " 'My Hideous Progeny': The Lady and the Monster," included in The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary Wollestonecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austen.

[3] London's essay offers nuanced readings of two statuary memorials to Percy Bysshe Shelley: one commissioned by Sir Percy and Lady Shelley to Percy Bysshe and Mary Shelley, a commemoration executed by Henry Weekes; the other, Onslow Ford's monument to Percy Bysshe at University College, Oxford. London also includes a discussion of Louis-Edouard Fournier's painting, The Funeral of Shelley (1889). In subsequent references to the Shelleys, I will use "Mary" and "Percy Bysshe" whenever the two authors appear in proximity, and "Shelley" when it is clear that the reference is to Mary Shelley.

[4] For a succinct discussion of the inherent problematics of any consideration of the relationship between Mary and Percy Bysshe Shelley, see William Veeder, "Introduction," Mary Shelley and *Frankenstein*: The Fate of Androgyny.

[5] London is here quoting from Margaret Homan's study, Bearing the Word: Language and Female Experience in Nineteenth-Century Women's Writing (117).

[6] In her subsequent introduction, Mary Shelley admits that "[a]s far as [she] can recollect, [the preface to the 1818 edition of Frankenstein] was entirely written by [Percy Bysshe]" (23).

[7] In a journal entry during the summer of 1816, Mary confesses that "incapacity and timidity always prevented [her] mingling in the nightly conversations" (Journal 184).

[8] Interestingly enough, although Vasbinder's study stresses the primacy of "scientific attitudes" in Frankenstein, he chooses to ignore Mary's comment in her introduction. When quoting the same paragraph from the text, Vasbinder instead inserts an ellipsis (79) and, in doing so, his argument acts complicitly to ensure a complete demarcation between speech and silence. Considering that his study involves examining the scientific influences upon Mary's writing of Frankenstein, it seems rather careless of Vasbinder to neglect the works of Erasmus Darwin, especially since he had speculated on a possible link, elsewhere, between Darwin's Zoonomia and Frankenstein (cf. Vasbinder, "A Possible Source for the

Term 'Vermicelli' in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein"). Also interesting is Mellor's mirroring of Shelley's parenthetical insertion early on in her essay on Frankenstein:

> While no scientist herself (her description of Victor Frankenstein's laboratory is both vague and naive; apparently Victor does all his experiments in a small attic room by the light of a single candle), Mary Shelley nonetheless had a sound grasp of the concepts and implications of some of the most important scientific work of her day.
>
> (288)

In light of Mellor's otherwise compelling reading of Frankenstein, it seems telling that she articulates her disappointment with the humble surroundings of Victor's laboratory. It seems as if the gothic narrative elements potentially distract from Frankenstein's "feminist critique of science."

[9] Of course, the relationship between science and religion became even more tenuous throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, especially because of the works of Charles Darwin, the grandson of Erasmus Darwin. See Frank Miller Turner, Between Science and Religion: The Reaction to Scientific Naturalism in Late Victorian England.

[10] Mary Shelley's "ambivalence" is characteristic of her writings and her relationships, according to both Mary Poovey and William Veeder. Poovey explains that "[Mary] Shelley's ambivalence with regard to female self-assertion was largely a response to her very particular position within the competing value

systems of the turbulent first decades of the nineteenth century" (115). Whereas Poovey views Shelley's ambivalent attitudes as both a response to and product of her culture, Veeder is more critical, I think, when he locates such ambivalent attitudes as *inherent* in Mary Shelley herself. According to Veeder, "[Mary Shelley's] private prose, her later novels, her relations with men, and Frankenstein all display Mary's need to express and her tendency to repress" (Mary 8).

[11] The full quotation from Bacon is: "I am come in very truth leading to you Nature with all her children to bind her to your service and make her your slave" (Farrington 197). Quoting the same Baconian dictum in her essay on Frankenstein, Mellor posits that Bacon thus "identified the pursuit of modern science with a form of sexual politics: the aggressive, virile male scientist legitimately captures and enslaves a passive, fertile female nature" (287). While Bacon's language frequently and graphically employed sexual imagery (common enough in descriptions of nature), and while it often identified the aim of modern science as seducing nature in order to conquer it, Mellor fails to notice the shifting views informing gender ideology in general and scientific discourses in particular during the eighteenth century. In short, by failing to account for the discursive shifts following Baconian science, Mellor presents an unproblematized construction of the gender binary between male and female.

[12] Thanks to Chris Wiesenthal for alerting me to this source.

[13] Below is Waldman's eulogy on modern chemistry as rehearsed by Victor to Walton, which Mellor isolates in her discussion:

After having made a few prepatory experiments, he [Professor Waldman] concluded with a panegyric upon modern chemistry, the terms of which I [Victor] shall never forget: —

'The ancient teachers of this science . . . promised impossibilities, and performed nothing. The modern masters promise very little; they know that metals cannot be transmuted, and that the elixir of life is a chimera. But these philosophers, whose hands seem only made to dabble in dirt, and their eyes to pore over the microscope or crucible, have indeed performed miracles. They penetrate into the recesses of nature, and show how she works in her hiding places. They ascend into the heavens: they have discovered how the blood circulates, and the nature of the air we breathe. They have acquired new and almost unlimited powers; they can command the thunders of heaven, mimic the earthquake, and even mock the invisible world with its own shadows.'

(50-51)

[14] In reference to this same passage, Mary Poovey observes that: This remarkable passage suggests that one's 'soul' can be taken over by an invading enemy, who, having taken up residence within, effectively becomes one's 'fate.' The 'palpable enemy,' which we know to be *imaginative desire*, is no stranger to its chosen victim; but Shelley's repeated use of the passive voice and her depiction of the 'soul' as a vessel to be filled, then objectified, makes this 'resolution' seem a visitation

> rather than an act of self-indulgence. Dramatizing the fragmentation of Frankenstein's psyche foreshadows, of course, the literal splitting-off of the monster; but, equally important, it suggests that Frankenstein cannot be held responsible for the 'destiny' he is powerless to resist.
>
> (136; emphasis added)

Although Poovey's observation supports her discussion of Mary Shelley's subsequent alterations of the 1818 text for purposes of "radically reduc[ing] the importance of external circumstances and underscor[ing] the inevitability of the overreacher's fall" (135), she nonetheless neglects to consider how Shelley's description of Victor's soul as a passive receptacle potentially reveals the subtle though pervasive homoerotic tensions which are, in fact, not "imaginative [nor imagined] desire[s]."

[15] Consider Victor's admission to Walton: "But I forget that I am moralising in the most interesting part of my tale; and your looks remind me to proceed" (57). Not only is Victor seducing his listener here, but moments like these foreground the very possibility that Victor is rehearsing his tale largely for the purpose of hearing his own voice. Both Victor and Walton, then, are solipsistic in their respective projects and, not to be too flippant, I would suggest that they are engaged in a (mutual) "masturbatory" session with each other and with themselves. This is a fair assumption in light of Victor's role as the editor of Walton's transcription of *his* own [Victor's] narrative. As Walton describes in his letter to Margaret, "*in continuation*" (174) to Victor's story:

> Frankenstein discovered that I made notes concerning his history: he asked to see them, and then himself *corrected and augmented* them in many places; but principally in giving the life and spirit to the conversations he held with his enemy. 'Since you have preserved my narration,' said he, 'I would not that a mutilated one should go down to posterity.'
>
> (175; emphasis added)

[16] For summaries of filmic/cinematic and dramatic adaptations of Shelley's Frankenstein, see Steven Earl Forry, " 'The Foulest Toadstool': Reviving Frankenstein in the Twentieth Century," included in The Fantastic in World Literature and the Arts; Albert J. Lavalley's "The Stage and Film Children of Frankenstein: A Survey," included in The Endurance of Frankenstein; and William Nestrick's "Coming to Life: Frankenstein and the Nature of Film Narrative," included in The Endurance of Frankenstein.

[17] In a different context, Gregg Bordowitz distinguishes the differences between "confession" and "testimony," as they relate to his life-experience as a seropositive gay man:

> The only activity I can perform without disgust is storytelling. That makes me kind of religious. I don't believe in god, but I have great faith in the power of testimony. Not confession. There are differences, very significant to me, between the confession and the testimony. Through testimony one bears witness to one's own experiences to one's self.

> Through confession one relinquishes responsibility for bearing witness to and for one's self with the hope that some force greater than one's self will bear away the responsibilities for one's actions. The testimony is the story of a survivor. The confession is the story of a sinner. Both are motivated by guilt. If the survivor does not bear witness to his experience, he may blame himself for the pain he feels despite the fact that pain was caused by another person's actions. If the sinner does not reveal the nature of his sins, he will suffer the consequences of his actions through punishment inflicted by god. The testimony is secular. The confession is religious. Each can involve the other. The testimony is offered to an other, who listens. The confession is posed to an other, who has the power to punish or forgive. They are two distinctly different acts because the precondition for the testimony is a historical cause and the preconditions for the confession is a subjective cause.
>
> (25-26)

I quote Bordowitz at length because I find his reflections quite appropriate for distinguishing between Victor's *confession* to Walton and the monster's *testimony* to his creator, Victor. Although I agree with numerous critics who observe the similarities between Victor's and the monster's skillful oratorical strategies, I also find that there are subtle distinctions in tone between the two, not to mention the differing circumstances which compel them to reveal and share their respective stories. Unfortunately, for considerations of length, I am unable to further this

observation in this chapter. For more on the confession as a prevalent discourse in the nineteenth century, see Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. The subject of confession will also recur in my discussions in the next two chapters.

[18] This crucial passage illustrates yet another subtle transformation on Victor's part, insofar as he translates the creature's interpellated use of the second-person pronoun "you" into the subjective, first-person pronoun "I." Victor's solipsistic gesture, I would argue, is certainly not an attempt to recognize his role as contributing to the creature's current misery; but, rather, it illustrates Victor's desire to claim, however perversely and at all costs, the assumption that *he is and will always remain the cause of the creature's misery.* In Victor's view, and even after the consecutive murdering of his loved ones, the monster will always direct his "feelings" towards himself and never anybody else. Even at the eleventh hour, during the festive preparations for the wedding, Victor considers *his* life to be potentially in danger, and never Elizabeth's:

> In the meantime *I* took every precaution to defend *my* person, in case the fiend should openly attack *me*. *I* carried pistols and a dagger constantly about *me*, and was ever on the watch to prevent artifice. . . .
>
> (161; emphasis added)

[19] For more on erotic male triangles, see Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, "Gender Asymmetry and Erotic Triangles," included in Between Men.

[20] I am, of course, appropriating Victor's semi-incestuous sentiments towards Elizabeth Lavenza, "[his] more than sister" (42).

[21] During the Wilde trials, Lord Alfred Douglas read out loud from his poem, "Two Loves":

> Then sighing, said the other, 'Have thy will
>
> I am the love that dare not speak its name.'

(Beckson Aesthetes 82)

[22] According to D. A. Miller, from whom I borrow the term "open secret," secrecy can function as:

> the subjective practice in which the oppositions of private/public, inside/outside, subject/object are established, and the sanctity of their first term kept inviolate. And the phenomenon of the 'open secret' does not, as one might think, bring about the collapse of those binarisms and their ideological effects, but rather attests to their fantasmatic recovery.

(207)

I will elaborate my use of "the open secret" in the subsequent chapters on Jekyll and Hyde and Dorian Gray, two texts where the homoerotic dynamics are perhaps more obvious and less muted than in Frankenstein.

[23] Sedgwick explains that "[s]o-called 'homosexual panic' is the most private, psychologized form in which many twentieth-century western men experience their vulnerability to the social pressure of homophobic blackmail; even for them, however, that is only one path of control, complementary to public sanctions through the institutions described by Foucault and others as defining and regulating the amorphous territory of 'the sexual' " (Between 89).

Chapter Two

[1] In the introduction to their important collection, Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde After One Hundred Years, William Veeder and Gordon Hirsch note the many possible variations of referring to Stevenson's text:

> [A]mong the many variations that the novella's title has assumed throughout the years — with and without the initial The, with and without periods after Dr and Mr, with and without both Strange Case of and Strange Case of . . . Dr . . . Mr — we use the least cumbersome, Jekyll and Hyde, except where full formal recognition of the title is required. Then we adopt the title that Stevenson himself designated: Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde.
>
> (xvii)

In this chapter, I shall follow Veeder and Hirsch's editorial example in referring to Stevenson's novella.

[2] Other similarities between Frankenstein and Jekyll and Hyde include the anecdotal details of the actual composition of the texts themselves — both having to do with the authors' dreams. On Shelley's dream, see her introduction to Frankenstein. For details and discussions of Stevenson's dream and his subsequent composition of Jekyll and Hyde, see Jenny Calder, "Introduction," Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde and Other Stories (9-10); Mark Kanzer, "The Self-Analytic Literature of Robert Stevenson," included in Psychoanalysis and Culture (eds.

George B. Wilbur and Warner Muensterberger); and R. L. Stevenson, "A Chapter on Dreams," Scribner's Magazine (January 1888), rpt. in Across the Plains: Memories and Essays (1892).

In "The Struggle for a Dichotomy: Abjection in Jekyll and His Interpreters," Jerrold E. Hogle reads Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde through the lens of Julia Kristeva's theory of abjection; and he offers a wonderful reading of the male "birth" in Stevenson's novella which is similar to my argument of male reproductive bodies in Frankenstein in Chapter I:

> Indeed, the first emergence of Hyde from Jekyll's body, as the doctor remembers it in the "Statement," can be thought of as the erection of an aggressive male phallus only at a late moment when patriarchal lenses have been imposed on that eruption. Initially this event is remembered as a giving birth with "pangs" and "nausea," not to mention the expulsion of a "younger, lighter," and "less developed" being — Hyde as infant (83-84). The male body is not just partly female but is able to retain visceral memories of the birth process (involving phallic and nonphallic elements) from which the male person once emerged.
>
> (168)

[3] "Invert" was a synonymous term for "homosexual"; and although it was used, it did not gain conspicuous circulation until the publication of Havelock Ellis and John Addington Symonds's Sexual Inversion (1897), the second volume of Ellis's Studies in the Psychology of Sex.

[4] According to Charles Longman, who headed the publishing house responsible for Jekyll and Hyde, the Times review marked the great popularity of the book with the reading public (Maixner 205).

[5] Stevenson first met Lang while traveling with Sydney Colvin (a long-time family friend and later mentor for Stevenson) in the south of France during the winter of 1873-74. "Thus was Lang's first acquaintance with Stevenson," writes Bryan Bevan, "but Lang, a fellow Scot, was at first unfavourably impressed by Louis's smooth face and long hair" (37). Stevenson, on his part, considered Lang to be "[a] la-de-da Oxford kind of Scot" (qtd. in Mackenzie 17). Despite their unfavourable first impressions of each other, however, the two men quickly developed a strong friendship. While their intimate friendship was certainly based on personal feelings, it nonetheless also yielded professional advantages for Stevenson. As Calder remarks of the friendship in her biography of Stevenson: "Louis became friendly with Lang, a useful friendship as Lang was an influential literary journalist, and was to make and break, in a not always entirely responsible way, literary reputations. He certainly helped to make Stevenson's [literary reputation]" (A Life Study 118).

[6] Another private correspondence/friendship is worth noting. In a letter to his American friend, Will Low, dated 2 January 1886, Stevenson concludes his correspondence with:

I send you herewith a gothic gnome for your Greek nymph; but the gnome

> is interesting I think and he came out of a deep mine, where he guards the fountain of tears. It is not always the time to rejoice. Yours ever
>
> R. L. S.
>
> The gnome's name is Jekyll and Hyde; I believe you will find that he is likewise quite willing to answer to the name of Low or Stevenson.
>
> (Letters 163)

The two men first met in Paris in the summer of 1875 and, according to Calder, "Low fell at once for Louis's personality and talent" (A Life Study 96). Low, himself, would favourably recall his friendship with Stevenson in his A Chronicle of Friendships (1908). Writing of Stevenson's facial appearance, Low remembers that "[i]t was not a handsome face until it spoke, and then I can hardly imagine that any could deny the appeal of the vivacious eyes, the humour of pathos of the mobile mouth, with its lurking suggestion of the great god Pan at times, or fail to realize that here was one so evidently touched with genius that the higher beauty of the soul was his" (53). Low's sensuous and poignant memory echoes and confirms Andrew Lang's comment in "Recollections of Robert Louis Stevenson," collected in his Adventures Among Books (1905). According to Lang, Stevenson "possessed, more than any man I ever met, the power of making other men fall in love with him" (51).

[7] Bradford A. Booth and Ernest Mehew, in their recent edition of Stevenson's Letters, point out that the reference is from the Book of James (4:1). The Biblical passage, essentially a warning against worldliness, reads:

> From whence *come* wars and fightings among you? *come they* not hence, *even* of your lusts that war in your members?
>
> (682; emphasis original)

In his "Full Statement of the Case," Jekyll, too, makes mention of "the perennial war among [his] members" (82).

[8] These questions become especially salient, perhaps even urgent, in light of Symonds's personal and professional reputation: as an "out" homosexual, not only did Symonds collaborate with Havelock Ellis in Sexual Inversion (1897), but he also included his own "case history" as well in the first volume, Studies in the Psychology of Sex (Heath 102). For more on the (homo)sexual politics of aestheticism in Victorian England, see Richard Dellamora, Masculine Desire, which offers an interesting footnote in relation to Symonds: "The 1976 Supplement to the OED reports two uses of the word 'homosexual,' one by Symonds, in 1892" (fn. 2; 241). Finally, for a discussion of Symond's collaboration with Ellis on Sexual Inversion, see Wayne Koestenbaum, "Unlocking Symonds: Sexual Inversion," in Double Talk: The Erotics of Male Literary Collaboration.

[9] Besides Stevenson's use of duality in Jekyll and Hyde, Miller additionally identifies "the spectacle of [William] Sharp in Celtic drag, the Anglo-Irish mysticism of [William Butler] Yeats, the Anglo-American fantasies of the late [Henry] James, the Anglo-Indian [Rudyard] Kipling's metempsychoses, [Oscar Wilde's] ageing portrait of Dorian Gray, [and] the Classical exoticism of

[Walter] Pater" as other examples of "queer fellows" and their fascination with the theme of duality.

Although Miller isolates his observations to a discussion of literary "queer fellows," his chapter of the same title nonetheless offers a useful entry for considering the relationship and connection between yet another duality which occupied the Victorian cultural imagination at this time — that of "literature and science," as proposed by Matthew Arnold. Arnold's Literature and Science was first delivered as a lecture during his 1883 tour of the United States and was later published in his collection, Discourses in America (1885). In his lecture/essay, Arnold defends the status of "literary" (i.e., classical and humanistic) studies in relation to and as distinct from the study of the natural sciences:

> If there is to be separation and option between humane letters on the one hand, and the natural sciences on the other, the great majority of mankind [*sic*], all who have not exceptional and overpowering aptitudes for the study of nature, would do well, I cannot but think, to chose [*sic*] to be educated in humane letters than in the natural sciences. Letters call out their being at more points, will make them live more.
>
> (1440)

In some ways, then, Stevenson's Jekyll and Hyde, published a year after Discourses in America, confirms and simultaneously presents a perversion of Arnold's thesis. That is, as a scientist and/or medical practitioner himself, Jekyll nonetheless *refuses* to "enter deeply into [the] scientific branch of [his]

confession" in his "Full Statement of the Case" (83). Jekyll's confession — itself a "letter," literally — thus indeed "call[s] out [its] being at more points" (as Arnold insists), even after the death of its author, who is/was, ironically, a man of science and not of letters.

[10] The figure of Herbert Spencer perhaps best exemplifies this discursive transition which united phrenology with both neurology and evolutionary psychology in the middle of the nineteenth century. Spencer began his scientific career as a phrenologist and he eventually widened his scope of study to include psychology as well. As Robin Gilmour points out in her summary of the intellectual and cultural contexts of the Victorian era, Spencer's Principles of Geology (1855) not only predated Charles Darwin's The Origin of Species (1859) by four years, but it was also "the first [published study] to offer a fully evolutionary psychology" (139). Gilmour further attributes Spencer with helping eventually to endorse and legitimate psychology as an experimental science by 1879, when the first laboratory was set up by Wilhelm Wendt in Leipzig (139).

Young Louis was familiar with Spencer's (and Darwin's) works, of course, since " '[s]urvival' had become a key word of science" amongst most of the literate population in Britain by the mid-nineteenth century (Calder A Life Study 93). Calder, moreover, notes that Thomas Stevenson, Louis's father, found his son's iconoclastic attitudes particularly disturbing (A Life Study 12). Louis's decision to marry Fanny Osbourne, an already-married American woman twelve years his senior, is a case in point. After hearing of the final arrangements of the

Osbournes's private divorce, which would allow Louis finally to wed Fanny, Thomas Stevenson articulated his paternal frustrations in a letter to Sydney Colvin: "Is it fair that we should all be murdered by his conduct. . . . I lay all this at the door of Herbert Spencer. Unsettling a man's faith is indeed a very serious matter" (qtd. in Mackenzie 25).

[11] Cooter's discussion foregrounds "the socioinstitutional, the clinical, and the scientific" (59) implications of phrenology on Victorian legislation in relation to the period's (re)conceptualizations of madness and morality.

[12] In Dangerous Sexualities, Frank Mort traces the 1864 legislation to, first, the steady increase of venereal infections in men during the 1820s (as documented in military reports of the period) and, also, to the public anxiety surrounding the issue of prostitution in the 1840s. "The dual problem of VD and sexual immorality," according to Mort, escalated in the 1850s and 60s due to the Crimean War and the statistics accompanying it (69). Mort further notes that the 1864 Act was later amended in 1866 and 1869 to extend "the geographical locations covered by the [original] regulations" (69). The Act was eventually suspended in 1883 and was finally repealed three years later in 1886, events which, according to Mort, "establish[ed] a landmark in the history of the nineteenth-century women's movement and in the development of a feminist politics of sexuality" (86).

[13] Ed Cohen notes the extensive documentation of police and court reports appearing in the Victorian commercial press at this time, "literally cover[ing] the

newspaper page[s] with representations of transgressive sexual practices (adultery, rape, prostitution, bestiality, pedophilia, homosexuality, transvestitism, etc.) ostensibly in order to represent the triumph of the norm and the rule of law" (119).

[14] For particulars of the Boulton/Park case, see William A. Cohen, "Privacy and Publicity in the Sex Scandal," in Sex Scandal: The Private Parts of Victorian Fiction. I will discuss Wilde's trials in more depth in the next chapter on The Picture of Dorian Gray; for a succinct overview of the Wilde trials, see Ed Cohen, Talk on the Wilde Side.

[15] Foucault's observation, moreover, nicely captures a productive discrepancy. On the one hand, the appearance of Ellis and Symonds's Sexual Inversion (1897) introduced into circulation the term "invert" as a synonym for "homosexual," thus continuing the medicalization of homosexuality. On the other hand, however, homosexual men and male inverts continued to be prosecuted for *sodomitical* acts. For, according to Jeffrey Weeks, "[t]he emergence of a psychological and medical model of homosexuality [during the later nineteenth century] was intimately connected with the legal situation" (Against 19). For specific background details of the Labouchère Amendment, see Jeffrey Weeks, Coming Out: Homosexual Politics in Britain, from the Nineteenth Century to the Present; H. Montgomery Hyde, The Love That Dared Not Speak Its Name; and F. B. Smith, "Labouchère's Amendment to the Criminal Law Amendment Bill."

[16] Of course, to a certain extent, *all* public literary reputations — for *both*

men and women — are based on the composition of texts within the confines of private/domestic spaces. Stevenson's case, however, remains particular because his literary works primarily attracted a male reading audience (this is certainly the case with Stevenson's adventure stories). For example, in a letter to Robert Bridges, Gerald Manley Hopkins praised Jekyll and Hyde over the novels of that "Evans-Eliot-Lewis[*sic*]-Cross woman" (qtd. in Maixner 230). For a succinct discussion of the shifting and gendered dynamics informing the fin-de-siècle literary climate, see Elaine Showalter, "Queen George" and "King Romance," in Sexual Anarchy.

[17] Veeder is here referring to G. K. Chesterson's observation (in his Robert Louis Stevenson [1928]) that "the story of Jekyll and Hyde, which is presumably presented as happening in London, is all the time very unmistakably happening in Edinburgh" (51).

[18] In "The Anatomy of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," Irving S. Saposnik aptly notes that, in Jekyll and Hyde, "[t]hree [of the characters] are professional men — two doctors, one lawyer — and the only nonprofessional, Richard Enfield, is so locked into his role that his description as 'the well-known man about town' [29] might as well be a professional designation" (110).

[19] In many ways, Veeder's conflation echoes that of Stephen Gwynn's observation (in his early study of Robert Louis Stevenson [1939]) that the male-oriented atmosphere of Jekyll and Hyde resembles "a community of monks" (130).

[20] Two important earlier commentaries are offered by Saposnik and Nabokov. Saposnik observes that "[a]lthough the reader's first views of the house are external, the action soon directs him [*sic*] to the hall, then to the study, and finally to the ominous experiments behind the closed door of the former dissection laboratory" (97). Nabokov similarly notes that "[j]ust as Jekyll is a mixture of good and bad, so Jekyll's dwelling place is also a mixture, a very neat symbol, a very neat representation of the Jekyll and Hyde relationship" (188). Nabokov even includes a student's drawing in his essay (187) which illustrates "the composite Jekyll building with its mellow and grand front hall [and where] there are corridors leading to Hyde, to the old surgery theatre, now Jekyll's laboratory. . ." (188). Jerrold E. Hogle also offers a wonderful reading, arguing that "[t]he parts of [Jekyll's] house as one moves among them shift from class level to class level, spatially reenacting the temporal history of the [geographical] district" (183).

[21] Cf. fn. 2.

[22] Slavoj Zizek proposes an argument of the "detachable phallus" (i.e., an artificial phallus such as a dildo employed in lesbian practices) that resonates with Veeder's observation of the dynamics of the (im)potency or the indeterminacy of the phallus in Jekyll and Hyde. Cf. Zizek, "I Hear You with My Eyes," included in Gaze and Voice as Love Objects. Thanks to Chris Wiesenthal for bringing this source to my attention.

[23] Thanks to Chris Wiesenthal for suggesting that I take my argument in

this direction.

[24] Utterson and readers eventually learn, via Jekyll's "Full Statement of the Case," that Hyde actually composed the two registered letters to Lanyon and Poole. This fact, however, does not weaken my argument that Jekyll's/Hyde's desperation reaches a pinnacle point at this moment — a form of "hysteria" most obviously articulated by the doctor's adamant rejection of his double: "He, I say — I cannot say, I" (94).

[25] As readers, we are finally made aware of the key's abused state and the backdoor's locked nature with Jekyll's explanation in his "Full Statement of the Case." Following the murder of Sir Danvers Carew, Jekyll rejects his private/secret identity as Hyde: "Hyde was henceforth impossible; . . . with what sincere renunciation I locked the door by which I had so often gone and come, and ground the key under my heel!" (91).

[26] To the extent that Jekyll inserts a final codicil in his will (72), it can certainly be argued that Utterson nonetheless succeeds in his endeavour to replace Hyde in Jekyll's estimation. But Utterson's success comes at a price. Veeder wonders: "Since Utterson did not draw up the will, since Jekyll's inheritance is in fact the responsibility of some other attorney, why does the novella emphasize *Utterson's* role in preserving the document?" (147; emphasis original). Veeder's query importantly reminds us that Stevenson, in fact, leaves open the possibility that Utterson offers his "services" *gratis*: therefore, Utterson is technically "prostituting" himself to Jekyll, his "client" (51-52). Moreover, since Jekyll and

Hyde is essentially composed of "ten disparate documents identified only as letters, incidents, cases, and statements" (Thomas 75), it can be argued that Stevenson's novella is a "promiscuous" text. Utterson's detection of the mysteries of Jekyll's relationship with Hyde thus entails, for the lawyer, the perusal of various documents — from Enfield's and Poole's verbal narratives to Lanyon's and Jekyll's written statements. With this argument in mind, an early description of Utterson can be read as fraught with sexual innuendo:

> In this character [of Utterson] it was frequently his fortune to be the last reputable acquaintance and the last good influence in the lives of down-going men. And to such as these, so long as they came about his chambers, he never marked a shade of change in his demeanour.
>
> (29)

Although it is obvious that Stevenson's intent, here, is to foreground the stable character of Utterson *as a lawyer*, I am equally interested about the man *hiding* behind the screen of professionalism. Considering that "[i]t was a nut to crack for many, what these two [Utterson and Enfield] could see in each other, or what subject they could find in common" (29-30), and considering that we are told that "the two men put the greatest store by these [routine Sunday] excursions, [and] counted them the chief jewel of each week" (30), Stevenson thus encourages us, in many ways, to interrogate the degree to which Utterson and Enfield are "romantically" attached to each other. On the one hand, as a bachelor, Utterson certainly displays a loyalty to his friend, Enfield. But, on the other hand, as a

bachelor lawyer, Utterson also displays an indiscriminate acquaintanceship with an array of "down-going men" who have free access to and from his "chambers" — indeed, the sexual connotations between "solicitor" and "client(s)" are multiple and resonant!

[27] In many ways, Stevenson never clarifies whether or not Lanyon's death is, indeed, a suicide. In his own letter to Utterson, Lanyon confesses to "feel[ing] that [his] days are numbered, and that [he] must [soon] die" (80). The narrator's descriptions in the "Remarkable Incident of Dr Lanyon" are equally vague, strongly suggesting Lanyon's resignation or will to death tantamount to suicide. A week following Utterson's last conversation with Lanyon, we are informed that "Dr Lanyon took to his bed, and in something less than a fortnight he was dead" (58). Unlike the surprising detail of Lanyon's "demise" (Hogle 168), however, Jekyll's death is expected almost at the outset of Jekyll and Hyde. As Ronald R. Thomas points out: "Dr. Jekyll's story begins with his preparations for the end; the first thing we know about him is that he has written a will and that it is written in his own hand" (75). To the extent degree that both deaths, then, appear "preordained," I will refer to both Lanyon's and Jekyll's deaths as suicides.

[28] Surely, Jekyll's professional identity as a doctor evokes, however tangentially, the nineteenth-century conflict between science and religion. But, in pointing out Stevenson's iconoclastic tendencies, I am by no means diminishing the effects of his childhood, a period of years in which he was raised by his nanny, Alison Cunningham, whom the young Louis fondly re-christened as "Cummy."

Cunningham and her strict Calvinist beliefs profoundly influenced young Louis, who, from a very early age, had developed a precocious and morbid grasp of evil and sin. In his poem, "Stormy Nights," Stevenson recalls of his childhood:

> Do I not know, how, nightly, on my bed
> The palpable close darkness shutting round me,
> How my small heart went forth to evil things,
> How all the possibilities of sin
> That were yet present to my innocence
> Bound me too narrowly,
> And how my spirit beat
> The cage of its compulsive purity;
> How — my eyes fixed,
> My shot lip tremulous between my fingers
> I fashioned for myself new modes of crime,
> Created for myself with pain and labour
> The evil that the cobwebs of society,
> The comely secrecies of education,
> Had made me an itching mystery to meward.

(Collected Poems 363)

As Calder notes in her biography of Stevenson, "[t]his was written by the young man looking back, another indication that the grimmer obsessions lingered in the adult mind along with the happier facets of childhood. Stevenson never lost his

preoccupation with evil, particularly with the duality of human nature, sin and respectability existing side by side, something he was to explore over and over again" (33). The concepts of sin and respectability that Calder rightly identifies as a preoccupation in Stevenson's literary works, however, exceed young Louis's childish notions of sin and evil. Therefore, I would argue that, although Stevenson often maintained his childish notions, the adult writing-subject also articulated a more nuanced understanding of other *social* sins and evils. In "fashioning for [himself] new modes of crime," "[c]reated . . . with pain and labour," Stevenson's mature understanding of the intricacies of life — an adult perception of "[t]he cobwebs of society" and "[t]he comely secrecies of education" — indeed exhibits and accompanies his nostalgia for a more concrete and perhaps, even, less complicated vision of sin and evil that informed his childhood.

Chapter Three

[1] The Picture of Dorian Gray first appeared in the June 1890 issue of Lippincott's Monthly Magazine. After several revisions, Dorian Gray then appeared in volume form in April 1891. The "Preface" to the novel, however, was first published in The Fortnightly Review (March 1891) before being included in the volume publication. For a detailed history of Wilde's stylistic and thematic revisions, see Donald Lawler, An Inquiry into Oscar Wilde's Revisions

of *The Picture of Dorian Gray*. For stylistic reasons, I will vary my use of referring to Wilde's novel as The Picture of Dorian Gray and, more often, as simply Dorian Gray.

[2] Such an economy of split subjectivities is also evident in most of Wilde's writings, though its stylistic treatments are markedly varied. Indeed, it can be argued that Wilde was preoccupied with the thematic of split subjects, and his literary *oeuvre* displays various methods of presenting this theme — ranging from the elevation and martyrdom of the self in the fairy tales in the collections The Happy Prince and Other Tales (1888) and The House of Pomegranates (1891); to the act of "bunburying" in The Importance of Being Earnest (1895); and culminating with De Profundis (1897), Wilde's autobiographical prison letter to Lord Alfred Douglas, in which Wilde often elevates *himself* to a form of "Christhood." On the fairy tales, see Guy Willoughby, Art and Christhood: The Aesthetics of Oscar Wilde; on The Importance of Being Earnest, see Christopher Craft, "Alias Bunbury: Desire and Termination in The Importance of Being Earnest," included in Another Kind of Love: Male Homosexual Desire in English Discourse, 1850-1920 (106-39); on De Profundis, see Regenia Gagnier, "De Produndis: An Audience of Peers," included in Idylls of the Marketplace: Oscar Wilde and the Victorian Public (177-95).

[3] Chris Baldick additionally connects Jekyll and Hyde and Dorian Gray to Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. Both of the later works, as the title of Baldick's study obviously suggests, are written in Frankenstein's "shadow." On Dorian

Gray, specifically, Baldick notes that Wilde's novel "takes a Frankensteinian creator and his monstrous creation, and subjects them to a further split, thus producing two creators — Wooton [*sic*] and Basil Hallward — and two monsters — Dorian and the picture" (149).

[4] The "new Hedonism" to which Lord Henry alludes is an obvious homage to Walter Pater and, specifically, to Pater's philosophies as outlined in Studies in the History of the Renaissance (1873) and later reissued as The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry (1887); and to two of Pater's novels, Marius the Epicurean (1885) and Gaston de Latour (1888) (Murray ix-x). Wilde had given Pater a manuscript version of Dorian Gray to read prior to its appearance in Lippincott's (Lawler 63). Pater (publicly) reviewed Wilde's novel in the Bookman (November 1891), and among the many contemporaneous reviews of Wilde's novel, his remains one of the most perceptive. Though Pater concedes that Wilde's characterization of his young protagonist clearly displays a failed experiment in Epicurianism, he nonetheless praises Wilde's "partly supernatural story" and, in particular, "those Epicurean niceties . . . adding to the decorative colour of its central figure, like so many exotic flowers, like so the charming scenery and the perpetual, epigrammatic, surprising, yet so natural, conversations, like an atmosphere all about it" (Beckson Critical 84). In this particular passage in his review, Pater's purple prose, in turn, pays homage to the opening scene of Dorian Gray, where the narrator describes Basil Hallward's studio (1). More importantly, however, although Pater approves of the

Epicurianistic (i.e., hedonistic) elements in Dorian Gray, he was never one to enjoy being labelled as a hedonist. As Edmund Gosse recalls in Critical Kit-Kats (1896), Pater once peevishly remarked: "I wish they [his critics] wouldn't call me 'a hedonist'; it produces such a bad effect on the minds of people who don't know Greek" (258).

[5] Wilde was also notorious in North America and Europe: he conducted a lecture tour in the United States and Canada in 1882 and frequently visited the Continent (especially Italy and France). In the West, even if (literate) people remained oblivious to Oscar Wilde in the 1880s and early 1890s, the Wilde trials of 1895 certainly changed the situation. As Ed Cohen remarks: "During the late spring of 1895, the trials of Oscar Wilde erupted from the pages of almost every London newspaper — and indeed from the pages of almost every newspaper throughout Europe and North America" (Talk 1). Similarly, the corresponding rise of a consumerist culture and of the sexological and psychoanalytic sciences were not limited only to Britain, but it was also present in much of the Western world. The scope of my argument, however, prevents me from more broadly addressing the particularities of geographical locations.

[6] According to Lawler, Wilde's "toned-down" presentation of the relationship between Dorian and Basil in the volume edition of his novel constitutes a primary deviation from the original, magazine version of the story. As Lawler explains: "By Wilde's shifting in Lippincott's and in the Ward, Lock and Company Dorian Gray from homosexual passion to aesthetic interest, Basil's

culpability in Dorian's fall from grace is muffled and reduced finally to that of the author of the detested painting" (26).

[7] Among the 216 contemporaneous reviews of Dorian Gray, Wilde condescended to respond to only three publicly (Gagnier 57). In addition to his letter to the editor of the Scot's Observer, Wilde also composed letters to the editors of the St. James's Gazette (Letters 257, 258-59, 259-61, 261-62) and the Daily Chronicle (Letters 263-64).

[8] Wilde reveals his sense of self as humourous and magnanimous in an observation put forth in "The Soul of Man Under Socialism" (1891): "And it is only fair to state, with regard to modern journalists, that they always apologize to one in private for what they have written against one in public" (38).

[9] Wilde's misogynist argument recalls to mind the masculinist tendencies which I discuss in Chapter One in relation to Frankenstein — specifically, the masculinist desire to co-opt the female procreative role evident in the discipline of the new science. However, it remains important to remember that Shelley's representation of the anxieties in her novel maintains a feminist perspective that cannot be wholly equated with Wilde's misogynist tendencies, nor with the perhaps "convenient" defenses of the homosexual literature of the fin-de-siècle that Gagnier discusses. During this time, moreover, the dynamics of the sex for sex's movement are further complicated by the sociocultural phenomenon of the New Woman. In "criticiz[ing] society's insistence on marriage as woman's only option for a fulfilling life" (Showalter 38), the remarkable figure of the New

Woman thus challenged dominant assumptions about the reproductive nature of (hetero)sexual desire. Thanks to Chris Wiesenthal for these reminders.

[10] Gagnier also notes that "[t]hroughout the second and third trials, in which Alfred Taylor was Wilde's co-defendant, the counsel for the Crown . . . [and] the solicitor-general . . . attempted to get extended mileage out of Taylor's having independent means, frequently stating that his habitual mode of living was 'idle' and 'extravagant' " (147). To the extent that leisure is associated with same-sex desires during the Wilde trials of 1895, the court's charges essentially *criminalizes* the hitherto benign notion of "having (too much) time on one's hands."

[11] In Dandies and Desert Saints: Styles of Victorian Manhood, James Eli Adams offers an approach to Kingsley that counters Dellamora's reading. According to Adams, "[w]hen Kingsley characterizes the entire British aristocracy as 'effeminate,' he is not insinuating that they are animated by same-sex desire. Instead, Kingsley develops the same associations . . . [as] in other critics of the [Oxford] Movement: the discipline of reserve that underwrites the elitism of the Tractarians is denigrated as the 'fastidious maundering' of the dandy, which Kingsley in good Carlylean fashion descries as a feeble echo of an already-enervated aristocracy, and thus a standing affront to middle-class manhood" (98-99). I demote Adam's observation to a footnote largely because his study's conclusions are contrary to my own methodologies in this project. Consider Adam's comment on secrecy in his introduction (a central if not always explicit

argument in my discussions): "It is of course the case that male-male desire throughout the Christian West has tended to be cloaked in secrecy, but this does not entail — as a good deal of recent literary and cultural criticism tends to assume — that secrecy always speaks of homoerotic desire" (13). Though I take his point that "Victorian obsessions with secrecy are manifold and powerfully overdetermined" (13), Adams's undervaluation of the critical work on same-sex desires unfairly reduces the highly nuanced arguments of the critics I cite in my discussions.

[12] On 18 February 1895, the Marquis of Queensberry (John Sholto Douglas, Lord Alfred Douglas's father), left a card for Wilde at the Albemarle Club which was inscribed with: "To Oscar Wilde posing [as] a Somdomite [*sic*]" (Ellmann 438). Another anecdotal detail between Queenberry and Wilde bears tangential relevance to Dorian Gray, insofar as it foregrounds the connection(s) between visual evidence, same sex desires, and public/private subjectivities. Wilde once asked if Queensberry was charging him (Wilde) with having a homosexual affair with Lord Alfred Douglas. Queensberry's response to Wilde's query: "I do not say that you are it, but you look it" (qtd. in Schmidgall 58). It certainly is unfortunate that Wilde did not possess a portrait of his own that would "bear the burden of his shame" (Dorian Gray 105). For a succinct discussion of the connection(s) between visual evidence and same-sex desires in relation to Dorian Gray, see Lee Edelman, "Homographesis," included in Homographesis: Essays in Gay Literary and Cultural Theory (3-23). On same-sex desires, nation,

and subjectivities in relation to Wilde and André Gide, see Jonathan Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault.

[13] Cohen similarly notes that Wilde's "Phrases and Philosophies for the Use of the Young" was also charged, during the trials, as "a corrupting influence against which the public should be forewarned, in this case not because the work itself depicted 'the practices and passions of persons of sodomitical and unnatural habits and tastes,' but because it appeared in a magazine, The Chameleon, containing another work, 'The Priest and the Acolyte' (not written by Wilde), that did" (fn. 2 250-51).

[14] Another of Wilde's observations from "The Soul of Man Under Socialism" deserves attention, not least because it demonstrates his uncanny prescience about the results of the trials four years later. Comparing the judicial and journalistic systems between Britain and France, Wilde observes:

> In France they manage these things better. There they do not allow the details of the trials that take place in the divorce courts to be published for the amusement or criticism of the public. All that the public are allowed to know is that the divorce has taken place and was granted on petition of one or other or both of the married parties concerned. In France, in fact, they limit the journalist, and allow the artist almost perfect freedom. Here we allow absolute freedom to the journalist and entirely limit the artist. English public opinion, that is to say, tries to constrain and impede and warp the man [*sic*] who *makes* things that are beautiful in effect, and

> compels the journalist to *retail* things that are ugly, or disgusting in fact, so that we have the most serious journalists in the world and the most indecent newspapers. *It is no exaggeration to talk of compulsion.*
>
> (41-42; emphasis added)

In bemoaning the dire state of British journalism, Wilde importantly reverses the economic and consumerist paradigms as outlined in Gagnier's study. According to Gagnier, Wilde's works privileged non-productive art, just as his life privileged non-reproductive sexuality. However, in the above instance, Wilde essentially assigns the productive role to the artist, and he consigns the consumerist role to the journalist. But, as I will immediately discuss, Wilde's marketing of his person(a)s and the journalistic and public consumption of Wildeiana were mutually constitutive strategies.

[15] The cultural fascination with Oscar Wilde remains to this day, and particularly so in the discipline of literary studies within the academy. Wendell Harris's entry in a Modern Language Association bibliography publication, Victorian Prose: A Guide to Research (Ed. David DeLaura 1973), states that "the relationship between Wilde's homosexuality, creative writing, and aesthetic theorizing has been wearisomely but largely *profitlessly* discussed" (qtd. in Schmidgall xv; emphasis added). Two recent, lucid studies are worth mentioning, both containing enough anecdotes to rival Ellmann's comprehensive biography of Wilde: Gary Schmidgall, The Stranger Wilde: Interpreting Oscar, and Neil Bartlett, Who Was That Man?: A Present for Mr Oscar Wilde.

[16] For an interesting study connecting Oscar Wilde and Dorian Gray with fin-de-siècle journalism and advertising, see Rachel Bowlby, "Promoting Dorian Gray."

[17] Dorian's request for Alan Campbell "to perform a certain scientific experiment" (169), in order to dispose of Basil's recently-murdered body, also indicates another subtle use of science on Wilde's part. The figure of Campbell presents a pertinent link to my discussion. To the extent that Dorian essentially blackmails his once "almost inseparable" friend (165) to agree to rid the evidence of Basil's body, the conspiracy of silence(s) in Dorian Gray hence crystallizes the link between class/gender privilege (i.e., the Old Boys Network) and same-sex desires in Wilde's novel.

[18] Birken situates his study during the years between 1871 and 1914: the first date refers to the publication of The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex, where Charles Darwin "elaborated his theory of the genderless ancestry of mankind [*sic*]" (14); and, the second, to Sigmund Freud's "On Narcissism," a paper which "ratified the universalization of sex" (15).

[19] This subtitle modifies and evokes Steven Marcus's essay title, "Freud and Dora: Story, History, Case History."

[20] Attempts to pin down the actual source of the "yellow book" are varied and, at best, merely speculative. As I document above, Wilde's letter to Ralph Payne denies the material existence of "[t]he book that poisoned, or made perfect, Dorian Gray" (Letters 352). But, in another letter to a certain E. W. Pratt, Wilde

indirectly asserts that "[t]he book in Dorian Gray is one of the many books I have never written, but it is partly suggested by Huysmans's À Rebours, which you will get at any French bookseller's" (Letters 313). Wilde's reference to Joris-Karl Huysmans's À Rebours (1884) encourages Robert Baldick to note the probable influence of the French writer on Wilde's composition of Dorian Gray in his introduction to the English translation of Huysmans's novel, Against Nature (5). Gagnier, however, cautions against any simplistic and "erroneous" comparisons between Dorian Gray and Des Esseintes, the young hero in À Rebours (5).

[21] As I mention in Chapter Two, John Addington Symonds collaborated with Ellis in Sexual Inversion (see fn. 8). Yet Ellis eventually published Sexual Inversion without mentioning the efforts of John Addington Symonds in the documentation of the case histories. As such, I have not attributed Sexual Inversion to Symonds in this chapter. The subject of collaborative research recalls another psychological coupling of the fin-de-siècle. In Joseph Breuer's study of "Fräulein Anna O.," included in Studies on Hysteria (jointly compiled with Freud, from 1893 to 1895), he similarly remarks about the validity of Anna O.'s testimonies: "The question now arises how far the patient's statements are to be trusted and whether the occasions and mode of origin of the phenomena [of hysteria] were really as she represented them" (3: 98).

[22] Many of the dense descriptions in Chapter 11, however, are not attributable to Wilde. In her notes to the OUP edition of Dorian Gray, Isobel Murray carefully documents Wilde's deliberate plagiarism of (unacknowledged

borrowings from?) other works for the purpose of furnishing his descriptions of Dorian's various pursuits (232-34). Ellmann, too, notes that "Lord Henry is forever quoting, or misquoting, without acknowledgment, from Pater's Studies in the History of the Renaissance. Plagiarism is the worst of his [Lord Henry's] crimes. He brazenly takes over the best-known passages" (317). Wilde was no stranger to being publicly accused of plagiarism, considering his mutual and long-standing antagonism with James McNeill Whistler, the resident art expert at the Royal Academy. On 17 November 1886, Whistler had published (in the World) his letter to the Committee of the National Art Exhibition. In his letter, Whistler wonders:

> What has Oscar common with Art? except that he dines at our tables and picks from our platters the plums for the pudding he peddles in the provinces. Oscar — the amiable, irresponsible, esurient Oscar — with no more sense of a picture than of the fit of a coat, has the courage of the opinions — of others!
>
> (qtd. in Letters 191)

Four years later, Whistler again launched a public attack on Wilde, sending a letter to the editor of Truth (2 January 1890) which charged:

> Dear Truth, Among your ruthless exposures of the shams of today, nothing, I confess, have I enjoyed with keener relish than your late tilt at that arch impostor and pest of the period — the all pervading plagiarist!
>
> I learn, by the way, that in America he may, under the 'Law of

> '84,' as it is called, be criminally prosecuted, incarcerated, and made to pick oakum, as he has hitherto picked brains — and pockets!
>
> How is it that, in your list of culprits, you omitted that fattest of offenders — our own Oscar?
>
> (qtd. in Letters 253)

Wilde's immediate response to Whistler also appeared in Truth. True to his characteristically cunning manner, Wilde turns the table back on Whistler, admitting that "the only thoroughly original ideas I have ever heard [Mr Whistler] express have had reference to his own superiority over painters greater than himself" (Letters 254). Although my point is not to diminish the seriousness of Wilde's tendency to "borrow" from other works, I think that the manifold references in Dorian Gray — in particular, to Pater's doctrines — exhibit a rather (post-) modern sense of referentiality. As I note above (fn. 4), Pater himself had read a manuscript version of Dorian Gray before the magazine appearance of the story. Yet, in his review, Pater praises both the subtle *and* not-so-subtle Epicurianist elements in Dorian Gray. Unlike Whistler, then, Pater seems to have had a finer appreciation for artistic/textual referentiality.

[23] Dorian Gray, from the very start, hints at the centrality of absences and disappearances and their relation to temporality, a structuring thematic which is fully developed in Chapter 11. "In the centre of the room . . . st[ands] the full length portrait of a young man of extraordinary personal beauty," the narrator describes, "and in front of it, some little distance away, . . . sit[s] the artist himself,

Basil Hallward, whose sudden disappearance some years ago caused, at the time, such public excitement, and gave rise to so many strange conjectures" (1). Basil's eventual "disappearance" by the end of Wilde's novel thus recalls to mind the opening scene at the studio. On a similar note, the final scene in Dorian Gray offers an alternative translation of "end-pleasure" — namely, the inextricable and sensual relationship between eros and thanatos. "Eroticism is assenting to life up to the point of death," Georges Batailles rightly maintains (11). In this sense, then, the "bright" and "glisten[ing]" knife — the instrument which, simultaneously, restores life to the painting and ends Dorian's life — figures as a phallic signifier that aptly captures the homoerotic (and autoerotic) nuances of the murder/suicide scene (223). This reading remains problematic, however, not least because it confirms Morrison's critique of Freudian theories of sexuality that deprive the homosexual subject of a "narrative future" (67). For a similar argument in specific reference to Wilde's novel, see Jeff Nunokawa, "Homosexual Desire and the Effacement of the Self in The Picture of Dorian Gray."

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